Public Key Exchange
draft-harkins-pkex-04
The information below is for an old version of the document |
Document |
Type |
|
Active Internet-Draft (individual)
|
|
Author |
|
Dan Harkins
|
|
Last updated |
|
2017-07-28
|
|
Stream |
|
(None)
|
|
Intended RFC status |
|
(None)
|
|
Formats |
|
pdf
htmlized (tools)
htmlized
bibtex
|
Stream |
Stream state |
|
(No stream defined) |
|
Consensus Boilerplate |
|
Unknown
|
|
RFC Editor Note |
|
(None)
|
IESG |
IESG state |
|
I-D Exists
|
|
Telechat date |
|
|
|
Responsible AD |
|
(None)
|
|
Send notices to |
|
(None)
|
Internet Research Task Force D. Harkins
Internet-Draft HP Enterprise
Intended status: Informational July 28, 2017
Expires: January 29, 2018
Public Key Exchange
draft-harkins-pkex-04
Abstract
This memo describes a password-authenticated protocol to allow two
devices to exchange "raw" (uncertified) public keys and establish
trust that the keys belong to their respective identities.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Harkins Expires January 29, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft PKEX July 2017
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Protocol Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Exchange Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Commit/Reveal Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Role-specific Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1. ECC Role-specific Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1.1. Role-specific Elements for NIST p256 . . . . . . . . 11
A.1.2. Role-specific Elements for NIST p384 . . . . . . . . 12
A.1.3. Role-specific Elements for NIST p521 . . . . . . . . 13
A.1.4. Role-specific Elements for brainpool p256r1 . . . . . 15
A.1.5. Role-specific Elements for brainpool p384r1 . . . . . 15
A.1.6. Role-specific Elements for brainpool p512r1 . . . . . 16
A.2. FFC Role-specific Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2.1. Role-specific Elements for 2048-bit FFC group . . . . 18
A.2.2. Role-specific Elements for 3072-bit FFC group . . . . 19
A.2.3. Role-specific Elements for 4096-bit FFC group . . . . 21
A.2.4. Role-specific Elements for 8192-bit FFC group . . . . 24
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction
Many authenticated key exchange protocols allow for authentication
using uncertified, or "raw", public keys. Usually these
specifications-- e.g. [RFC7250] for TLS and [RFC7670] for IKEv2--
assume keys are exchanged in some out-of-band mechanism.
[RFC7250] further states that "the main security challenge [to using
'raw' public keys] is how to associate the public key with a specific
entity. Without a secure binding between identifier and key, the
protocol will be vulnerable to man-in-the- middle attacks."
The Public Key Exchange (PKEX) is designed to fill that gap: it
establishs a secure binding between exchanged public keys and
identifiers, it provides proof-of-possession of the exchanged public
keys to each peer, and it enables the establishment of trust in
Show full document text