Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond Web (ABFAB) Architecture
draft-ietf-abfab-arch-07
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (abfab WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Josh Howlett , Sam Hartman , Hannes Tschofenig , Eliot Lear , Jim Schaad | ||
| Last updated | 2013-07-30 | ||
| Replaces | draft-lear-abfab-arch | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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draft-ietf-abfab-arch-07
ABFAB J. Howlett
Internet-Draft JANET(UK)
Intended status: Informational S. Hartman
Expires: January 31, 2014 Painless Security
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
E. Lear
Cisco Systems GmbH
J. Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting
July 30, 2013
Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond Web (ABFAB)
Architecture
draft-ietf-abfab-arch-07.txt
Abstract
Over the last decade a substantial amount of work has occurred in the
space of federated access management. Most of this effort has
focused on two use cases: network access and web-based access.
However, the solutions to these use cases that have been proposed and
deployed tend to have few common building blocks in common.
This memo describes an architecture that makes use of extensions to
the commonly used security mechanisms for both federated and non-
federated access management, including the Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service (RADIUS) and the Diameter protocol, the Generic
Security Service (GSS), the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). The architecture
addresses the problem of federated access management to primarily
non-web-based services, in a manner that will scale to large numbers
of identity providers, relying parties, and federations.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 31, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.1. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. An Overview of Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. Challenges for Contemporary Federation . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4. An Overview of ABFAB-based Federation . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5. Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1. Relying Party to Identity Provider . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1. AAA, RADIUS and Diameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.2. Discovery and Rules Determination . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.3. Routing and Technical Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.4. AAA Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.5. SAML Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2. Client To Identity Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2.1. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) . . . . . . 23
2.2.2. EAP Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3. Client to Relying Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.1. GSS-API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.2. Protocol Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.3. Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3. Application Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2. GSS-API Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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3.3. Host-Based Service Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4. Additional GSS-API Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1. Entities and their roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2. Privacy Aspects of ABFAB Communication Flows . . . . . . 34
4.2.1. Client to RP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.2. Client to IdP (via Federation Substrate) . . . . . . 35
4.2.3. IdP to RP (via Federation Substrate) . . . . . . . . 36
4.3. Relationship between User and Entities . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4. Accounting Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.5. Collection and retention of data and identifiers . . . . 37
4.6. User Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1. Introduction
The Internet uses numerous security mechanisms to manage access to
various resources. These mechanisms have been generalized and scaled
over the last decade through mechanisms such as Simple Authentication
and Security Layer (SASL) with the Generic Security Server
Application Program Interface (GSS-API) (known as the GS2 family)
[RFC5801], Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], and the Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting (AAA) architecture as embodied in RADIUS [RFC2865] and
Diameter [RFC3588].
A Relying Party (RP) is the entity that manages access to some
resource. The entity that is requesting access to that resource is
often described as the Client. Many security mechanisms are
manifested as an exchange of information between these entities. The
RP is therefore able to decide whether the Client is authorized, or
not.
Some security mechanisms allow the RP to delegate aspects of the
access management decision to an entity called the Identity Provider
(IdP). This delegation requires technical signaling, trust and a
common understanding of semantics between the RP and IdP. These
aspects are generally managed within a relationship known as a
'federation'. This style of access management is accordingly
described as 'federated access management'.
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Federated access management has evolved over the last decade through
specifications like SAML [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os], OpenID [1], OAuth
[RFC5849], [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] and WS-Trust [WS-TRUST]. The benefits
of federated access management include:
Single or Simplified sign-on:
An Internet service can delegate access management, and the
associated responsibilities such as identity management and
credentialing, to an organization that already has a long-term
relationship with the Client. This is often attractive as Relying
Parties frequently do not want these responsibilities. The Client
also requires fewer credentials, which is also desirable.
Data Minimization and User Participation:
Often a Relying Party does not need to know the identity of a
Client to reach an access management decision. It is frequently
only necessary for the Relying Party know specific attributes
about the client, for example, that the client is affiliated with
a particular organization or has a certain role or entitlement.
Sometimes the RP only needs to know a pseudonym of the client.
Prior to the release of attributes to the RP from the IdP, the IdP
will check configuration and policy to determine if the attributes
are to be released. There is currently no direct client
participation in this decision.
Provisioning:
Sometimes a Relying Party needs, or would like, to know more about
a client than an affiliation or a pseudonym. For example, a
Relying Party may want the Client's email address or name. Some
federated access management technologies provide the ability for
the IdP to supply this information, either on request by the RP or
unsolicited.
This memo describes the Application Bridging for Federated Access
Beyond the Web (ABFAB) architecture. This architecture makes use of
extensions to the commonly used security mechanisms for both
federated and non-federated access management, including the RADIUS
and the Diameter protocols, the Generic Security Service (GSS), the
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and SAML. The architecture
addresses the problem of federated access management primarily for
non-web-based services. It does so in a manner that will scale to
large numbers of identity providers, relying parties, and
federations.
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1.1. Terminology
This document uses identity management and privacy terminology from
[I-D.iab-privacy-considerations]. In particular, this document uses
the terms identity provider, relying party, identifier, pseudonymity,
unlinkability, and anonymity.
In this architecture the IdP consists of the following components: an
EAP server, a RADIUS or a Diameter server, and optionally a SAML
Assertion service.
This document uses the term Network Access Identifier (NAI), as
defined in [I-D.ietf-radext-nai]. An NAI consists of a realm
identifier, which is associated with an IdP and a username which is
associated with a specific client of the IdP.
One of the problems people will find with reading this document is
that the terminology sometimes appears to be inconsistent. This is
due the fact that the terms used by the different standards we are
referencing are not consistent. In general the document uses either
a the ABFAB term or the term associated with the standard under
discussion as appropriate. For reference we include this table which
maps the different terms into a single table.
+--------------+--------------+-----------------+-------------------+
| Protocol | Client | Relying Party | Identity Provider |
+--------------+--------------+-----------------+-------------------+
| ABFAB | Client | Relying Party | Identity Provider |
| | | (RP) | (IdP) |
| | | | |
| | Initiator | Acceptor | |
| | | | |
| | | Server | |
| | | | |
| SAML | Subject | Service | Issuer |
| | | Provider | |
| | | | |
| GSS-API | Initiator | Acceptor | |
| | | | |
| EAP | EAP peer | | EAP server |
| | | | |
| AAA | | AAA Client | AAA server |
| | | | |
| RADIUS | user | NAS | RADIUS server |
| | | | |
| | | RADIUS client | |
+--------------+--------------+-----------------+-------------------+
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Note that in some cases a cell has been left empty; in these cases
there is no name that represents the entity.
1.1.1. Channel Binding
This document uses the term channel binding with two different
meanings.
EAP channel binding is used to provide GSS-API naming semantics.
Channel binding sends a set of attributes from the peer to the EAP
server either as part of the EAP conversation or as part of a secure
association protocol. In addition, attributes are sent in the
backend protocol from the authenticator to the EAP server. The EAP
server confirms the consistency of these attributes and provides the
confirmation back to the peer. In this document, channel binding
without qualification refers to EAP channel binding.
GSS-API channel binding provides protection against man-in-the-middle
attacks when GSS-API is used for authentication inside of some
tunnel; it is similar to a facility called cryptographic binding in
EAP. The binding works by each side deriving a cryptographic value
from the tunnel itself and then using that cryptographic value to
prove to the other side that it knows the value.
See [RFC5056] for a discussion of the differences between these two
facilities. However, the difference can be summarized as GSS-API
channel binding says that there is nobody between the client and the
authenticator while EAP channel binding allows the client to have
knowledge about attributes of the authenticator (such as it's name).
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Typically when considering channel binding, people think of channel
binding in combination with mutual authentication. This is
sufficiently common that without additional qualification channel
binding should be assumed to imply mutual authentication. Without
mutual authentication, only one party knows that the endpoints are
correct. That's sometimes useful. Consider for example a user who
wishes to access a protected resource from a shared whiteboard in a
conference room. The whiteboard is the initiator; it does not need
to actually authenticate that it is talking to the correct resource
because the user will be able to recognize whether the displayed
content is correct. If channel binding is used without mutual
authentication, it is effectively a request to disclose the resource
in the context of a particular channel. Such an authentication would
be similar in concept to a holder-of-key SAML assertion. However,
also note that while it is not happening in the protocol, mutual
authentication is happening in the overall system: the user is able
to visually authenticate the content. This is consistent with all
uses of channel binding without protocol level mutual authentication
found so far.
1.2. An Overview of Federation
In the previous section we introduced the following entities:
o the Client,
o the Identity Provider, and
o the Relying Party.
