DDoS Mitigation Offload: DOTS Applicability and Deployment Considerations
draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload-00

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Last updated 2019-07-21
Replaces draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload-usecase
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DOTS                                                          Y. Hayashi
Internet-Draft                                                       NTT
Intended status: Informational                              K. Nishizuka
Expires: January 21, 2020                             NTT Communications
                                                            M. Boucadair
                                                                  Orange
                                                           July 20, 2019

       DDoS Mitigation Offload: DOTS Applicability and Deployment
                             Considerations
                   draft-hayashi-dots-dms-offload-00

Abstract

   This document describes a deployment scenario to assess the
   applicability of DOTS protocols together with a discussion on DOTS
   deployment considerations of such scenario.  This scenario assumes
   that a DMS (DDoS Mitigation System) whose utilization rate is high
   sends its blocked traffic information to an orchestrator using DOTS
   protocols, then the orchestrator requests forwarding nodes such as
   routers to filter the traffic.  Doing so enables service providers to
   mitigate the DDoS attack traffic automatically while ensuring
   interoperability and distributed filter enforcement.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Hayashi, et al.         Expires January 21, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             Mitigation Offload                  July 2019

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  DDoS Mitigation Offload Scenario  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  DOTS Deployment Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  DOTS Signaling via Out-of-band Link . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       5.1.1.  Example of using Data Channel . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  DOTS Signaling via In-band Link . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       5.2.1.  Example of using Signal Channel . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       5.2.2.  Example of using Signal Channel Call Home . . . . . .  12
       5.2.3.  Data Channel and Signal Channel Controlling Filtering  14
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   Volume-based distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks such as DNS
   amplification attacks are critical threats to be handled by service
   providers.  When such attacks occur, service providers have to
   mitigate them immediately to protect or recover their services.

   Therefore, for the service providers to immediately protect their
   network services from DDoS attacks, DDoS mitigation needs to be
   automated.  To automate DDoS attack mitigation, it is desirable that
   multi-vendor elements involved in DDoS attack detection and
   mitigation collaborate and support standard interfaces to
   communicate.

   DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is a set of protocols for real-time
   signaling, threat-handling requests, and data filtering between the
   multi-vendor elements [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]
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