A RADIUS Attribute, Binding and Profiles for SAML
draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml-03
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draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml-03
ABFAB J. Howlett
Internet-Draft Janet
Intended status: Informational S. Hartman
Expires: September 13, 2012 Painless Security
March 12, 2012
A RADIUS Attribute, Binding and Profiles for SAML
draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml-03
Abstract
This document specifies a RADIUS attribute, a binding and two
profiles for the Security Assertion Mark-up Language (SAML). The
attribute provides RADIUS encapsulation of SAML protocol messages,
while the binding describes the transport of this attribute, and the
SAML protocol messages within, using RADIUS. The profiles describe
the application of this binding for Abfab authentication and
assertion query/request. The SAML RADIUS attribute and binding are
defined generically to permit application in other scenarios, such as
network access.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 13, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. RADIUS SAML-Message Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. SAML RADIUS Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Required Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. Metadata Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Abfab Authentication Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Required Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Profile Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Profile Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3.1. User Agent Request to Relying Party . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3.2. Relying Party Issues <samlp:AuthnRequest> to
Identity Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.3.3. Identity Provider Identifies Principal . . . . . . . . 10
5.3.4. Identity Provider Issues <samlp:Response> to
Relying Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3.5. Relying Party Grants or Denies Access to Principal . . 10
5.4. Use of Authentication Request Protocol . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4.1. <samlp:AuthnRequest> Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4.2. <samlp:Response message> Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4.3. samlp:Response Message Processing Rules . . . . . . . 12
5.4.4. Unsolicited Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4.5. Use of the SAML RADIUS Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4.6. Metadata Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Abfab Assertion Query/Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction
The SAML RADIUS attribute, binding and profiles are motivated by the
requirements of the Abfab architecture [I-D.lear-abfab-arch]. In
this architecture, it is often desirable to convey Security Assertion
Mark-up Language (SAML) protocol messages between a SAML requester
and SAML responder; for example, to allow a Relying Party to obtain a
SAML assertion containing attributes that describe a principal.
SAML [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] defines a number of SAML protocol
messages that are used for a range of different purposes
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]. These messages are derived from common
request and reponse abstract types. These request and response
protocol messages can be exchanged using a variety of underlying
transport protocols, such as HTTP. In the SAML model, the means by
which a SAML protocol message exchange is framed over an underlying
transport protocol is known as a SAML 'binding'. SAML already
defines [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os] a number of mainly HTTP-based
bindings; these principally use HTTP as the underlying transport
protocol, generally for use with the SAML Web Browser Single Sign-On
Profile [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os].
However, the goal of Abfab is to extend the applicability of
federated identity beyond the Web to other application protocols by
building on the AAA framework. Consequently here exists a
requirement for an AAA-based binding, that is functionally equivalent
to the existing bindings, that uses the RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter
[RFC3588] protocols, rather than HTTP. This document defines a new
RADIUS-based SAML binding, building on a SAML RADIUS attribute also
defined by this document. A companion specification
[I-D.jones-diameter-abfab] defines equivalent funtionality for
Diameter.
This attribute and binding are likely to be useful for purposes
besides Abfab; an example of one potential application is SAML-based
authorisation for network access. The attribute and binding are
therefore defined generically to facilitate general applicability.
Nonetheless it is useful to also define how the SAML RADIUS binding
should be used for Abfab-specific purposes to facilitate
interoperability. This document therefore also define two profiles
of this binding to support authentication and assertion request.
To summarise, this document specifies:
o A SAML RADIUS attribute that defines how to encapsulate a SAML
protocol message within a RADIUS attribute.
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o A SAML RADIUS binding that defines how SAML requesters and
responders can exchange SAML protocol messages.
o The Abfab Authentication Profile that defines how the SAML RADIUS
binding is used to effect SAML-based authentication and
authorisation within the Abfab architecture.
o The Abfab Assertion Request Profile that defines how the SAML
RADIUS binding is used to effect SAML-based assertion request
within the Abfab architecture.
The RADIUS SAML binding and profile specifications aspire to adhere
to the guidelines stipulated by [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os] and
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] respectively. To this end, the binding
and profiles provide a 'Required Information' section that
enumerates:
o A URI that uniquely identifies the protocol binding or profile
o Postal or electronic contact information for the author
o A reference to previously defined bindings or profiles that the
new binding updates or obsoletes.
o In the case of a profile, any SAML confirmation method identifiers
defined and/or utilized by the profile.
