Requirements for CoAP End-To-End Security
draft-hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs-02

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CoRE Working Group                                           G. Selander
Internet-Draft                                              F. Palombini
Intended status: Informational                               Ericsson AB
Expires: July 10, 2017                                         K. Hartke
                                                 Universitaet Bremen TZI
                                                         January 6, 2017

               Requirements for CoAP End-To-End Security
                 draft-hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs-02

Abstract

   This document analyses threats to CoAP message exchanges traversing
   proxies and derives the security requirements for mitigating those
   threats.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 10, 2017.

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Selander, et al.          Expires July 10, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft  Requirements for CoAP End-To-End Security   January 2017

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Assets and Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Proxying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Threats and Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.1.  Client-side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
         2.1.1.1.  Threat 1: Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
         2.1.1.2.  Threat 2: Delaying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
         2.1.1.3.  Threat 3: Withholding . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
         2.1.1.4.  Threat 4: Flooding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
         2.1.1.5.  Threat 5: Eavesdropping . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
         2.1.1.6.  Threat 6: Traffic Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.1.2.  Server-side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
         2.1.2.1.  Threat 1: Spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
         2.1.2.2.  Threat 2: Delaying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
         2.1.2.3.  Threat 3: Withholding . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
         2.1.2.4.  Threat 4: Flooding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
         2.1.2.5.  Threat 5: Eavesdropping . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
         2.1.2.6.  Threat 6: Traffic Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.2.  Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.2.1.  Forwarding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
         2.2.1.1.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
         2.2.1.2.  Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
         2.2.1.3.  Processing Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
         2.2.1.4.  Authenticity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
         2.2.1.5.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       2.2.2.  Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
         2.2.2.1.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
         2.2.2.2.  Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
         2.2.2.3.  Processing Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
         2.2.2.4.  Authenticity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
         2.2.2.5.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   3.  Publish-Subscribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     3.1.  Threats and Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       3.1.1.  Subscriber-side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
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