Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-04

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (dnsop WG)
Last updated 2017-03-29 (latest revision 2017-02-17)
Replaced by draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
Formats
Expired & archived
plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream WG state Adopted by a WG
Document shepherd Tim Wicinski
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-04.txt

Abstract

This document describes the math behind the minimum time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before using a new DNSKEY to sign records when supporting the RFC5011 rollover strategies.

Authors

Wesley Hardaker (ietf@hardakers.net)
Warren Kumari (warren@kumari.net)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)