Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-00

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (6tisch WG)
Last updated 2016-12-14
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6TiSCH                                                   M. Vucinic, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     Inria
Intended status: Standards Track                                J. Simon
Expires: June 17, 2017                                 Linear Technology
                                                               K. Pister
                                       University of California Berkeley
                                                       December 14, 2016

                 Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
                 draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-00

Abstract

   This draft describes the minimal mechanisms required to support
   secure initial configuration in a device being added to a 6TiSCH
   network.  The goal of this configuration is to set link-layer keys,
   and to establish a secure session between each joining node and the
   JCE who may use that to further configure the joining device.
   Additional security behaviors and mechanisms may be added on top of
   this minimal framework.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 17, 2017.

Vucinic, et al.           Expires June 17, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           6tisch-minimal-security           December 2016

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Join Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Step 3 - Security Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.3.1.  Pre-Shared Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.3.2.  Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Step 4 - Join Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.5.  Step 5 - Join Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Protocol Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Proxy Operation of JA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.1.  Implementation of origin_info . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  OSCOAP Security Context Instantiation . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Implementation of Join Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Implementation of Join Response . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Link-layer requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Well-known beacon authentication key  . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Private beacon authentication key . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     11.3.  External Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Appendix A.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
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