Teredo Security Concerns Beyond What Is In RFC 4380
draft-hoagland-v6ops-teredosecconcerns-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Suresh Krishnan , James Hoagland | ||
| Last updated | 2007-07-12 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Additional security concerns with Teredo are documented, beyond what is in RFC 4380. This is based on an independent analysis of Teredo's security implications. The primary intent of this document is to provide information and recommendations to the IETF that can be used in any updated Teredo specification. The second intended audience is anyone that can help improve security in Teredo as deployed, so they will be aware of these concerns.
Authors
Suresh Krishnan
James Hoagland
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)