Design considerations for Metadata Insertion
draft-hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion-07

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual in sec area)
Last updated 2017-03-16 (latest revision 2017-03-03)
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Network Working Group                                          T. Hardie
Internet-Draft                                            March 03, 2017
Intended status: Informational
Expires: September 4, 2017

              Design considerations for Metadata Insertion
               draft-hardie-privsec-metadata-insertion-07

Abstract

   The IAB has published RFC7624 in response to several revelations of
   pervasive attack on Internet communications.  This document considers
   the implications of protocol designs which associate metadata with
   encrypted flows.  In particular, it asserts that designs which do so
   by explicit actions at the host are preferable to designs in which
   middleboxes insert them.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Design patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  Advice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Deployment considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   To minimize the risks associated with pervasive surveillance, it is
   necessary for the Internet technical community to address the
   vulnerabilities exploited in the attacks document in [RFC7258] and
   the threats described in [RFC7624].  The goal of this document is to
   address a common design pattern which emerges from the increase in
   encryption: explicit association of metadata which would previously
   have been inferred from the plaintext protocol.

2.  Terminology

   This document makes extensive use of standard security and privacy
   terminology; see [RFC4949] and [RFC6973].  Terms used from [RFC6973]
   include Eavesdropper, Observer, Initiator, Intermediary, Recipient,
   Attack (in a privacy context), Correlation, Fingerprint, Traffic
   Analysis, and Identifiability (and related terms).  In addition, we
   use terms that are specific to the attacks discussed in [RFC7624].
   Terms introduced terms from there include: Pervasive Attack, Passive
   Pervasive Attack, Active Pervasive Attack, Observation, Inference,
   and Collaborator.

3.  Design patterns

   One of the core mitigations for the loss of confidentiality in the
   presence of pervasive surveillance is data minimization, which limits
   the amount of data disclosed to those elements absolutely required to
   complete the relevant protocol exchange.  When data minimization is
   in effect, some information which was previously available may be
   removed from specific protocol exchanges.  The information may be

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