2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. RADIUS SAML-Message Attribute
This attribute contains a SAML [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] protocol
message. Where multiple SAML-Message attributes are included in a
RADIUS message, the Message fields of these attributes are to be
concatenated to form a single SAML message.
A summary of the SAML-Message format is shown below. The fields are
transmitted from left to right.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | SAML Message...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1
Type: TBD
Length: >=3
Message: The Message field is one or more octets containing a SAML
message. If larger than a single attribute, the SAML message data
MUST be split on 253-octet boundaries over as many attributes as
necessary. The SAML message is reconstructed by concatenating the
contents of all SAML-Message attributes.
TODO: request a new RADIUS attribute
4. SAML RADIUS Binding
The SAML RADIUS binding defines how RADIUS [RFC2865] can be used to
enable a RADIUS client and server to exchange SAML protocol messages.
4.1. Required Information
Identification: TBD
Contact information: TBD
Updates: None.
4.2. Operation
RADIUS can be used over multiple underlying transports; this binding
calls out the use of RADIUS over UDP as REQUIRED. It is RECOMMENDED
that the RADIUS exchange is protected using TLS encryption for RADIUS
[I-D.ietf-radext-radsec] to provide confidentiality and improve
integrity protection. It is also RECOMMENDED that RADIUS packet
fragmentation [I-D.perez-radext-radius-fragmentation] is used to
permit transport of large SAML messages.
The system model used for SAML conversations over RADIUS is a simple
request-response model, using the RADIUS SAML-Message attribute
defined in Section 3 to encapsulate the SAML protocol messages.
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1. The RADIUS client, acting as a SAML requester, transmits a SAML
request element within a RADIUS Access-Request message. This
message MUST include a single instance of the RADIUS User-Name
attribute whose value MUST conform to the Network Access
Identifier [RFC4282] scheme. The NAI SHOULD be used to route the
message towards the SAML responder, which MAY be more than one
RADIUS hop distant. The SAML requester MUST NOT include more
than one SAML request element.
2. The RADIUS server, acting as a SAML responder, MAY return a SAML
protocol message within a RADIUS Access-Accept or Access-Reject
message. The SAML responder MUST NOT include more than one SAML
response. A SAML responder that refuses to perform a message
exchange with the SAML requester MUST silently discard the SAML
request.
A SAML responder MAY also return an unsolicited responser (a SAML
response generated and emitted in the absence of a request from a
SAML requester).
This binding is intended to be composed with any use of RADIUS, such
as network access. Therefore, other arbitrary RADIUS attributes MAY
be used in either the request of response.
In the case of a SAML processing error and successful authentication,
the RADIUS server SHOULD include a SAML-specified <samlp:Status>
element in the SAML response that is transported within the Access-
Accept packet sent by the RADIUS server.
In the case of a SAML processing error and failed authentication, the
RADIUS server MAY include a SAML-specified <samlp:Status> element in
the SAML response that is transported within the Access-Reject packet
sent by the RADIUS server.
4.2.1. Metadata Considerations
There are no metadata considerations particular to this binding.
5. Abfab Authentication Profile
In the scenario supported by the Abfab Authentication Profile, a
Principal controlling a User Agent requests access to a Relying
Party. The User Agent and Relying Party use the GSS EAP mechanism to
authenticate the Principal. The Relying Party, acting as an EAP
pass-through authenticator, acts as a conduit for the EAP frames
emitted by the User Agent and an EAP server which acts as the
Principal's Identity Provider. If the Identity Provider successfully
authenticates the Principal, it produces an authentication assertion
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which is consumed by the Relying Party. During this process, a name
identifier might also be established between the Relying Party and
the Identity Provider.
5.1. Required Information
Identification: TBD
Contact information: TBD
SAML Confirmation Method Identifiers: The SAML V2.0 "sender vouches"
confirmation method identifier,
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:sender-vouches, is used by this
profile.
Updates: None.
