Deprecate Use of 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman Moduli in Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos
draft-harwood-krb-pkinit-dh-upsize-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Robbie Harwood | ||
| Last updated | 2022-02-07 (Latest revision 2021-08-06) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT) permits a client and a Kerberos Domain Controller (KDC) to use a Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange to derive an encryption key. The group with minimum modulus size permitted for this exchange is 1024 bits, which recent security research has shown to provide insufficient protection against organizations with sufficient computing resources, such as state-sponsored actors. This document updates RFC 4556 to increase the minimum group size to 2048 bits and define permitted groups of size larger than 4096-bits.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)