Secure Password Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
draft-harkins-tls-dragonfly-01

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Replaces draft-ietf-tls-pwd
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Transport Layer Security                                 D. Harkins, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                             HP Enterprise
Intended status: Informational                         February 28, 2017
Expires: September 1, 2017

    Secure Password Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                     draft-harkins-tls-dragonfly-01

Abstract

   This memo defines several new ciphersuites for the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) protocol to support certificate-less, secure
   authentication using only a simple, low-entropy, password.  The
   exchange is called TLS-PWD.  The ciphersuites are all based on an
   authentication and key exchange protocol, named "dragonfly", that is
   resistant to off-line dictionary attack.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 1, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Harkins                 Expires September 1, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                TLS Password                 February 2017

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  The Case for Certificate-less Authentication  . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Resistance to Dictionary Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Keyword Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Discrete Logarithm Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.1.  Elliptic Curve Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.2.  Finite Field Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Instantiating the Random Function . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.5.  Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Specification of the TLS-PWD Handshake  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Protecting the Username . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.1.  Construction of a Protected Username  . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.2.  Recovery of a Protected Username  . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.2.  Fixing the Password Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.2.1.  Computing an ECC Password Element . . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.2.2.  Computing an FFC Password Element . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.3.  Changes to Handshake Message Contents . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.3.1.  Client Hello Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       4.3.2.  Server Key Exchange Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
         4.3.2.1.  Generation of ServerKeyExchange . . . . . . . . .  19
         4.3.2.2.  Processing of ServerKeyExchange . . . . . . . . .  20
       4.3.3.  Client Key Exchange Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
         4.3.3.1.  Generation of Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . .  21
         4.3.3.2.  Processing of Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . .  22
     4.4.  Computing the Premaster Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   5.  Ciphersuite Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   9.  Human Rights Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   10. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
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