Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
draft-hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jun Hu , Yasufumi Morioka | ||
| Last updated | 2024-08-27 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
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| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
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draft-hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth-00
ipsecme H. Jun
Internet-Draft Nokia
Intended status: Standards Track Y. Morioka
Expires: 28 February 2025 NTT DOCOMO, INC.
27 August 2024
Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Authentication in the Internet
Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
draft-hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth-00
Abstract
One IPsec area that would be impacted by Cryptographically Relevant
Quantum Computer (CRQC) is IKEv2 authentication based on classic
asymmetric cryptograph algorithms: e.g RSA, ECDSA; which are widely
deployed authentication options of IKEv2. There are new Post-Quantum
Cryptograph (PQC) algorithms for digital signature like NIST
[ML-DSA], however it takes time for new cryptograph algorithms to
mature, so there is security risk to use only the new algorithm
before it is field proven. This document describes a IKEv2 hybrid
authentication scheme that could contain both classic and PQC
algorithms, so that authentication is secure as long as one algorithm
in the hybrid scheme is secure.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://example.com/LATEST. Status information for this document may
be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hu-ipsecme-pqt-
hybrid-auth/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the WG Working Group
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Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. IKEv2 Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Announcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. AUTH Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. RelatedCertificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Certificate with Composite Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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1. Introduction
A Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) could break
classic asymmetric cryptograph algorithms: e.g RSA, ECDSA; which are
widely deployed authentication options of IKEv2. New Post-Quantum
Cryptograph (PQC) algorithms for digital signature are being
standardized at the time of writing like NIST [ML-DSA], however
consider potential flaws in the new algorithm's specifications and
implementations, it will take time for these new PQC algorithms to be
field proven. So it is risky to only use PQC algorithms before they
are mature. There is more detailed discussion on motivation of a
hybrid approach for authentication in Section 1.3 of
[I-D.ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums].
This document describes a IKEv2 hybrid authentication scheme that
contains both classic and PQC algorithms, so that authentication is
secure as long as one algorithm in the hybrid scheme is secure.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC): A quantum
computer that is capable of breaking real world cryptographic
systems.
Post-Quantum Cryptograph (PQC) algorithms: Asymmetric cryptograph
algorithms are thought to be secure against CRQC.
Traditional Cryptograph algorithms: Existing asymmetric cryptograph
algorithms could be broken by CRQC, like RSA, ECDSA ..etc.
3. IKEv2 Key Exchange
There is no changes introduced in this document to the IKEv2 key
exchange process, although it MUST be also resilient to CRQC when
using along with the PQ/T hybrid authentication, for example key
exchange using the PPK as defined in [RFC8784], or hybrid key
exchanges that include PQC algorithm via multiple key exchange
process as defined in [RFC9370].
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4. Exchanges
The hybrid authentication exchanges is illustrated in an example
depicted in Figure 1, the key exchange uses PPK, however it could be
other key exchanges that involves PQC algorithm since how key
exchange is done is transparent to authentication.
Initiator Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
N(SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS), N(USE_PPK) -->
<-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ,] N(USE_PPK),
N(SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS),
N(SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS)
HDR, SK {IDi, CERT+, [CERTREQ,]
[IDr,] AUTH, SAi2,
TSi, TSr, N(PPK_IDENTITY, PPK_ID),
N(SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS)} -->
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, CERT+, [CERTREQ,]
AUTH, [N(PPK_IDENTITY)]}
Figure 1: Hybrid Authentication Exchanges with RFC8784 Key Exchange
4.1. Announcement
Both peers includes SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS as defined in Section 4
of [RFC7427] notification in IKE_SA_INIT exchange to indicate
supported hash algorithms used with digital signature.
Responder includes SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS as defined in [RFC9593]
notification include a list of supported authentication methods
announcements includes a hybrid authentication announcements with
following format:
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Length (>3) | Auth Method | Cert Link 1 | Alg 1 Len |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ AlgorithmIdentifier 1 ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert Link 2 | Alg 2 Len | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| |
~ AlgorithmIdentifier 2 ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ ... ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert Link N | Alg N Len | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
| |
~ AlgorithmIdentifier N ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Hybrid Authentication Announcement
The announcement include a list algorithms could be used for hybrid
signature
* Auth Method: A new value to be allocated by IANA
* Cert Link N: Links corresponding signature algorithm N with a
particular CA. as defined in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC9593]
* AlgorithmIdentifier N: The variable-length ASN.1 object that is
encoded using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690] and
identifies the signature algorithm;
Receiver of this announcement could choose one PQC algorithm and one
traditional algorithm from the list to create the hybrid signature.
