Multi Provider DNSSEC models
draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-02

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-03-19
Replaced by draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Internet Engineering Task Force                                 S. Huque
Internet-Draft                                                   P. Aras
Intended status: Informational                                Salesforce
Expires: September 20, 2018                                 J. Dickinson
                                                                 Sinodun
                                                               J. Vcelak
                                                                     NS1
                                                          March 19, 2018

                      Multi Provider DNSSEC models
               draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-02

Abstract

   Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
   to distribute their authoritative DNS service.  Deploying DNSSEC in
   such an environment can have some challenges depending on the
   configuration and feature set in use.  This document will present
   several deployment models that may be suitable.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Huque, et al.          Expires September 20, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        Multi Provider DNSSEC models            March 2018

   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     2.1.  Serve Only model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Sign and Serve model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.2.1.  Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider  . . . .   4
       2.2.2.  Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider  . . . . . .   4
       2.2.3.  Model 3: Shared KSK/ZSK Signing Keys  . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Inline Signing model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Hybrid model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Signing Algorithm Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Validating Resolver Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Key Rollover Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction and Motivation

   RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING:
   The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub at: https://
   github.com/shuque/multi-provider-dnssec

   Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
   to distribute their authoritative DNS service.  Two providers are
   fairly typical and this allows the DNS service to survive a complete
   failure of any single provider.  This document outlines some possible
   models of DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] deployment in such an
   environment.

2.  Deployment Models

   The two main models discussed are (1) where the zone owner runs a
   master signing server and essentially treats the managed DNS
   providers as secondary servers, the "Serve Only" model, and (2) where
   the managed DNS providers each act like primary servers, signing data
   received from the zone owner and serving it out to DNS queriers, the
   "Sign and Serve" model.  Inline signing and hybrid models are also
Show full document text