DDoS Mitigation Offload Use Case and DOTS Deployment Considerations
draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload-usecase-01

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Last updated 2019-07-04
Replaces draft-h-dots-mitigation-offload-expansion
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DOTS                                                          Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Informational                              K. Nishizuka
Expires: January 6, 2020                              NTT Communications
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                            July 5, 2019

  DDoS Mitigation Offload Use Case and DOTS Deployment Considerations
               draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload-usecase-01

Abstract

   This document describes a DDoS mitigation offload use case and DOTS
   deployment consideration of the use case.  This use case assumes that
   a DMS (DDoS Mitigation System) whose utilization rate is high sends
   its blocked traffic information to an orchestrator using DOTS
   protocols, then the orchestrator requests forwarding nodes such as
   routers to filter the traffic.  Doing so enables service providers to
   mitigate DDoS attack traffic automatically while ensuring
   interoperability and distributed filter enforcement.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Hayashi, et al.          Expires January 6, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             Mitigation Offload                  July 2019

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Use Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  DOTS Deployment Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  DOTS Signaling via Out-of-band Link . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       5.1.1.  Example of using Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  DOTS Signaling via In-band Link . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.2.1.  Example of using Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.2.2.  Example of using Signal Channel Call Home . . . . . .  11
       5.2.3.  Data Channel and Signal Channel Controlling Filtering  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Volume-based distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks such as DNS
   amplification attacks are critical threats to be handled by service
   providers.  When such attacks occur, service providers have to
   mitigate them immediately to protect or recover their services.

   Therefore, for the service providers to immediately protect their
   network services from DDoS attacks, DDoS mitigation needs to be
   automated.  To automate DDoS attack mitigation, it is desirable that
   multi-vendor elements involved in DDoS attack detection and
   mitigation collaborate and support standard interfaces to
   communicate.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a set of protocols for real-time
   signaling, threat-handling requests, and data between the multi-
   vendor elements [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-call-home]
   [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-filter-control] [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].
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