A Sentinel for Detecting Trusted Keys in DNSSEC
draft-huston-kskroll-sentinel-04
| Document | Type | Replaced Internet-Draft (dnsop WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2017-12-10 (latest revision 2017-11-13) | ||
| Replaced by | RFC 8509 | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats |
Expired & archived
pdf
htmlized (tools)
htmlized
bibtex
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| Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
| Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-huston-kskroll-sentinel-04.txt
Abstract
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital signatures. These digital signatures can be verified by building a chain of trust starting from a trust anchor and proceeding down to a particular node in the DNS. This document specifies a mechanism that will allow an end user to determine the trusted key state of the resolvers that handle the user's DNS queries.
Authors
Geoff Huston
(gih@apnic.net)
Joao Damas
(joao@apnic.net)
Warren Kumari
(warren@kumari.net)
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)