Randomized and Changing MAC Address Framework
draft-henry-madinas-framework-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Jerome Henry  , Yiu Lee 
Last updated 2021-04-10
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Internet Engineering Task Force                                 J. Henry
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Informational                                    Y. Lee
Expires: 12 October 2021                                         Comcast
                                                           10 April 2021

             Randomized and Changing MAC Address Framework
                  draft-henry-madinas-framework-01

Abstract

   To limit the association between a device traffic and its user,
   client vendors have started implementing MAC address rotation.  When
   such rotation happens, some in-network states may break, which may
   affect network efficiency and the user experience.  At the same time,
   devices may continue sending other stable identifiers, defeating the
   MAC rotation purposes.  This document lists various network
   environements and a set of network services that may be affected by
   such rotation.  This docuemnt then examines settings where the user
   experience may be affected by in-network state disruption, and
   settings where other machine identifiers may expose the user privacy.
   Last, this document examines solutions to maintain user privacy while
   preserving user quality of experience and network operation
   efficiency.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 October 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Henry & Lee              Expires 12 October 2021                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                RCM Framework                   April 2021

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  MAC Adress as an Identity: User vs. Device  . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Actors: Network Functional Entities and Human Entities  .   6
     3.1.  Network Functional Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Human-related Entities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  The Trust and the Environments  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  The Purpose of Device Identification and Associated
           Problems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.5.  Scenario Mapping Table  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.6.  Problem Statment Formulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Appendix A.  Existing Solutions Directions  . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

   It has become easier for attackers to track the activity of a
   personal device, particularly when traffic is sent over a wireless
   link.  Once the association between a device and its user is made,
   identifying the device and its activity is sufficient to deduce
   information about what the user is doing, without the user consent.

   To reduce the risks of correlation between a device activity and its
   owner, multiple vendors have started to implement Randomized and
   Changing MAC addresses (RCM).  With this scheme, an end-device
   implements a different RCM over time when exchanging traffic over a
   wireless network.  By randomizing the MAC address, the association
   between a given traffic flow and a single device is made more
   difficult, assuming no other visible unique identifiers are in use.
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