The final entity that needs to be introduced is the Individual. An
Individual is a human being that is using the Client. In any given
situation, an Individual may or may not exist. Clients can act
either as front ends for Individuals or they may be independent
entities that are setup and allowed to run autonomously. An example
of such an entity can be found in the trust routing protocol where
the routers use ABFAB to authenticate to each other.
These entities and their relationships are illustrated graphically in
Figure 1.
,----------\ ,---------\
| Identity | Federation | Relying |
| Provider + <-------------------> + Party |
`----------' '---------'
<
\
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\ Authentication
\
\
\
\
\ +---------+
\ | | O
v| Client | \|/ Individual
| | |
+---------+ / \
Figure 1: Entities and their Relationships
The relationships between the entities in Figure 1 are:
Federation
The Identity Provider and the Relying Parties are part of a
Federation. The relationship may be direct (they have an explicit
trust relationship) or transitive (the trust relationship is
mediated by one or more entities). The federation relationship is
governed by a federation agreement. Within a single federation,
there may be multiple Identity Providers as well as multiple
Relying Parties. A federation is governed by a federation
agreement.
Authentication
There is a direct relationship between the Client and the Identity
Provider by which the entities trust and can securely authenticate
each other.
A federation agreement typically encompasses operational
specifications and legal rules:
Operational Specifications:
These include the technical specifications (e.g. protocols used to
communicate between the three parties), process standards,
policies, identity proofing, credential and authentication
algorithm requirements, performance requirements, assessment and
audit criteria, etc. The goal of operational specifications is to
provide enough definition that the system works and
interoperability is possible.
Legal Rules:
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The legal rules take the legal framework into consideration and
provide contractual obligations for each entity. The rules define
the responsibilities of each party and provide further
clarification of the operational specifications. These legal
rules regulate the operational specifications, make operational
specifications legally binding to the participants, define and
govern the rights and responsibilities of the participants. The
legal rules may, for example, describe liability for losses,
termination rights, enforcement mechanisms, measures of damage,
dispute resolution, warranties, etc.
The Operational Specifications can demand the usage of a
sophisticated technical infrastructure, including requirements on the
message routing intermediaries, to offer the required technical
functionality. In other environments, the Operational Specifications
require fewer technical components in order to meet the required
technical functionality.
The Legal Rules include many non-technical aspects of federation,
such as business practices and legal arrangements, which are outside
the scope of the IETF. The Legal Rules can still have an impact on
the architectural setup or on how to ensure the dynamic establishment
of trust.
While a federation agreement is often discussed within the context of
formal relationships, such as between an enterprise and an employee
or a government and a citizen, a federation agreement does not have
to require any particular level of formality. For an IdP and a
Client, it is sufficient for a relationship to be established by
something as simple as using a web form and confirmation email. For
an IdP and an RP, it is sufficient for the IdP to publish contact
information along with a public key and for the RP to use that data.
Within the framework of ABFAB, it will generally be required that a
mechanism exists for the IdP to be able to trust the identity of the
RP, if this is not present then the IdP cannot provide the assurances
to the client that the identity of the RP has been established.
The nature of federation dictates that there is some form of
relationship between the identity provider and the relying party.
This is particularly important when the relying party wants to use
information obtained from the identity provider for access management
decisions and when the identity provider does not want to release
information to every relying party (or only under certain
conditions).
While it is possible to have a bilateral agreement between every IdP
and every RP; on an Internet scale this setup requires the
introduction of the multi-lateral federation concept, as the
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management of such pair-wise relationships would otherwise prove
burdensome.
The IdP will typically have a long-term relationship with the Client.
This relationship typically involves the IdP positively identifying
and credentialing the Client (for example, at time of employment
within an organization). When dealing with individuals, this process
is called identity proofing [NIST-SP.800-63]. The relationship will
often be instantiated within an agreement between the IdP and the
Client (for example, within an employment contract or terms of use
that stipulates the appropriate use of credentials and so forth).
The nature and quality of the relationship between the Client and the
IdP is an important contributor to the level of trust that an RP may
attribute to an assertion describing a Client made by an IdP. This
is sometimes described as the Level of Assurance [NIST-SP.800-63].
Federation does not require an a priori relationship or a long-term
relationship between the RP and the Client; it is this property of
federation that yields many of its benefits. However, federation
does not preclude the possibility of a pre-existing relationship
between the RP and the Client, nor that they may use the introduction
to create a new long-term relationship independent of the federation.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that in some scenarios there
might indeed be an Individual behind the Client and in other cases
the Client may be autonomous.
1.3. Challenges for Contemporary Federation
As the number of federated services has proliferated, the role of the
individual can become ambiguous in certain circumstances. For
example, a school might provide online access for a student's grades
to their parents for review, and to the student's teacher for
modification. A teacher who is also a parent must clearly
distinguish her role upon access.
Similarly, as the number of federations proliferates, it becomes
increasingly difficult to discover which identity provider(s) a user
is associated with. This is true for both the web and non-web case,
but is particularly acute for the latter as many non-web
authentication systems are not semantically rich enough on their own
to allow for such ambiguities. For instance, in the case of an email
provider, the use of SMTP and IMAP protocols do not have the ability
for the server to get additional information, beyond the clients NAI,
in order to provide additional input to decide between multiple
federations it may be associated with. However, the building blocks
do exist to add this functionality.
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1.4. An Overview of ABFAB-based Federation
The previous section described the general model of federation, and
the application of access management within the federation. This
section provides a brief overview of ABFAB in the context of this
model.
In this example, a client is attempting to connect to a server in
order to either get access to some data or perform some type of
transaction. In order for the client to mutually authenticate with
the server, the following steps are taken in an ABFAB federated
architecture:
1. Client Configuration: The Client Application is configured with
an NAI assigned by the IdP. It is also configured with any
keys, certificates, passwords or other secret and public
information needed to run the EAP protocols between it and the
IdP.
2. Authentication mechanism selection: The GSS-EAP GSS-API
mechanism is selected for authentication/authorization.
3. Client provides an NAI to RP: The client application sets up a
transport to the RP and begins the GSS-EAP authentication. In
response, the RP sends an EAP request message (nested in the
GSS-EAP protocol) asking for the Client's name. The Client
sends an EAP response with an NAI name form that, at a minimum,
contains the realm portion of its full NAI.
4. Discovery of federated IdP: The RP uses pre-configured
information or a federation proxy to determine what IdP to use
based on policy and the realm portion of the provided Client
NAI. This is discussed in detail below (Section 2.1.2).
5. Request from Relying Party to IdP: Once the RP knows who the IdP
is, it (or its agent) will send a RADIUS/Diameter request to the
IdP. The RADIUS/Diameter access request encapsulates the EAP
response. At this stage, the RP will likely have no idea who
the client is. The RP sends its identity to the IdP in AAA
attributes, and it may send a SAML Attribute Requests in a AAA
attribute. The AAA network checks that the identity claimed by
the RP is valid.
6. IdP begins EAP with the client: The IdP sends an EAP message to
the client with an EAP method to be used. The IdP SHOULD NOT
re-request the clients name in this message, but clients need to
be able to handle it. In this case the IdP MUST accept a realm
only in order to protect the client's name from the RP. The
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available and appropriate methods are discussed below in this
memo (Section 2.2.1).
7. The EAP protocol is run: A bunch of EAP messages are passed
between the client (EAP peer) and the IdP (EAP server), until
the result of the authentication protocol is determined. The
number and content of those messages depends on the EAP method
selected. If the IdP is unable to authenticate the client, the
IdP sends a EAP failure message to the RP. As part of the EAP
protocol, the client sends a channel bindings EAP message to the
IdP (Section 2.2.2). In the channel binding message the client
identifies, among other things, the RP to which it is attempting
to authenticate. The IdP checks the channel binding data from
the client with that provided by the RP via the AAA protocol.
If the bindings do not match the IdP sends an EAP failure
message to the RP.
8. Successful EAP Authentication: At this point, the IdP (EAP
server) and client (EAP peer) have mutually authenticated each
other. As a result, the client and the IdP hold two
cryptographic keys: a Master Session Key (MSK), and an Extended
MSK (EMSK). At this point the client has a level of assurance
about the identity of the RP based on the name checking the IdP
has done using the RP naming information from the AAA framework
and from the client (by the channel binding data).
9. Local IdP Policy Check: At this stage, the IdP checks local
policy to determine whether the RP and client are authorized for
a given transaction/service, and if so, what if any, attributes
will be released to the RP. If the IdP gets a policy failure,
it sends an EAP failure message to the RP.[[Should this be an
EAP failure to the client as well?]] (The RP will have done its
policy checks during the discovery process.)
10. IdP provide the RP with the MSK: The IdP sends a positive result
EAP to the RP, along with an optional set of AAA attributes
associated with the client (usually as one or more SAML
assertions). In addition, the EAP MSK is returned to the RP.
