EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding
draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind-00
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Sam Hartman , Margaret Cullen , Dacheng Zhang | ||
| Last updated | 2012-07-31 (Latest revision 2012-03-05) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server. EAP extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this information. [RFC 3748] is a facility that protects tunnel methods against man-in-the-middle attacks. However, cryptographic binding focuses on protecting the server rather than the peer. This memo explores attacks possible when the peer is not protected from man-in- the-middle attacks and recommends mutual cryptographic binding, a new form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server.
Authors
Sam Hartman
Margaret Cullen
Dacheng Zhang
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)