Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers-04
The information below is for an old version of the document | |||
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Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (6man WG) | |
Author | Fernando Gont | ||
Last updated | 2013-04-16 (latest revision 2013-03-22) | ||
Replaces | draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
Formats | pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Bob Hinden | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2012-12-10) | ||
IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed | |
Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date |
Needs a YES. Needs 9 more YES or NO OBJECTION positions to pass. |
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Responsible AD | Brian Haberman | ||
Send notices to | 6man-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers@tools.ietf.org | ||
IANA | IANA review state | IANA - Review Needed |
IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) F. Gont Internet-Draft SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Updates: 3971, 4861 (if approved) March 22, 2013 Intended status: Standards Track Expires: September 23, 2013 Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers-04 Abstract This document analyzes the security implications of employing IPv6 fragmentation with Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages. It updates RFC 4861 such that use of the IPv6 Fragmentation Header is forbidden in all Neighbor Discovery messages, thus allowing for simple and effective counter-measures for Neighbor Discovery attacks. Finally, it discusses the security implications of using IPv6 fragmentation with SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), and formally updates RFC 3971 to provide advice regarding how the aforementioned security implications can be prevented. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2013. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents Gont Expires September 23, 2013 [Page 1] Internet-Draft ND and IPv6 Fragmentation March 2013 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Traditional Neighbor Discovery and IPv6 Fragmentation . . . . 5 3. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) and IPv6 Fragmentation . . . 6 4. Rationale for Forbidding IPv6 Fragmentation in Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Operational Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Gont Expires September 23, 2013 [Page 2] Internet-Draft ND and IPv6 Fragmentation March 2013 1. Introduction The Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is specified in RFC 4861 [RFC4861]. It is used by both hosts and routers. Its functions include Neighbor Discovery (ND), Router Discovery (RD), Address Autoconfiguration, Address Resolution, Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD), Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), and Redirection. Many of the possible attacks against the Neighbor Discovery Protocol are discussed in detail in [RFC3756]. In order to mitigate the aforementioned possible attacks, the SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) was standardized. SEND employs a number of mechanisms to certify the origin of Neighbor Discovery packets and the authority of routers, and to protect Neighbor Discovery packets from being the subject of modification or replay attacks. However, a number of factors, such as the use of trust anchors and the unavailability of SEND implementations for many widely-deployed operating systems, make SEND hard to deploy [Gont-DEEPSEC2011]. Thus, in many general scenarios it may be necessary and/or convenient to use other mitigation techniques for NDP-based attacks. The following mitigations are currently available for NDP attacks:Show full document text