11. RP Processes Results: When the RP receives the result from the
IdP, it should have enough information to either grant or refuse
a resource access request. It may have information that
associates the client with specific authorization identities.
If additional attributes are needed from the IdP the RP may make
a new SAML Request to the IdP. It will apply these results in
an application-specific way.
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12. RP returns results to client: Once the RP has a response it must
inform the client application of the result. If all has gone
well, all are authenticated, and the application proceeds with
appropriate authorization levels. The client can now complete
the authentication of the RP by the use of the EAP MSK value.
An example communication flow is given below:
Relying Client Identity
Party App Provider
| (1) | Client Configuration
| | |
|<-----(2)----->| | Mechanism Selection
| | |
|<-----(3)-----<| | NAI transmitted to RP
| | |
|<=====(4)====================>| Discovery
| | |
|>=====(5)====================>| Access request from RP to IdP
| | |
| |< - - (6) - -<| EAP method to Client
| | |
| |< - - (7) - ->| EAP Exchange to authenticate
| | | Client
| | |
| | (8 & 9) Local Policy Check
| | |
|<====(10)====================<| IdP Assertion to RP
| | |
(11) | | RP processes results
| | |
|>----(12)----->| | Results to client app.
----- = Between Client App and RP
===== = Between RP and IdP
- - - = Between Client App and IdP
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1.5. Design Goals
Our key design goals are as follows:
o Each party of a transaction will be authenticated, although
perhaps not identified, and the client will be authorized for
access to a specific resource.
o Means of authentication is decoupled so as to allow for multiple
authentication methods.
o The architecture requires no sharing of long term private keys
between clients and servers.
o The system will scale to large numbers of identity providers,
relying parties, and users.
o The system will be designed primarily for non-Web-based
authentication.
o The system will build upon existing standards, components, and
operational practices.
Designing new three party authentication and authorization protocols
is hard and fraught with risk of cryptographic flaws. Achieving
widespread deployment is even more difficult. A lot of attention on
federated access has been devoted to the Web. This document instead
focuses on a non-Web-based environment and focuses on those protocols
where HTTP is not used. Despite the increased excitement for
layering every protocol on top of HTTP there are still a number of
protocols available that do not use HTTP-based transports. Many of
these protocols are lacking a native authentication and authorization
framework of the style shown in Figure 1.
2. Architecture
We have already introduced the federated access architecture, with
the illustration of the different actors that need to interact, but
did not expand on the specifics of providing support for non-Web
based applications. This section details this aspect and motivates
design decisions. The main theme of the work described in this
document is focused on re-using existing building blocks that have
been deployed already and to re-arrange them in a novel way.
Although this architecture assumes updates to the relying party, the
client application, and the Identity Provider, those changes are kept
at a minimum. A mechanism that can demonstrate deployment benefits
(based on ease of update of existing software, low implementation
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effort, etc.) is preferred and there may be a need to specify
multiple mechanisms to support the range of different deployment
scenarios.
There are a number of ways for encapsulating EAP into an application
protocol. For ease of integration with a wide range of non-Web based
application protocols the usage of the GSS-API was chosen. A
description of the technical specification can be found in
[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap].
The architecture consists of several building blocks, which is shown
graphically in Figure 2. In the following sections, we discuss the
data flow between each of the entities, the protocols used for that
data flow and some of the trade-offs made in choosing the protocols.
+--------------+
| Identity |
| Provider |
| (IdP) |
+-^----------^-+
* EAP o RADIUS/
* o Diameter
--v----------v--
/// \\\
// \\
| Federation |
| Substrate |
\\ //
\\\ ///
--^----------^--
* EAP o RADIUS/
* o Diameter
+-------------+ +-v----------v--+
| | | |
| Client | EAP/EAP Method | Relying Party |
| Application |<****************>| (RP) |
| | GSS-API | |
| |<---------------->| |
| | Application | |
| | Protocol | |
| |<================>| |
+-------------+ +---------------+
Legend:
<****>: Client-to-IdP Exchange
<---->: Client-to-RP Exchange
<oooo>: RP-to-IdP Exchange
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<====>: Protocol through which GSS-API/GS2 exchanges are tunneled
Figure 2: ABFAB Protocol Instantiation
2.1. Relying Party to Identity Provider
Communications between the Relying Party and the Identity Provider is
done by the federation substrate. This communication channel is
responsible for:
o Establishing the trust relationship between the RP and the IdP.
o Determining the rules governing the relationship.
o Conveying authentication packets from the client to the IdP and
back.
o Providing the means of establishing a trust relationship between
the RP and the client.
o Providing a means for the RP to obtain attributes about the client
from the IdP.
The ABFAB working group has chosen the AAA framework for the messages
transported between the RP and IdP. The AAA framework supports the
requirements stated above as follows:
o The AAA backbone supplies the trust relationship between the RP
and the IdP.
o The agreements governing a specific AAA backbone contains the
rules governing the relationships within the AAA federation.
o A method exists for carrying EAP packets within RADIUS [RFC3579]
and Diameter [RFC4072].
o The use of EAP channel binding [RFC6677] along with the core ABFAB
protocol provide the pieces necessary to establish the identities
of the RP and the client, while EAP provides the cryptographic
methods for the RP and the client to validate they are talking to
each other.
o A method exists for carrying SAML packets within RADIUS
[I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml] and Diameter (work in progress) which
allows the RP to query attributes about the client from the IdP.
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Future protocols that support the same framework but do different
routing may be used in the future. One such effort is to setup a
framework that creates a trusted point-to-point channel on the fly.
2.1.1. AAA, RADIUS and Diameter
Interestingly, for network access authentication the usage of the AAA
framework with RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter [RFC3588] was quite
successful from a deployment point of view. To map to the
terminology used in Figure 1 to the AAA framework the IdP corresponds
to the AAA server, the RP corresponds to the AAA client, and the
technical building blocks of a federation are AAA proxies, relays and
redirect agents (particularly if they are operated by third parties,
such as AAA brokers and clearing houses). The front-end, i.e. the
end host to AAA client communication, is in case of network access
authentication offered by link layer protocols that forward
authentication protocol exchanges back-and-forth. An example of a
large scale RADIUS-based federation is EDUROAM [2].
By using the AAA framework, ABFAB gets a lot of mileage as many of
the federation agreements already exist and merely need to be
expanded to cover the ABFAB additions. The AAA framework has already
addressed some of the problems outlined above. For example,
o It already has a method for routing requests based on a domain.
o It already has an extensible architecture allowing for new
attributes to be defined and transported.
o Pre-existing relationships can be re-used.
The astute reader will notice that RADIUS and Diameter have
substantially similar characteristics. Why not pick one? RADIUS and
Diameter are deployed in different environments. RADIUS can often be
found in enterprise and university networks, and is also in use by
fixed network operators. Diameter, on the other hand, is deployed by
mobile operators. Another key difference is that today RADIUS is
largely transported upon UDP. We leave as a deployment decision,
which protocol will be appropriate. The protocol defines all the
necessary new AAA attributes as RADIUS attributes. A future document
would define the same AAA attributes for a Diameter environment. We
also note that there exist proxies which convert from RADIUS to
Diameter and back. This makes it possible for both to be deployed in
a single federation substrate.
Through the integrity protection mechanisms in the AAA framework, the
identity provider can establish technical trust that messages are
being sent by the appropriate relying party. Any given interaction
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will be associated with one federation at the policy level. The
legal or business relationship defines what statements the identity
provider is trusted to make and how these statements are interpreted
by the relying party. The AAA framework also permits the relying
party or elements between the relying party and identity provider to
make statements about the relying party.
The AAA framework provides transport for attributes. Statements made
about the client by the identity provider, statements made about the
relying party and other information are transported as attributes.
One demand that the AAA substrate makes of the upper layers is that
they must properly identify the end points of the communication. It
must be possible for the AAA client at the RP to determine where to
send each RADIUS or Diameter message. Without this requirement, it
would be the RP's responsibility to determine the identity of the
client on its own, without the assistance of an IdP. This
architecture makes use of the Network Access Identifier (NAI), where
the IdP is indicated by the realm component [I-D.ietf-radext-nai].
The NAI is represented and consumed by the GSS-API layer as
GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME as specified in [RFC2743]. The GSS-API EAP
mechanism includes the NAI in the EAP Response/Identity message.
2.1.2. Discovery and Rules Determination
While we are using the AAA protocols to communicate with the IdP, the
RP may have multiple federation substrates to select from. The RP
has a number of criteria that it will use in selecting which of the
different federations to use:
o The federation selected must be able to communicate with the IdP.
o The federation selected must match the business rules and
technical policies required for the RP security requirements.
