A method for Generating Stable Privacy-Enhanced Addresses with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)
draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-10

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (6man WG)
Last updated 2013-06-12
Replaces draft-gont-6man-stable-privacy-addresses
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IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man)                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                    SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Intended status: Standards Track                           June 12, 2013
Expires: December 14, 2013

  A method for Generating Stable Privacy-Enhanced Addresses with IPv6
              Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)
              draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-10

Abstract

   This document specifies a method for generating IPv6 Interface
   Identifiers to be used with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
   (SLAAC), such that addresses configured using this method are stable
   within each subnet, but the Interface Identifier changes when hosts
   move from one network to another.  This method is meant to be an
   alternative to generating Interface Identifiers based on hardware
   address (e.g., using IEEE identifiers), such that the benefits of
   stable addresses can be achieved without sacrificing the privacy of
   users.  The method specified in this document applies to all prefixes
   a host may be employing, including link-local, global, and unique-
   local addresses.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 14, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Gont                    Expires December 14, 2013               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          Stable Privacy Addresses               June 2013

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Design goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  Algorithm specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Resolving Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) conflicts  . . . . 13
   5.  Specified Constants  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   Appendix A.  Possible sources for the Net_Iface parameter  . . . . 22
     A.1.  Interface Index  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     A.2.  Interface Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     A.3.  Link-layer Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     A.4.  Logical Network Service Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Appendix B.  Security/privacy issues with traditional SLAAC
                addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     B.1.  Correlation of node activities within the same network . . 24
     B.2.  Correlation of node activities across networks (host
           tracking)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     B.3.  Address-scanning attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     B.4.  Exploitation of device-specific information  . . . . . . . 25
   Appendix C.  Privacy issues still present when temporary
                addresses are employed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     C.1.  Host tracking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       C.1.1.  Tracking hosts across networks #1  . . . . . . . . . . 26
       C.1.2.  Tracking hosts across networks #2  . . . . . . . . . . 27
       C.1.3.  Revealing the identity of devices performing
               server-like functions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     C.2.  Address-scanning attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     C.3.  Information Leakage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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