Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-00

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Last updated 2016-07-25
Replaced by draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations
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dnsop                                                        W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft                                             Parsons, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                               W. Kumari
Expires: January 26, 2017                                         Google
                                                           July 25, 2016

             Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
           draft-hardaker-rfc5011-security-considerations-00

Abstract

   This document describes the minimum requirements which a publisher of
   a zone must wait before using a new DNSKEY advertised using the
   RFC5011 DNSKEY rollover process.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 26, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Internet-Draft       RFC5011 Security Considerations           July 2016

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Timing associated with RFC5011 processing . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Denial of Service Attack Considerations . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     5.1.  Numerical Concrete Attack Example . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       5.1.1.  Attack Timing Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Operational
       Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Changes / Author Notes.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   RFC5011 [RFC5011] defines a mechanism by which DNSSEC validators can
   extend their list of trust anchors when they've seen a new key.
   However, RFC5011 [intentionally] provides no guidance to publishers
   of DNSKEYs about how long they must wait before such a new key is
   actually usable.  Because of this lack of guidance, DNSSEC publishers
   may derive incorrect assumptions about safe usage of the RFC5011
   process.  This document describes the minimum security requirements
   from a publishers point of view and is indented to compliment the
   guidance offered in RFC5011 (which is designed to solely represent
   the Validating Resolvers point of view).

   The authors reached out to 5 DNSSEC experts and asked them how long
   they must wait before using a new KSK that was being rolled according
   to the 5011 process.  All 5 experts answered with an insecure value,
   and thus the authors have determined that this lack of operational
   guidance is causing security concerns.  This document will hopefully
   help rectify this problem.

   One important (temporary?) note about ICANN's upcoming KSK rolling
   plan for the root zone: the timing values, at the time of this
   writing, chosen for rolling the KSK in the root zone appear
   completely safe, and are not in any way affected by the timing
   concerns introduced by this draft

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1.1.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
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