The RP needs to discover which federation will be used to contact the
IdP. The first selection criteria used during discovery is going to
be the name of the IdP to be contacted. The second selection
criteria used during discovery is going to be the set of business
rules and technical policies governing the relationship; this is
called rules determination. The RP also needs to establish technical
trust in the communications with the IdP.
Rules determination covers a broad range of decisions about the
exchange. One of these is whether the given RP is permitted to talk
to the IdP using a given federation at all, so rules determination
encompasses the basic authorization decision. Other factors are
included, such as what policies govern release of information about
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the client to the RP and what policies govern the RP's use of this
information. While rules determination is ultimately a business
function, it has significant impact on the technical exchanges. The
protocols need to communicate the result of authorization. When
multiple sets of rules are possible, the protocol must disambiguate
which set of rules are in play. Some rules have technical
enforcement mechanisms; for example in some federations
intermediaries validate information that is being communicated within
the federation.
At the time of writing no protocol mechanism has been specified to
allow a AAA client to determine whether a AAA proxy will indeed be
able to route AAA requests to a specific IdP. The AAA routing is
impacted by business rules and technical policies that may be quite
complex and at the present time, the route selection is based on
manual configuration.
2.1.3. Routing and Technical Trust
Several approaches to having messages routed through the federation
substrate are possible. These routing methods can most easily be
classified based on the mechanism for technical trust that is used.
The choice of technical trust mechanism constrains how rules
determination is implemented. Regardless of what deployment strategy
is chosen, it is important that the technical trust mechanism be able
to validate theg identities of both parties to the exchange. The
trust mechanism must to ensure that the entity acting as IdP for a
given NAI is permitted to be the IdP for that realm, and that any
service name claimed by the RP is permitted to be claimed by that
entity. Here are the categories of technical trust determination:
AAA Proxy:
The simplest model is that an RP is an AAA client and can send the
request directly to an AAA proxy. The hop-by-hop integrity
protection of the AAA fabric provides technical trust. An RP can
submit a request directly to a federation. Alternatively, a
federation disambiguation fabric can be used. Such a fabric takes
information about what federations the RP is part of and what
federations the IdP is part of and routes a message to the
appropriate federation. The routing of messages across the fabric
plus attributes added to requests and responses provides rules
determination. For example, when a disambiguation fabric routes a
message to a given federation, that federation's rules are chosen.
Name validation is enforced as messages travel across the fabric.
The entities near the RP confirm its identity and validate names
it claims. The fabric routes the message towards the appropriate
IdP, validating the IdP's name in the process. The routing can be
statically configured. Alternatively a routing protocol could be
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developed to exchange reachability information about given a IdP
and to apply policy across the AAA fabric. Such a routing
protocol could flood naming constraints to the appropriate points
in the fabric.
Trust Broker:
Instead of routing messages through AAA proxies, some trust broker
could establish keys between entities near the RP and entities
near the IdP. The advantage of this approach is efficiency of
message handling. Fewer entities are needed to be involved for
each message. Security may be improved by sending individual
messages over fewer hops. Rules determination involves decisions
made by trust brokers about what keys to grant. Also, associated
with each credential is context about rules and about other
aspects of technical trust including names that may be claimed. A
routing protocol similar to the one for AAA proxies is likely to
be useful to trust brokers in flooding rules and naming
constraints.
Global Credential:
A global credential such as a public key and certificate in a
public key infrastructure can be used to establish technical
trust. A directory or distributed database such as the Domain
Name System is used by the RP to discover the endpoint to contact
for a given NAI. Either the database or certificates can provide
a place to store information about rules determination and naming
constraints. Provided that no intermediates are required (or
appear to be required) and that the RP and IdP are sufficient to
enforce and determine rules, rules determination is reasonably
simple. However applying certain rules is likely to be quite
complex. For example if multiple sets of rules are possible
between an IdP and RP, confirming the correct set is used may be
difficult. This is particularly true if intermediates are
involved in making the decision. Also, to the extent that
directory information needs to be trusted, rules determination may
be more complex.
Real-world deployments are likely to be mixtures of these basic
approaches. For example, it will be quite common for an RP to route
traffic to a AAA proxy within an organization. That proxy could then
use any of the three methods to get closer to the IdP. It is also
likely that rather than being directly reachable, the IdP may have a
proxy on the edge of its organization. Federations will likely
provide a traditional AAA proxy interface even if they also provide
another mechanism for increased efficiency or security.
2.1.4. AAA Security
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For the AAA framework there are two different places where security
needs to be examined. The first is the security that is in place for
the links in the AAA backbone being used. The second is the nodes
that the backbone consists of.
The default link security for RADIUS is showing its age as it uses
MD5 and a shared secret to both obfuscate passwords and to provide
integrity on the RADIUS messages. While some EAP methods have
designed in the ability to protect the client authentication
credentials, the MSK returned from the IDP to the RP is protected
only by the RADIUS security. In many environments this is considered
to be insufficient, especially as not all attributes are obfuscated
and can thus leak information to a passive eavesdropper. The use of
RADIUS with TLS [RFC6614] and/or DTLS [I-D.ietf-radext-dtls]
addresses these attacks. The same level of security is included in
the base Diameter specifications.
2.1.5. SAML Assertions
For the traditional use of AAA frameworks, network access, the only
requirement that was necessary to grant access was an affirmative
response from the IdP. In the ABFAB world, the RP may need to get
additional information about the client before granting access.
ABFAB therefore has a requirement that it can transport an arbitrary
set of attributes about the client from the IdP to the RP.
Security Assertions Markup Language (SAML) [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
was designed in order to carry an extensible set of attributes about
a subject. Since SAML is extensible in the attribute space, ABFAB
has no immediate needs to update the core SAML specifications for our
work. It will be necessary to update IdPs that need to return SAML
assertions to RPs and for both the IdP and the RP to implement a new
SAML profile designed to carry SAML assertions in AAA. The new
profile can be found in RFCXXXX [I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml]. As SAML
statements will frequently be large, RADIUS servers and clients that
deal with SAML statements will need to implement RFC XXXX
[I-D.perez-radext-radius-fragmentation]
There are several issues that need to be highlighted:
o The security of SAML assertions.
o Namespaces and mapping of SAML attributes.
o Subject naming of entities.
o Making multiple queries about the subject(s).
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o Level of Assurance for authentication.
SAML assertions have an optional signature that can be used to
protect and provide origination of the assertion. These signatures
are normally based on asymmetric key operations and require that the
verifier be able to check not only the cryptographic operation, but
also the binding of the originators name and the public key. In a
federated environment it will not always be possible for the RP to
validate the binding, for this reason the technical trust established
in the federation is used as an alternate method of validating the
origination and integrity of the SAML Assertion.
Attributes placed in SAML assertions can have different namespaces
assigned to the same name. In many, but not all, cases the
federation agreements will determine what attributes can be used in a
SAML statement. This means that the RP needs to map from the
federation names, types and semantics into the ones that the policies
of the RP are written in. In other cases the federation substrate
may modify the SAML assertions in transit to do the necessary
namespace, naming and semantic mappings as the assertion crosses the
different boundaries in the federation. If the proxies are modifying
the SAML Assertion, then they will obviously remove any signatures as
they would no longer validate. In this case the technical trust is
the required mechanism for validating the integrity of the assertion.
Finally, the attributes may still be in the namespace of the
originating IdP. When this occurs the RP will need to get the
required mapping operations from the federation agreements and do the
appropriate mappings itself.
The RADIUS SAML RFC [I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml] has define a new SAML
name format that corresponds to the NAI name form defined by RFC XXXX
[I-D.ietf-radext-nai]. This allows for easy name matching in many
cases as the name form in the SAML statement and the name form used
in RADIUS or Diameter will be the same. In addition to the NAI name
form, the document also defines a pair of implicit name forms
corresponding to the Client and the Client's machine. These implicit
name forms are based on the Identity-Type enumeration defined in TEAP
[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method]. If the name form returned in a
SAML statement is not based on the NAI, then it is a requirement on
the EAP server that it validate that the subject of the SAML
assertion, if any, is equivalent to the subject identified by the NAI
used in the RADIUS or Diameter session.
RADIUS has the ability to deal with multiple SAML queries for those
EAP Servers which follow RFC 5080 [RFC5080]. In this case a State
attribute will always be returned with the Access-Accept. The EAP
client can then send a new Access-Request with the State attribute
and the new SAML Request Multiple SAML queries can then be done by
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making a new Access-Request using the State attribute returned in the
last Access-Accept to link together the different RADIUS sessions.
