Collision Free Keytags for DNSSEC
draft-huque-dnsop-keytags-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Mark P. Andrews , Shumon Huque , Yorgos Thessalonikefs | ||
| Last updated | 2025-09-03 (Latest revision 2025-03-02) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
DNSSEC employs a Key Tag field in the RRSIG and DS resource records in order to efficiently identify the key that produced a DNSSEC signature and the key that should be used as a secure entry point into a delegated zone. The Key Tag was not intended to be a unique identifier. Key tag collisions can occur in practice for keys in the same zone, though they are relatively rare in normal operation. Colliding key tags impose additional work on a validating resolver because it then has to check signatures for each of the candidate set of keys identified by the Key Tag. Furthermore, they open up resolvers to computational denial of service attacks by adversaries deploying specially crafted zones with many intentionally colliding key tags. This document specifies updates to the DNSSEC protocol and the process of key generation to avoid colliding key tags.
Authors
Mark P. Andrews
Shumon Huque
Yorgos Thessalonikefs
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)