The With-MAC key-wrapping algorithm for Cryptographic Message Syntax
draft-herzog-withmac-keywrap-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Herzog , Roger Khazan | ||
| Last updated | 2013-03-11 (Latest revision 2012-08-27) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes a new key-wrapping algorithm to be used in the EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData structures of the Cryptographic Message Syntax. Because these structures do not provide data-origin authentication, a recipient cannot cryptographically verify that the plaintext received was the plaintext encapsulated by the message's original sender. The With- MAC key-wrapping algorithm allows an EncryptedKey value to hold both a wrapped symmetric key and a MAC value on the data to be authenticated. When used in EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData structures, therefore, these structures can achieve data-origin authentication (in some circumstances) using only symmetric-key algorithms. This is useful in cases where the structures must be generated by entities without certified digital- signature keys.
Authors
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