5.2. Profile Overview
To implement this scenario, a profile of the SAML Authentication
Request protocol is used in conjuction with the SAML RADIUS binding
defined in Section 4 and the GSS EAP mechanism
[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap].
This profile is based on the SAML Web Browser Single Sign-On Profile
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]. There are some important differences
between these profiles; specifically:
o Authentication. This profile specifically calls out the use of a
particular authentication framework (although not a particular
authentication mechanism). This is necessary so that the profile
is able to build on the AAA and GSS frameworks.
o Bindings. This profile does not use any HTTP-based bindings;
instead, all SAML protocol messages are transported using the SAML
RADIUS binding defined in Section 4. This is intended to minimize
the number of bindings that interoperable implementations must
support.
o Requests. The profile does not permit the Relying Party to name
the <saml:Subject> of the <samlp:AuthnRequest>. This is intended
to simplify the business logic of interoperable implementations.
o Responses. The profile only permits the Identity Provider to
return a single assertion that must contain exactly one
authentication statement. Other statements may be included within
this assertion at the disgression of the Identity Provider. This
is intended to simplify the business logic of interoperable
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implementations.
Figure 1 below illustrates the flow of messages within this profile.
User Agent Relying Party Identity Provider
| | |
| (1) | |
| - - - - - - - - - > | |
| | |
| | (2) |
| | - - - - - - - - - - - - > |
| | |
| (3) | |
| < - - - - - - - - - |- - - - - - - - - - - - -> |
| | |
| | (4) |
| | < - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| | |
| (5) | |
| < - - - - - - - - - | |
| | |
V V V
The following steps are described by the profile. Within an
individual step, there may be one or more actual message exchanges.
Figure 1
1. User Agent Request to Relying Party (Section 5.3.1): In step 1,
the Principal, via a User Agent, makes a request for a secured
resource at the Relying Party. The Relying Party determines that
no security context for the User Agent exists and initiates GSS
EAP authentication of the Principal.
2. Relying Party Issues <samlp:AuthnRequest> to Identity Provider
(Section 5.3.2). In step 2, the Relying Party issues a <samlp:
AuthnRequest> message to be delivered to the Identity Provider
using the SAML RADIUS binding.
3. Identity Provider Identifies Principal (Section 5.3.3). In step
3, the Principal is identified by the Identity Provider using EAP
authentication, while honoring any requirements imposed by the
Relying Party in the <samlp:AuthnRequest> message.
4. Identity Provider Issues <samlp:Response> to Relying Party
(Section 5.3.4). In step 4, the Identity Provider issues a
<samlp:Response> message to the Relying Party using the SAML
RADIUS binding. The response either indicates an error or
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includes an authentication statement in exactly one assertion.
5. Relying Party Grants or Denies Access to Principal
(Section 5.3.5). In step 5, having received the response from
the Identity Provider, the Relying Party can respond to the
Principal's User Agent with its own error, or can establish its
own security context for the Principal and return the requested
resource.
Note that an Identity Provider can initiate this profile at step 4
and issue a <samlp:Response> message to a Relying Party without the
preceding steps.
5.3. Profile Description
The Abfab Authentication Profile is a profile of the SAML V2.0
Authentication Request Protocol [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. Where this
specification conflicts with Core, the former takes precedence.
If the profile is initiated by the Relying Party, start with
Section 5.3.1. If initiated by the Identity Provider, start with
Section 5.3.4.
5.3.1. User Agent Request to Relying Party
The profile is initiated by an arbitrary User Agent request to the
Relying Party. There are no restrictions on the form of the request.
The Relying Party is free to use any means it wishes to associate the
subsequent interactions with the original request. The Relying
Party, acting as a GSS acceptor, MUST invoke the GSS EAP mechanism
(either spontaneously or as the result of a mechanism negotiation)
and send an EAP-Identity/Request message to the User Agent, acting as
a GSS initiator.
5.3.2. Relying Party Issues <samlp:AuthnRequest> to Identity Provider
The Relying Party, on receiving the EAP-Response/Identity message
from the User Agent, MUST send it towards the Identity Provider using
RADIUS [RFC3579]. The Relying Party MAY include a <samlp:
AuthnRequest> within this RADIUS Access-Request message. The next
hop destination MAY be the Identity Provider or alternatively an
intermediate RADIUS proxy.