Initiator also includes SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification in
IKE_AUTH request message to announce its support of hybrid
authentication.
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4.2. AUTH Payload
The IKEv2 AUTH payload has following format as defined in Section 3.8
of [RFC7296]:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Method | RESERVED |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Authentication Data ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: AUTH payload
For hybrid authentication, the AUTH Method has value defined in
Section 4.1
The Authentication Data field follows format defined in Section 3 of
[RFC7427]:
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ASN.1 Length | AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 object |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 object continuing ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Signature Value ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Authentication Data in hybrid AUTH payload
The Signature Value is created via following procedure:
1. Choose a hash algorithm H from peer's SIGNATURE_HASH_ALGORITHMS,
a PQC algorithm Sig1 and a traditional algorithm Sig2 from peer's
hybrid authentication method announcement;
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2. Follow the procedure defined in Section 4.2 of
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs], where the domain separator is
the value in Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]
correspond to the combination of Sig1, Sig2 and H.
The domain separator is also used as AlgorithmIdentifier in the
Authentication Data.
The corresponding certificates of Sig1 and Sig2 MUST be put in the
first and second CERT payload, in the order, of the message;
4.3. RelatedCertificate
The signing certificate MAY contain RelatedCertificate extension,
then the receiver SHOULD verify the extension according to
Section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth], failed
verification SHOULD fail authentication.
4.4. Certificate with Composite Keys
So far, this document assumes the signing certificate contains a key
of single algorithm, however there might be certificate with
composite key as define in [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs], in
such case, AUTH payload is created with same procedure in
Section 4.2:
* Sig1 and Sig2 are specified by the signing certificate
Supported composite signature algorithms are announced via
SUPPORTED_AUTH_METHODS notification with 3-Octet announcement as
defined in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC9593].
5. Security Considerations
The security of general PQ/T hybrid authentication is discussed in
[I-D.ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums].
This document uses mechanisms defined in [RFC7427] and [RFC9593], the
security discussion in the corresponding RFCs also apply.
6. IANA Considerations
This document requests a value in "IKEv2 Authentication Method"
subregistry under IANA "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
Parameters" registry
7. References
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7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth]
Becker, A., Guthrie, R., and M. J. Jenkins, "Related
Certificates for Use in Multiple Authentications within a
Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-05, 29 April 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
cert-binding-for-multi-auth-05>.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]
Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., Klaußner, J., and S.
Fluhrer, "Composite ML-DSA for use in Internet PKI", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-pq-
composite-sigs-02, 8 July 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
pq-composite-sigs-02>.
[I-D.ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums]
Bindel, N., Hale, B., Connolly, D., and F. D, "Hybrid
signature spectrums", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums-00, 24 May
2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums-00>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4739] Eronen, P. and J. Korhonen, "Multiple Authentication
Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4739, DOI 10.17487/RFC4739, November 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4739>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7296>.
[RFC7427] Kivinen, T. and J. Snyder, "Signature Authentication in
the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 7427,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7427, January 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7427>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
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[RFC9593] Smyslov, V., "Announcing Supported Authentication Methods
in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 9593, DOI 10.17487/RFC9593, July 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9593>.
[X.690] "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021 (E), ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, February 2021.
7.2. Informative References
[ML-DSA] "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", NIST
FIPS-204, State Initial Public Draft, August 2023,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/ipd>.
[QRPKI] Bindel, N., Herath, U., McKague, M., and D. Stebila,
"Transitioning to a Quantum-Resistant Public Key
Infrastructure", 2017, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/460>.
[RFC8784] Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P., McGrew, D., and V. Smyslov,
"Mixing Preshared Keys in the Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) for Post-quantum Security",
RFC 8784, DOI 10.17487/RFC8784, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8784>.
[RFC9370] Tjhai, CJ., Tomlinson, M., Bartlett, G., Fluhrer, S., Van
Geest, D., Garcia-Morchon, O., and V. Smyslov, "Multiple
Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 9370, DOI 10.17487/RFC9370, May
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9370>.
Acknowledgments
TODO acknowledge.
Authors' Addresses
Hu, Jun
Nokia
United States of America
Email: jun.hu@nokia.com
Yasufumi Morioka
NTT DOCOMO, INC.
Japan
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Email: yasufumi.morioka.dt@nttdocomo.com
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