Some RPs need to ensure that specific criteria are met during the
authentication process. This need is met by using Levels of
Assurance. The way a Level of Assurance is communicated to the RP
from the EAP server is by the use of a SAML Authentication Request
using the Authentication Profile from RFC XXX
[I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml] When crossing boundaries between different
federations, either the policy specified will need to be shared
between the two federations, the policy will need to be mapped by the
proxy server on the boundary or the proxy server on the boundary will
need to supply information the EAP server so that it can do the
required mapping. If this mapping is not done, then the EAP server
will not be able to enforce the desired Level of Assurance as it will
not understand the policy requirements.
2.2. Client To Identity Provider
Looking at the communications between the client and the IdP, the
following items need to be dealt with:
o The client and the IdP need to mutually authenticate each other.
o The client and the IdP need to mutually agree on the identity of
the RP.
ABFAB selected EAP for the purposes of mutual authentication and
assisted in creating some new EAP channel binding documents for
dealing with determining the identity of the RP. A framework for the
channel binding mechanism has been defined in RFC 6677 [RFC6677] that
allows the IdP to check the identity of the RP provided by the AAA
framework with that provided by the client.
2.2.1. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Traditional web federation does not describe how a client interacts
with an identity provider for authentication. As a result, this
communication is not standardized. There are several disadvantages
to this approach. Since the communication is not standardized, it is
difficult for machines to correctly enter their credentials with
different authentications, where Individuals can correctly identify
the entire mechanism on the fly. The use of browsers for
authentication restricts the deployment of more secure forms of
authentication beyond plaintext username and password known by the
server. In a number of cases the authentication interface may be
presented before the client has adequately validated they are talking
to the intended server. By giving control of the authentication
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interface to a potential attacker, the security of the system may be
reduced and phishing opportunities introduced.
As a result, it is desirable to choose some standardized approach for
communication between the client's end-host and the identity
provider. There are a number of requirements this approach must
meet.
Experience has taught us one key security and scalability
requirement: it is important that the relying party not get
possession of the long-term secret of the client. Aside from a
valuable secret being exposed, a synchronization problem can develop
when the client changes keys with the IdP.
Since there is no single authentication mechanism that will be used
everywhere there is another associated requirement: The
authentication framework must allow for the flexible integration of
authentication mechanisms. For instance, some IdPs require hardware
tokens while others use passwords. A service provider wants to
provide support for both authentication methods, and other methods
from IdPs not yet seen.
These requirements can be met by utilizing standardized and
successfully deployed technology, namely by the Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) framework [RFC3748]. Figure 2
illustrates the integration graphically.
EAP is an end-to-end framework; it provides for two-way communication
between a peer (i.e. client or individual) through the authenticator
(i.e., relying party) to the back-end (i.e., identity provider).
Conveniently, this is precisely the communication path that is needed
for federated identity. Although EAP support is already integrated
in AAA systems (see [RFC3579] and [RFC4072]) several challenges
remain:
o The first is how to carry EAP payloads from the end host to the
relying party.
o Another is to verify statements the relying party has made to the
client, confirm these statements are consistent with statements
made to the identity provider and confirm all the above are
consistent with the federation and any federation-specific policy
or configuration.
o Another challenge is choosing which identity provider to use for
which service.
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The EAP method used for ABFAB needs to meet the following
requirements:
o It needs to provide mutual authentication of the client and IdP.
o It needs to support channel binding.
As of this writing, the only EAP method that meets these criteria is
TEAP [I-D.ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method] either alone (if client
certificates are used) or with an inner EAP method that does mutual
authentication.
2.2.2. EAP Channel Binding
EAP channel binding is easily confused with a facility in GSS-API
also called channel binding. GSS-API channel binding provides
protection against man-in-the-middle attacks when GSS-API is used as
authentication inside some tunnel; it is similar to a facility called
cryptographic binding in EAP. See [RFC5056] for a discussion of the
differences between these two facilities and Section 6.1 for how GSS-
API channel binding is handled in this mechanism.
The client knows, in theory, the name of the RP that it attempted to
connect to, however in the event that an attacker has intercepted the
protocol, the client and the IdP need to be able to detect this
situation. A general overview of the problem along with a
recommended way to deal with the channel binding issues can be found
in RFC 6677 [RFC6677].
Since that document was published, a number of possible attacks were
found and methods to address these attacks have been outlined in
[I-D.ietf-emu-crypto-bind].
2.3. Client to Relying Party
The final set of interactions between parties to consider are those
between the client and the RP. In some ways this is the most complex
set since at least part of it is outside the scope of the ABFAB work.
The interactions between these parties include:
o Running the protocol that implements the service that is provided
by the RP and desired by the client.
o Authenticating the client to the RP and the RP to the client.
o Providing the necessary security services to the service protocol
that it needs beyond authentication.
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o Deal with client re-authentication where desired.
2.3.1. GSS-API
One of the remaining layers is responsible for integration of
federated authentication into the application. There are a number of
approaches that applications have adopted for security. So, there
may need to be multiple strategies for integration of federated
authentication into applications. However, we have started with a
strategy that provides integration to a large number of application
protocols.
Many applications such as SSH [RFC4462], NFS [RFC2203], DNS [RFC3645]
and several non-IETF applications support the Generic Security
Services Application Programming Interface [RFC2743]. Many
applications such as IMAP, SMTP, XMPP and LDAP support the Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422] framework. These
two approaches work together nicely: by creating a GSS-API mechanism,
SASL integration is also addressed. In effect, using a GSS-API
mechanism with SASL simply requires placing some headers on the front
of the mechanism and constraining certain GSS-API options.
GSS-API is specified in terms of an abstract set of operations which
can be mapped into a programming language to form an API. When
people are first introduced to GSS-API, they focus on it as an API.
However, from the prospective of authentication for non-web
applications, GSS-API should be thought of as a protocol as well as
an API. When looked at as a protocol, it consists of abstract
operations such as the initial context exchange, which includes two
sub-operations (gss_init_sec_context and gss_accept_sec_context). An
application defines which abstract operations it is going to use and
where messages produced by these operations fit into the application
architecture. A GSS-API mechanism will define what actual protocol
messages result from that abstract message for a given abstract
operation. So, since this work is focusing on a particular GSS-API
mechanism, we generally focus on protocol elements rather than the
API view of GSS-API.
The API view of GSS-API does have significant value as well, since
the abstract operations are well defined, the set of information that
a mechanism gets from the application is well defined. Also, the set
of assumptions the application is permitted to make is generally well
defined. As a result, an application protocol that supports GSS-API
or SASL is very likely to be usable with a new approach to
authentication including this one with no required modifications. In
some cases, support for a new authentication mechanism has been added
using plugin interfaces to applications without the application being
modified at all. Even when modifications are required, they can
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often be limited to supporting a new naming and authorization model.
For example, this work focuses on privacy; an application that
assumes it will always obtain an identifier for the client will need
to be modified to support anonymity, unlinkability or pseudonymity.
So, we use GSS-API and SASL because a number of the application
protocols we wish to federate support these strategies for security
integration. What does this mean from a protocol standpoint and how
does this relate to other layers? This means we need to design a
concrete GSS-API mechanism. We have chosen to use a GSS-API
mechanism that encapsulates EAP authentication. So, GSS-API (and
SASL) encapsulate EAP between the end-host and the service. The AAA
framework encapsulates EAP between the relying party and the identity
provider. The GSS-API mechanism includes rules about how initiators
and services are named as well as per-message security and other
facilities required by the applications we wish to support.
2.3.2. Protocol Transport
The transport of data between the client and the relying party is not
provided by GSS-API. GSS-API creates and consumes messages, but it
does not provide the transport itself, instead the protocol using
GSS-API needs to provide the transport. In many cases HTTP or HTTPS
is used for this transport, but other transports are perfectly
acceptable. The core GSS-API document [RFC2743] provides some
details on what requirements exist.
In addition we highlight the following:
o The transport does not need to provide either privacy or
integrity. After GSS-EAP has finished negotiation, GSS-API can be
used to provide both services. If the negotiation process itself
needs protection from eavesdroppers then the transport would need
to provide the necessary services.
o The transport needs to provide reliable transport of the messages.
o The transport needs to ensure that tokens are delivered in order
during the negotiation process.
o GSS-API messages need to be delivered atomically. If the
transport breaks up a message it must also reassemble the message
before delivery.
2.3.3. Reauthentication
TBD.
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3. Application Security Services
One of the key goals is to integrate federated authentication into
existing application protocols and where possible, existing
implementations of these protocols. Another goal is to perform this
integration while meeting the best security practices of the
technologies used to perform the integration. This section describes
security services and properties required by the EAP GSS-API
mechanism in order to meet these goals. This information could be
viewed as specific to that mechanism. However, other future
application integration strategies are very likely to need similar
services. So, it is likely that these services will be expanded
across application integration strategies if new application
integration strategies are adopted.
