BGP IPSEC VPNs - A Solution Analysis
draft-hares-idr-bgp-ipsec-analysis-00

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IDR Working Group                                               S. Hares
Internet-Draft                                   Hickory Hill Consulting
Intended status: Informational                             July 14, 2020
Expires: January 15, 2021

                  BGP IPSEC VPNs - A Solution Analysis
                 draft-hares-idr-bgp-ipsec-analysis-00

Abstract

   This draft describes problems with IGP convergence time in some IPRAN
   networks that use a physical topology of grid backbones that connect
   rings of routers.  Part of these IPRAN network topologies exist in
   data centers with sufficient power and interconnections, but some
   network equipment sits in remote sites impacted by power loss.  In
   some geographic areas these remote sites may be subject to rolling
   blackouts.  These rolling power blackouts could cause multiple
   simultaneous node and link failures.  In these remote networks with
   blackouts, it is often critical that the IPRAN phone network re-
   converge quickly.

   The IGP running in these networks may run in a single level of the
   IGP.  This document seeks to briefly describe these problems to
   determine if the emerging IGP technologies (flexible algorithms,
   dynamic flooding, layers of hierarchy in IGPs) can be applied to help
   reduce convergence times.  It also seeks to determine if the
   improvements of these algorithms or the IP-Fast re-route algorithms
   are thwarted by the failure of multiple link and nodes.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 15, 2021.

Hares                   Expires January 15, 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             BGP-IPSEC-ANALYSIS                  July 2020

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  IPSEC deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  History of BGP passing Tunnel Endpoints . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.4.  Overview of proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.5.  Method of analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Security and Privacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.1.  Option 1 - Configuration Plus BGP Routes with Tunnel SA
           IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.2.  Option 2- BGP passes client routes with SA-ID plus NLRI
           passes underlay SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.3.  Option 3:  Secure EVPN (client routes + SA information) .  14
     2.4.  comparison of security issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   3.  Manageability and Scaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.1.  Configuration sizes - used for theoretical comparison . .  17
     3.2.  BGP Route sizes for theoretical comparison  . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.1.  Size of Tunnel encapsulation attribute with 1 SA per
               tunnel endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.2.  Size of Tunnel encapsulation attribute with 10 SAs
               per tunnel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.3.  Network Scenario 1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.4.  Network scenario 2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.5.  Scaling Memory sizes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   4.  Key differences between the options . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   5.  Processing of BGP routes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  Future Issues - SBGP and Secure IPSEC VPNs  . . . . . . . . .  19
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
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