@techreport{harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode-04, number = {draft-harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode-04}, type = {Internet-Draft}, institution = {Internet Engineering Task Force}, publisher = {Internet Engineering Task Force}, note = {Work in Progress}, url = {https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode/04/}, author = {Joe Harvey and Burt Kaliski and Andrew Fregly and Swapneel Sheth}, title = {{Merkle Tree Ladder (MTL) Mode Signatures}}, pagetotal = 53, year = 2024, month = sep, day = 17, abstract = {This document provides an interoperable specification for Merkle tree ladder (MTL) mode, a technique for using an underlying signature scheme to authenticate an evolving series of messages. MTL mode can reduce the signature scheme's operational impact. Rather than signing messages individually, the MTL mode of operation signs structures called "Merkle tree ladders" that are derived from the messages to be authenticated. Individual messages are then authenticated relative to the ladder using a Merkle tree authentication path and the ladder is authenticated using the public key of the underlying signature scheme. The size and computational cost of the underlying signatures are thereby amortized across multiple messages, reducing the scheme's operational impact. The reduction can be particularly beneficial when MTL mode is applied to a post-quantum signature scheme that has a large signature size or computational cost. As an example, the document shows how to use MTL mode with the Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH- DSA) specified in the draft FIPS 205. Like other Merkle tree techniques, MTL mode's security is based only on cryptographic hash functions, so the mode is quantum-safe based on the quantum- resistance of its cryptographic hash functions.}, }