3.1. Authentication
GSS-API provides an optional security service called mutual
authentication. This service means that in addition to the initiator
providing (potentially anonymous or pseudonymous) identity to the
acceptor, the acceptor confirms its identity to the initiator.
Especially for the ABFAB context, this service is confusingly named.
We still say that mutual authentication is provided when the identity
of an acceptor is strongly authenticated to an anonymous initiator.
RFC 2743, unfortunately, does not explicitly talk about what mutual
authentication means. Within this document we therefore define it
as:
o If a target name is configured for the initiator, then the
initiator trusts that the supplied target name describes the
acceptor. This implies both that appropriate cryptographic
exchanges took place for the initiator to make such a trust
decision, and that after evaluating the results of these
exchanges, the initiator's policy trusts that the target name is
accurate.
o If no target name is configured for the initiator, then the
initiator trusts that the acceptor name, supplied by the acceptor,
correctly names the entity it is communicating with.
o Both the initiator and acceptor have the same key material for
per-message keys and both parties have confirmed they actually
have the key material. In EAP terms, there is a protected
indication of success.
Mutual authentication is an important defense against certain aspects
of phishing. Intuitively, clients would like to assume that if some
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party asks for their credentials as part of authentication,
successfully gaining access to the resource means that they are
talking to the expected party. Without mutual authentication, the
server could "grant access" regardless of what credentials are
supplied. Mutual authentication better matches this user intuition.
It is important, therefore, that the GSS-EAP mechanism implement
mutual authentication. That is, an initiator needs to be able to
request mutual authentication. When mutual authentication is
requested, only EAP methods capable of providing the necessary
service can be used, and appropriate steps need to be taken to
provide mutual authentication. While a broader set of EAP methods
could be supported by not requiring mutual authentication, it was
decided that the client needs to always have the ability to request
it. In some cases the IdP and the RP will not support mutual
authentication, however the client will always be able to detect this
and make an appropriate security decision.
The AAA infrastructure MAY hide the initiator's identity from the
GSS-API acceptor, providing anonymity between the initiator and the
acceptor. At this time, whether the identity is disclosed is
determined by EAP server policy rather than by an indication from the
initiator. Also, initiators are unlikely to be able to determine
whether anonymous communication will be provided. For this reason,
initiators are unlikely to set the anonymous return flag from
GSS_Init_Sec_context.
3.2. GSS-API Channel Binding
[RFC5056] defines a concept of channel binding which is used prevent
man-in-the-middle attacks. The channel binding works by taking a
cryptographic value from the transport security and checks that both
sides of the GSS-API conversation know this value. Transport Layer
Security (TLS) is the most common transport security layer used for
this purpose.
It needs to be stressed that RFC 5056 channel binding (also called
GSS-API channel binding when GSS-API is involved) is not the same
thing as EAP channel binding. GSS-API channel binding is used for
detecting Man-In-The-Middle attacks. EAP channel binding is used for
mutual authentication and acceptor naming checks. Details are
discussed in the mechanisms specification [I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap].
A fuller description of the differences between the facilities can be
found in RFC 5056 [RFC5056].
The use of TLS can provide both encryption and integrity on the
channel. It is common to provide SASL and GSS-API with these other
security services.
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One of the benefits that the use of TLS provides, is that client has
the ability to validate the name of the server. However this
validation is predicated on a couple of things. The TLS sessions
needs to be using certificates and not be an anonymous session. The
client and the TLS need to share a common trust point for the
certificate used in validating the server. TLS provides its own
server authentication. However there are a variety of situations
where this authentication is not checked for policy or usability
reasons. Even when it is checked, if the trust infrastructure behind
the TLS authentication is different from the trust infrastructure
behind the GSS-API mutual authentication then confirming the end-
points using both trust infrastructures is likely to enhance
security. If the endpoints of the GSS-API authentication are
different than the endpoints of the lower layer, this is a strong
indication of a problem such as a man-in-the-middle attack. Channel
binding provides a facility to determine whether these endpoints are
the same.
The GSS-EAP mechanism needs to support channel binding. When an
application provides channel binding data, the mechanism needs to
confirm this is the same on both sides consistent with the GSS-API
specification.
3.3. Host-Based Service Names
IETF security mechanisms typically take a host name and perhaps a
service, entered by a user, and make some trust decision about
whether the remote party in the interaction is the intended party.
This decision can be made by the use of certificates, pre-configured
key information or a previous leap of trust. GSS-API has defined a
relatively flexible name convention, however most of the IETF
applications that use GSS-API (including SSH, NFS, IMAP, LDAP and
XMPP) have chosen to use a more restricted naming convention based on
the host name. The GSS-EAP mechanism needs to support host-based
service names in order to work with existing IETF protocols.
The use of host-based service names leads to a challenging trust
delegation problem. Who is allowed to decide whether a particular
host name maps to a specific entity. Possible solutions to this
problem have been looked at.
o The public-key infrastructure (PKI) used by the web has chosen to
have a number of trust anchors (root certificate authorities) each
of which can map any host name to a public key.
o A number of GSS-API mechanisms, such as Kerberos [RFC1964], have
split the problem into two parts. A new concept called a realm is
introduced, the realm is responsible for host mapping within that
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realm. The mechanism then decides what realm is responsible for a
given name. This is the approach adopted by ABFAB.
GSS-EAP defines a host naming convention that takes into account the
host name, the realm, the service and the service parameters. An
example of GSS-API service name is "xmpp/foo@example.com". This
identifies the XMPP service on the host foo in the realm example.com.
Any of the components, except for the service name may be omitted
from a name. When omitted, then a local default would be used for
that component of the name.
While there is no requirement that realm names map to Fully Qualified
Domain Names (FQDN) within DNS, in practice this is normally true.
Doing so allows for the realm portion of service names and the
portion of NAIs to be the same. It also allows for the use of DNS in
locating the host of a service while establishing the transport
channel between the client and the relying party.
It is the responsibility of the application to determine the server
that it is going to communicate with, GSS-API has the ability to help
confirm that the server is the desired server but not to determine
the name of the server to use. It is also the responsibility of the
application to determine how much of the information identifying the
service needs to be validated by the ABFAB system. The information
that needs to be validated is used to build up the service name
passed into the GSS-EAP mechanism. What information is to be
validated will depend on both what information was provided by the
client, and what information is considered significant. If the
client only cares about getting a specific service, then the host and
realm that provides the service does not need to be validated.
In many cases applications may retrieve information about providers
of services from DNS. When Service Records (SRV) and Naming
Authority Pointer (NAPTR) records are used to help find a host that
provides a service, the security requirements on the referrals is
going to interact with the information used in the service name. If
a host name is returned from the DNS referrals, and the host name is
to be validated by GS-EAP, then it makes sense that the referrals
themselves should be secure. On the other hand, if the host name
returned is not validated, i.e. only the service is passed in, then
it is less important that the host name be obtained in a secure
manner.
Another issue that needs to be addressed for host-based service names
is that they do not work ideally when different instances of a
service are running on different ports. If the services are
equivalent, then it does not matter. However if there are
substantial differences in the quality of the service that
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information needs to be part of the validation process. If one has
just a host name and not a port in the information being validated,
then this is not going to be a successful strategy.
3.4. Additional GSS-API Services
GSS-API provides per-message security services that can provide
confidentiality and/or integrity. Some IETF protocols such as NFS
and SSH take advantage of these services. As a result GSS-EAP needs
to support these services. As with mutual authentication, per-
message services will limit the set of EAP methods that can be used
to those that generate a Master Session Key (MSK). Any EAP method
that produces an MSK is able to support per-message security services
described in [RFC2743].
GSS-API provides a pseudo-random function. This function generates a
pseudo-random sequence using the shared private key as the seed for
the bytes generated. This provides an algorithm that both the
initiator and acceptor can run in order to arrive at the same key
value. The use of this feature allows for an application to generate
keys or other shared secrets for use in other places in the protocol.
In this regards, it is similar in concept to the TLS extractor (RFC
5705 [RFC5705].). While no current IETF protocols require this, non-
IETF protocols are expected to take advantage of this in the near
future. Additionally, a number of protocols have found the TLS
extractor to be useful in this regards so it is highly probably that
IETF protocols may also start using this feature.
4. Privacy Considerations
ABFAB, as an architecture designed to enable federated authentication
and allow for the secure transmission of identity information between
entities, obviously requires careful consideration around privacy and
the potential for privacy violations.
This section examines the privacy related information presented in
this document, summarising the entities that are involved in ABFAB
communications and what exposure they have to identity information.
In discussing these privacy considerations in this section, we use
terminology and ideas from [I-D.iab-privacy-considerations].
Note that the ABFAB architecture uses at its core several existing
technologies and protocols; detailed privacy discussion around these
is not examined. This section instead focuses on privacy
considerations specifically related to overall architecture and usage
of ABFAB.