Profile-specific rules for the contents of the <samlp:AuthnRequest>
element are given in Section 5.4.1.
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5.3.3. Identity Provider Identifies Principal
The Identity Provider MUST establish the identity of the Principal
using EAP authentication, or else it will return an error. If the
ForceAuthn attribute on the <samlp:AuthnRequest> element is present
and true, the Identity Provider MUST freshly establish this identity
rather than relying on any existing session state it may have with
the Principal (for example, TLS state that may be used for session
resumption). Otherwise, and in all other respects, the Identity
Provider may use any EAP method to authenticate the Principal,
subject to the requirements of Section 5.8 of
[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap]. and any others called out in the <samlp:
AuthnRequest> message.
5.3.4. Identity Provider Issues <samlp:Response> to Relying Party
Regardless of the success or failure of the <samlp:AuthnRequest>, the
Identity Provider MUST produce a <samlp:Response> message to be
delivered to the Relying Party using the SAML RADIUS binding.
Profile-specific rules regarding the contents of the <samlp:Response>
element are given in Section 5.4.2.
5.3.5. Relying Party Grants or Denies Access to Principal
The Relying Party MUST process the <samlp:Response> message and any
enclosed <saml:Assertion> elements as described in
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. Any subsequent use of the <saml:Assertion>
elements is at the discretion of the Relying Party, subject to any
restrictions on use contained within the assertions themselves or
previously established out-of-band policy governing interactions
between the Identity Provider and the Relying Party.
To complete the profile, the Relying Party creates a GSS security
context for the User Agent.
5.4. Use of Authentication Request Protocol
This profile is based on the Authentication Request Protocol defined
in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]. In the nomenclature of actors
enumerated in section 3.4, the Relying Party is the requester, the
User Agent is the attesting entity and the Principal is the Requested
Subject.
5.4.1. <samlp:AuthnRequest> Usage
A Relying Party MAY include any message content described in
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], Section 3.4.1. All processing rules are as
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defined in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
If the Identity Provider cannot or will not satisfy the request, it
MUST respond with a <samlp:Response> message containing an
appropriate error status code or codes.
If the Relying Party wishes to permit the Identity Provider to
establish a new identifier for the principal if none exists, it MUST
include a <saml:NameIDPolicy> element with the AllowCreate attribute
set to "true". Otherwise, only a principal for whom the Identity
Provider has previously established an identifier usable by the
Relying Party can be authenticated successfully.
The Relying Party MUST NOT include a <saml:Subject> element in the
request. The authenticated EAP Identity implicitly names the
Principal of the requested <samlp:AuthnRequest> to the Identity
Provider.
The <samlp:AuthnRequest> message MAY be signed. Authentication and
integrity are also provided by the RADIUS SAML binding.
5.4.2. <samlp:Response message> Usage
If the Identity Provider wishes to return an error, it MUST NOT
include any assertions in the <samlp:Response message>. Otherwise,
if the request is successful (or if the response is not associated
with a request), the <samlp:Response> element MUST conform to the
following:
o It MAY be signed.
o It MUST contain exactly one <saml:Assertion>. The <saml:Subject>
element of this assertion MUST refer to the authenticated
Principal.
o The assertion MUST contain a <saml:AuthnStatement>. This MUST
contain a <saml:Subject> element with at least one <saml:
SubjectConfirmation> element containing a Method of
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:sender-vouches that reflects the
authentication of the Principal to the Identity Provider. If the
containing message is in response to an <samlp:AuthnRequest>, then
the InResponseTo attribute MUST match the request's ID.
o Other statements and confirmation methods MAY be included in the
assertion at the discretion of the Identity Provider. In
particular, <samlp:AttributeStatement> elements MAY be included.
Deployers should be aware of the implications of allowing weaker
confirmation as the processing as defined in section 2.4.1.1 of
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[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] is effectively satisfy-any.
o Other conditions MAY be included as requested by the Relying Party
or at the discretion of the Identity Provider. The Identity
Provider is NOT obligated to honor the requested set of conditions
in the <samlp:AuthnRequest>, if any.
