Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Using Only a Password
draft-harkins-eap-pwd-prime-00

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EMU                                                           D. Harkins
Internet-Draft                                                       HPE
Intended status: Informational                             July 24, 2019
Expires: January 25, 2020

   Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Using Only a Password
                   draft-harkins-eap-pwd-prime-00.txt

Abstract

   Passwords are a popular form of credential for user authentication.
   EAP-pwd (RFC 5931) is a popular method of performing secure password
   authenticaiton.  EAP-pwd requires a secret element in a finite cyclic
   group, unfortunately the technique it uses to derive this secret is
   open to timing and cache attacks.  This improved version, EAP-pwd',
   uses a different technique to derive the secret element which is
   resistant to timing and cache attacks.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 25, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  EAP-pwd'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Secret Element Derivation for ECC . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Secret Element Derivation for FFC . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Fixing the Password Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   EAP-pwd is a popular EAP method due to the fact that it authenticates
   without requiring certificates.  Large federated networks sometimes
   have latency issues with numerous fragmented packets going between
   the EAP client and EAP server, a problem exacerbated by using EAP
   methods that require certificate-based authentication.  EAP-pwd
   obviates this.

   The technique used by EAP-pwd to obtain its secret element is
   susceptible to timing attacks and cache attacks that can partition
   the dictionary enough to successfully determine the password.  Recent
   work in the Crypto Forum Research Group on constant time techniques
   to hash a string into a point on an elliptic curve in constant time
   [2] provides an opportunity to address this.

2.  EAP-pwd'

   EAP-pwd' is an EAP method that follows the EAP-pwd specification
   ([3]) in all respects except for the following:

   o  It uses the Type code TBD-1, not 52 which is used by EAP-pwd.

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   o  It derives PWE/pwe as defined in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2 for
      ECC and FFC groups, respectively, using a different technique than
      the "hunting and pecking" loop defined in [3].

   o  it defines three new random functions using HKDF instantiated with
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