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+--------+ +---------------+ +--------------+
| Client | <---> | RP | <---> | AAA Client |
+--------+ +---------------+ +--------------+
^
|
v
+---------------+ +--------------+
| SAML Server | | AAA Proxy(s) |
+---------------+ +--------------+
^ ^
| |
v v
+------------+ +---------------+ +--------------+
| EAP Server | <---> | IdP | <---> | AAA Server |
+------------+ +---------------+ +--------------+
Figure 3: Entities and Data Flow
4.1. Entities and their roles
Categorizing the ABFAB entities shown in the Figure 3 according to
the taxonomy of terms from [I-D.iab-privacy-considerations] the
entities shown in Figure 3 is somewhat complicated as during the
various phases of ABFAB communications the roles of each entity
changes. The three main phases of relevance are the Client to RP
communication phase, the Client to IdP (via the Federation Substrate)
phase, and the IdP to RP (via the Federation Substrate) phase.
In the Client to RP communication phase, we have:
Initiator: Client.
Observers: Client, RP.
Recipient: RP.
In the Client to IdP (via the Federation Substrate) communication
phase, we have:
Initiator: Client.
Observers: Client, RP, AAA Client, AAA Proxy(s), AAA Server, IdP.
Recipient: IdP
In the IdP to Relying party (via the Federation Substrate)
communication phase, we have:
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Initiator: RP.
Observers: IdP, AAA Server, AAA Proxy(s), AAA Client, RP.
Recipient: IdP
Eavesdroppers and Attackers can reside on any communication link
between entities in Figure 3.
The Federation Substrate consists of all of the AAA entities. In
some cases the AAA Proxies entities may not exist as the AAA Client
can talk directly to the AAA Server. Specifications such as the
Trust Router Protocol and RADIUS dynamic discovery
[I-D.ietf-radext-dynamic-discovery] can be used to shorten the path
between the AAA client and the AAA server (and thus stop these AAA
Proxies from being Observers), however even in these circumstances
there may be AAA Proxies in the path.
In Figure 3 the IdP has been divided into multiple logical pieces, in
actual implementations these pieces will frequently be tightly
coupled. The links between these pieces provide the greatest
opportunity for attackers and eavesdroppers to acquire information,
however, as they are all under the control of a single entity they
are also the easiest to have tightly secured.
4.2. Privacy Aspects of ABFAB Communication Flows
In the ABFAB architecture, there are a few different types of data
and identifiers in use. The best way to understand them, and the
potential privacy impacts of them, is to look at each phase of
communication in ABFAB.
4.2.1. Client to RP
The flow of data between the client and the RP is divided into two
parts. The first part consists of all of the data exchanged as part
of the ABFAB authentication process. The second part consists of all
of the data exchanged after the authentication process has been
finished.
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During the initial communications phase, the client sends an NAI (see
[I-D.ietf-radext-nai]) to the RP. Many EAP methods (but not all)
allow for the client to disclose an NAI to RP the in a form that
includes only a realm component during this communications phase.
This is the minimum amount of identity information necessary for
ABFAB to work - it indicates an IdP that the principal has a
relationship with. EAP methods that do not allow this will
necessarily also reveal an identifier for the principal in the IdP
realm (e.g. a username).
The data shared during the initial communication phase may be
protected by a channel protocol such as TLS. This will prevent the
leak of information to passive eavesdroppers, however an active
attacker may still be able to setup as a man-in-the-middle. The
client may not be able to validate the certificates (if any) provided
by the service, defering the check of the identity of the RP until
the completion of the ABFAB authentication protocol (i.e., using EAP
channel binding).
The data exchanged after the authentication process can have privacy
and authentication using the GSS-API services. If the overall
application protocol allows for the process of re-authentication,
then the same privacy impliciations as discussed in previous
paragraphs apply.
4.2.2. Client to IdP (via Federation Substrate)
This phase sees a secure TLS tunnel initiated between the Client and
the IdP via the RP and federation substrate. The process is
initiated by the RP using the realm information given to it by the
client. Once set up, the tunnel is used to send credentials to IdP
to authenticate.
Various operational information is transported between RP and IdP,
over the AAA infrastructure, for example using RADIUS headers. As no
end-to-end security is provided by AAA, all AAA entities on the path
between the RP and IdP have the ability to eavesdrop on this
information unless additional security measures are taken (such as
the use of TLS for RADIUS [I-D.ietf-radext-dtls]). Some of this
information may form identifiers or explicit identity information:
o The Relying Party knows the IP address of the Client. It is
possible that the Relying Party could choose to expose this IP
address by including it in a RADIUS header such as Calling Station
ID. This is a privacy consideration to take into account of the
application protocol.
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o The EAP MSK is transported between the IdP and the RP over the AAA
infrastructure, for example through RADIUS headers. This is a
particularly important privacy consideration, as any AAA Proxy
that has access to the EAP MSK is able to decrypt and eavesdrop on
any traffic encrypted using that EAP MSK (i.e. all communications
between the Client and IdP).
o Related to the above, the AAA server has access to the material
necessary to derive the session key, thus the AAA server can
observe any traffic encrypted between the Client and RP. This
"feature" was" chosen as a simplification and to make performance
faster; if it was decided that this trade-off was not desireable
for privacy and security reasons, then extensions to ABFAB that
make use of techniques such as Diffie-Helman key exchange would
mitigate against this.
The choice of EAP method used has other potential privacy
implications. For example, if the EAP method in use does not support
trust anchors to enable mutual authentication, then there are no
guarantees that the IdP is who it claims to be, and thus the full NAI
including a username and a realm might be sent to any entity
masquerading as a particular IdP.
Note that ABFAB has not specified any AAA accounting requirements.
Implementations that use the accounting portion of AAA should
consider privacy appropriately when designing this aspect.
4.2.3. IdP to RP (via Federation Substrate)
In this phase, the IdP communicates with the RP informing it as to
the success or failure of authentication of the user, and optionally,
the sending of identity information about the principal.
As in the previous flow (Client to IdP), various operation
information is transported between IdP and RP over the AAA
infrastructure, and the same privacy considerations apply. However,
in this flow, explicit identity information about the authenticated
principal can be sent from the IdP to the RP. This information can
be sent through RADIUS headers, or using SAML
[I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml]. This can include protocol specific
identitifiers, such as SAML NameIDs, as well as arbitrary attribute
information about the principal. What information will be released
is controlled by policy on the Identity Provider. As before, when
sending this through RADIUS headers, all AAA entities on the path
between the RP and IdP have the ability to eavesdrop unless
additional security measures are taken (such as the use of TLS for
RADIUS [I-D.ietf-radext-dtls]). When sending this using SAML, as
specified in [I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml], confidentiality of the
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information should however be guaranteed as [I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml]
requires the use of TLS for RADIUS.
4.3. Relationship between User and Entities
o Between User and IdP - the IdP is an entity the user will have a
direct relationship with, created when the organisation that
operates the entity provisioned and exchanged the user's
credentials. Privacy and data protection guarantees may form a
part of this relationship.
o Between User and RP - the RP is an entity the user may or may not
have a direct relationship with, depending on the service in
question. Some services may only be offered to those users where
such a direct relationship exists (for particularly sensitive
services, for example), while some may not require this and would
instead be satisfied with basic federation trust guarantees
between themselves and the IdP). This may well include the option
that the user stays anonymous with respect to the RP (though
obviously never to the IdP). If attempting to preserve privacy
through the mitigation of data minimisation, then the only
attribute information about individuals exposed to the RP should
be that which is strictly necessary for the operation of the
service.
o Between User and Federation substrate - the user is highly likely
to have no knowledge of, or relationship with, any entities
involved with the federation substrate (not that the IdP and/or RP
may, however). Knowledge of attribute information about
individuals for these entities is not necessary, and thus such
information should be protected in such a way as to prevent access
to this information from being possible.
4.4. Accounting Information
Alongside the core authentication and authorization that occurs in
AAA communications, accounting information about resource consumption
may be delivered as part of the accounting exchange during the
lifetime of the granted application session.
4.5. Collection and retention of data and identifiers
In cases where Relying Parties do not require to identify a
particular individual when an individual wishes to make use of their
service, the ABFAB architecture enable anonymous or pseudonymous
access. Thus data and identifiers other than pseudonyms and
unlinkable attribute information need not be stored and retained.
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However, in cases where Relying Parties require the ability to
identify a particular individual (e.g. so they can link this identity
information to a particular account in their service, or where
identity information is required for audit purposes), the service
will need to collect and store such information, and to retain it for
as long as they require. Deprovisioning of such accounts and
information is out of scope for ABFAB, but obviously for privacy
protection any identifiers collected should be deleted when they are
no longer needed.
