Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-04

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Last updated 2017-03-29 (latest revision 2017-02-17)
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dnsop                                                        W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft                                             Parsons, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                               W. Kumari
Expires: August 21, 2017                                          Google
                                                       February 17, 2017

             Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
           draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-04

Abstract

   This document describes the math behind the minimum time-length that
   a DNS zone publisher must wait before using a new DNSKEY to sign
   records when supporting the RFC5011 rollover strategies.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 21, 2017.

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   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Hardaker & Kumari        Expires August 21, 2017                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       RFC5011 Security Considerations       February 2017

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Timing associated with RFC5011 processing . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Denial of Service Attack Considerations . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Enumerated Attack Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       5.1.1.  Attack Timing Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Minimum RFC5011 Timing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   11. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Changes / Author Notes.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   RFC5011 [RFC5011] defines a mechanism by which DNSSEC validators can
   extend their list of trust anchors when they've seen a new key
   published in a zone.  However, RFC5011 [intentionally] provides no
   guidance to the publishers of DNSKEYs about how long they must wait
   before switching to the newly published key for signing records.
   Because of this lack of guidance, zone publishers may derive
   incorrect assumptions about safe usage of the RFC5011 DNSKEY
   advertising and rolling process.  This document describes the minimum
   security requirements from a publishers point of view and is intended
   to compliment the guidance offered in RFC5011 (which is written to
   provide timing guidance solely to the Validating Resolvers point of
   view).

   To verify this lack of understanding is wide-spread, the authors
   reached out to 5 DNSSEC experts to ask them how long they thought
   they must wait before using a new KSK that was being rolled according
   to the 5011 process.  All 5 experts answered with an insecure value,
   and thus we have determined that this lack of operational guidance is
   causing security concerns today.  We hope that this document will
   rectify this understanding and provide better guidance to zone
   publishers that wish to make use of the RFC5011 rollover process.
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