5.4.3. samlp:Response Message Processing Rules
The Relying Party MUST do the following:
o Verify that the InResponseTo attribute in the sender-vouches
<saml:SubjectConfirmationData> equals the ID of its original
<samlp:AuthnRequest> message, unless the response is unsolicited,
in which case the attribute MUST NOT be present.
o If a <saml:AuthnStatement> used to establish a security context
for the Principal contains a SessionNotOnOrAfter attribute, the
security context SHOULD be discarded once this time is reached,
unless the service provider reestablishes the Principal's identity
by repeating the use of this profile.
o Verify that any assertions relied upon are valid according to
processing rules in [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os].
o Any assertion which is not valid, or whose subject confirmation
requirements cannot be met MUST be discarded and MUST NOT be used
to establish a security context for the Principal.
5.4.4. Unsolicited Responses
An Identity Provider MAY initiate this profile by delivering an
unsolicited <samlp:Response> message to a Relying Party.
An unsolicited <samlp:Response> MUST NOT contain an InResponseTo
attribute, nor should any sender-vouches <saml:
SubjectConfirmationData> elements contain one.
5.4.5. Use of the SAML RADIUS Binding
It is RECOMMENDED that the RADIUS exchange is protected using TLS
encryption for RADIUS [I-D.ietf-radext-radsec] to provide
confidentiality and improve integrity protection.
5.4.6. Metadata Considerations
There are no metadata considerations particular to this binding.
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6. Abfab Assertion Query/Request Profile
7. Security Considerations
TODO
8. IANA Considerations
Assignments of additional enumerated values for the RADIUS attributes
defined in this document are to be processed as described in
[RFC3575], subject to the additional requirements of a published
specification.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for
use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S.,
Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, June 2000.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] Cantor, S., Kemp, J.,
Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for
the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML)
V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-
core-2.0-os, March 2005.
[RFC3575] Aboba, B., "IANA
Considerations for RADIUS
(Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service)", RFC 3575,
July 2003.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun,
"RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial In User
Service) Support For
Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
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September 2003.
[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M.,
Arkko, J., and P. Eronen,
"The Network Access
Identifier", RFC 4282,
December 2005.
[I-D.ietf-radext-radsec] Winter, S., McCauley, M.,
Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
"TLS encryption for RADIUS",
draft-ietf-radext-radsec-09
(work in progress),
July 2011.
[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap] Howlett, J. and S. Hartman,
"A GSS-API Mechanism for the
Extensible Authentication
Protocol",
draft-ietf-abfab-gss-eap-04
(work in progress),
October 2011.
[I-D.perez-radext-radius-fragmentation] Perez-Mendez, A., Lopez, R.,
Pereniguez-Garcia, F.,
Lopez-Millan, G., Lopez, D.,
and A. DeKok, "Support of
fragmentation of RADIUS
packets", draft-perez-
radext-radius-fragmentation-
01 (work in progress),
February 2012.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J.,
Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and
J. Arkko, "Diameter Base
Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
[I-D.jones-diameter-abfab] Jones, M. and H. Tschofenig,
"The Diameter 'Application
Bridging for Federated
Access Beyond Web (ABFAB)'
Application", draft-jones-
diameter-abfab-00 (work in
progress), March 2011.
Howlett & Hartman Expires September 13, 2012 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft SAML RADIUS March 2012
[I-D.lear-abfab-arch] Howlett, J., Hartman, S.,
Tschofenig, H., and E. Lear,
"Application Bridging for
Federated Access Beyond Web
(ABFAB) Architecture",
draft-lear-abfab-arch-02
(work in progress),
March 2011.
[OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os] Cantor, S., Hirsch, F.,
Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and
E. Maler, "Bindings for the
OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML)
V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-
bindings-2.0-os, March 2005.
[OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] Hughes, J., Cantor, S.,
Hodges, J., Hirsch, F.,
Mishra, P., Philpott, R.,
and E. Maler, "Profiles for
the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML)
V2.0", OASIS Standard OASIS.
saml-profiles-2.0-os,
March 2005.
Authors' Addresses
Josh Howlett
Janet
Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell
Oxford OX11 0SG
UK
Phone: +44 1235 822363
EMail: Josh.Howlett@ja.net
Sam Hartman
Painless Security
Phone:
EMail: hartmans-ietf@mit.edu
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