4.6. User Participation
In the ABFAB architecture, by its very nature users are active
participants in the sharing of their identifiers as they initiate the
communications exchange every time they wish to access a server.
They are, however, not involved in control of the set of information
related to them that transmitted from the IdP to RP for authorisation
purposes; rather, this is under the control of policy on the IdP.
Due to the nature of the AAA communication flows, with the current
ABFAB architecture there is no place for a process of gaining user
consent for the information to be released from IdP to RP.
5. Security Considerations
This document describes the architecture for Application Bridging for
Federated Access Beyond Web (ABFAB) and security is therefore the
main focus. This section highlights the main communication channels
and their security properties:
Client-to-RP Channel:
The channel binding material is provided by any certificates and
the final message (i.e., a cryptographic token for the channel).
Authentication may be provided by the RP to the client but a
deployment without authentication at the TLS layer is possible as
well. In addition, there is a channel between the GSS requestor
and the GSS acceptor, but the keying material is provided by a
"third party" to both entities. The client can derive keying
material locally, but the RP gets the material from the IdP. In
the absence of a transport that provides encryption and/or
integrity, the channel between the client and the RP has no
ability to have any cryptographic protection until the EAP
authentication has been completed and the MSK is transferred from
the IdP to the RP.
RP-to-IdP Channel:
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The security of this communication channel is mainly provided by
the functionality offered via RADIUS and Diameter. At the time of
writing there are no end-to-end security mechanisms standardized
and thereby the architecture has to rely on hop-by-hop security
with trusted AAA entities or, as an alternative but possible
deployment variant, direct communication between the AAA client to
the AAA server. Note that the authorization result the IdP
provides to the RP in the form of a SAML assertion may, however,
be protected such that the SAML related components are secured
end-to-end.
The MSK is transported from the IdP to the RP over this channel.
As no end-to-end security is provided by AAA, all AAA entities on
the path between the RP and IdP have the ability to eavesdrop if
no additional security measures are taken. One such measure is to
use a transport between the client and the IdP that provides
confidentiality.
Client-to-IdP Channel:
This communication interaction is accomplished with the help of
EAP and EAP methods. The offered security protection will depend
on the EAP method that is chosen but a minimum requirement is to
offer mutual authentication, and key derivation. The IdP is
responsible during this process to determine that the RP that is
communication to the client over the RP-to-IdP channel is the same
one talking to the IdP. This is accomplished via the EAP channel
binding.
Partial list of issues to be addressed in this section: Privacy,
SAML, Trust Anchors, EAP Algorithm Selection, Diameter/RADIUS/AAA
Issues, Naming of Entities, Protection of passwords, Channel Binding,
End-point-connections (TLS), Proxy problems
When a pseudonym is generated as a unique long term identifier for a
client by an IdP, care MUST be taken in the algorithm that it cannot
easily be reverse engineered by the service provider. If it can be
reversed then the service provider can consult an oracle to determine
if a given unique long term identifier is associated with a different
known identifier.
6. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA.
7. Acknowledgments
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We would like to thank Mayutan Arumaithurai, Klaas Wierenga and Rhys
Smith for their feedback. Additionally, we would like to thank Eve
Maler, Nicolas Williams, Bob Morgan, Scott Cantor, Jim Fenton, Paul
Leach, and Luke Howard for their feedback on the federation
terminology question.
Furthermore, we would like to thank Klaas Wierenga for his review of
the pre-00 draft version.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
2865, June 2000.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005.
[I-D.ietf-abfab-gss-eap]
Hartman, S. and J. Howlett, "A GSS-API Mechanism for the
Extensible Authentication Protocol", draft-ietf-abfab-gss-
eap-09 (work in progress), August 2012.
[I-D.ietf-abfab-aaa-saml]
Howlett, J. and S. Hartman, "A RADIUS Attribute, Binding,
Profiles, Name Identifier Format, and Confirmation Methods
for SAML", draft-ietf-abfab-aaa-saml-05 (work in
progress), February 2013.
[I-D.ietf-radext-nai]
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DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", draft-ietf-
radext-nai-02 (work in progress), January 2013.
[RFC6677] Hartman, S., Clancy, T., and K. Hoeper, "Channel-Binding
Support for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Methods", RFC 6677, July 2012.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC2903] de Laat, C., Gross, G., Gommans, L., Vollbrecht, J., and
D. Spence, "Generic AAA Architecture", RFC 2903, August
2000.
[I-D.nir-tls-eap]
Nir, Y., Sheffer, Y., Tschofenig, H., and P. Gutmann, "A
Flexible Authentication Framework for the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol using the Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", draft-nir-tls-eap-13 (work
in progress), December 2011.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]
Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", draft-
ietf-oauth-v2-31 (work in progress), August 2012.
[I-D.iab-privacy-considerations]
Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", draft-iab-privacy-
considerations-03 (work in progress), July 2012.
[I-D.perez-radext-radius-fragmentation]
Perez-Mendez, A., Lopez, R., Pereniguez-Garcia, F., Lopez-
Millan, G., Lopez, D., and A. DeKok, "Support of
fragmentation of RADIUS packets", draft-perez-radext-
radius-fragmentation-05 (work in progress), February 2013.
[RFC4017] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for
Wireless LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.
[RFC5106] Tschofenig, H., Kroeselberg, D., Pashalidis, A., Ohba, Y.,
and F. Bersani, "The Extensible Authentication Protocol-
Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (EAP-IKEv2)
Method", RFC 5106, February 2008.
[RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", RFC
1964, June 1996.
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[RFC2203] Eisler, M., Chiu, A., and L. Ling, "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol
Specification", RFC 2203, September 1997.
[RFC3645] Kwan, S., Garg, P., Gilroy, J., Esibov, L., Westhead, J.,
and R. Hall, "Generic Security Service Algorithm for
Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (GSS-TSIG)",
RFC 3645, October 2003.
[RFC2138] Rigney, C., Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson, W., and S.
Willens, "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS)", RFC 2138, April 1997.
[RFC4462] Hutzelman, J., Salowey, J., Galbraith, J., and V. Welch,
"Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
(GSS-API) Authentication and Key Exchange for the Secure
Shell (SSH) Protocol", RFC 4462, May 2006.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.
[RFC5080] Nelson, D. and A. DeKok, "Common Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service (RADIUS) Implementation Issues and
Suggested Fixes", RFC 5080, December 2007.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, March 2010.
[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, July 2010.
[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,
April 2010.
[RFC6614] Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
RFC 6614, May 2012.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-
core-2.0-os, March 2005.
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Internet-Draft ABFAB Architecture July 2013
[RFC2904] Vollbrecht, J., Calhoun, P., Farrell, S., Gommans, L.,
Gross, G., de Bruijn, B., de Laat, C., Holdrege, M., and
D. Spence, "AAA Authorization Framework", RFC 2904, August
2000.
[I-D.ietf-emu-crypto-bind]
Hartman, S., Wasserman, M., and D. Zhang, "EAP Mutual
Cryptographic Binding", draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind-03
(work in progress), March 2013.
[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-tunnel-method]
Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
"Tunnel EAP Method (TEAP) Version 1", draft-ietf-emu-eap-
tunnel-method-05 (work in progress), February 2013.
[I-D.ietf-radext-dtls]
DeKok, A., "DTLS as a Transport Layer for RADIUS", draft-
ietf-radext-dtls-03 (work in progress), January 2013.
[I-D.ietf-radext-dynamic-discovery]
Winter, S. and M. McCauley, "NAI-based Dynamic Peer
Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS", draft-ietf-
radext-dynamic-discovery-06 (work in progress), February
2013.
[WS-TRUST]
Lawrence, K., Kaler, C., Nadalin, A., Goodner, M., Gudgin,
M., Barbir, A., and H. Granqvist, "WS-Trust 1.4", OASIS
Standard ws-trust-200902, February 2009, <http://docs
.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/v1.4/ws-trust.html>.
[NIST-SP.800-63]
Burr, W., Dodson, D., and W. Polk, "Electronic
Authentication Guideline", NIST Special Publication
800-63, April 2006.
Authors' Addresses
Josh Howlett
JANET(UK)
Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell
Oxford OX11 0SG
UK
Phone: +44 1235 822363
Email: Josh.Howlett@ja.net
Howlett, et al. Expires January 31, 2014 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft ABFAB Architecture July 2013
Sam Hartman
Painless Security
Email: hartmans-ietf@mit.edu
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6
Espoo 02600
Finland
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Eliot Lear
Cisco Systems GmbH
Richtistrasse 7
Wallisellen, ZH CH-8304
Switzerland
Phone: +41 44 878 9200
Email: lear@cisco.com
Jim Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting
Email: ietf@augustcellars.com
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