Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-04
| Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (dnsop WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Wes Hardaker , Warren "Ace" Kumari | ||
| Last updated | 2017-03-29 (Latest revision 2017-02-17) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
plain text
xml
htmlized
pdfized
bibtex
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| Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
| Document shepherd | Tim Wicinski | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> |
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-04.txt
Abstract
This document describes the math behind the minimum time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before using a new DNSKEY to sign records when supporting the RFC5011 rollover strategies.
Authors
Wes Hardaker
Warren "Ace" Kumari
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)