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Extension of the CoAP-DTLS Profile for ACE to TLS
draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (ace WG)
Authors Olaf Bergmann , John Preuß Mattsson , Göran Selander
Last updated 2022-11-04 (Latest revision 2022-09-21)
Replaces draft-bergmann-ace-extend-dtls-authorize
Stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
Formats
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Daniel Migault
Shepherd write-up Show Last changed 2022-09-21
IESG IESG state AD Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed
Action Holders
Consensus boilerplate Yes
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD Roman Danyliw
Send notices to mglt.ietf@gmail.com
draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-04
ACE Working Group                                            O. Bergmann
Internet-Draft                                                       TZI
Updates: draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize (if             J. Preuß Mattsson
         approved)                                           G. Selander
Intended status: Standards Track                                Ericsson
Expires: 25 March 2023                                 21 September 2022

           Extension of the CoAP-DTLS Profile for ACE to TLS
                draft-ietf-ace-extend-dtls-authorize-04

Abstract

   This document updates the CoAP-DTLS profile for ACE by specifying
   that the profile applies to TLS as well as DTLS.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Authentication and
   Authorization for Constrained Environments Working Group mailing list
   (ace@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ace/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ace-wg/ace-extend-dtls-authorize.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 March 2023.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Connection Establishment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   [RFC9202] only specifies the use of DTLS [RFC6347] [RFC9147] but
   works equally well for TLS [RFC8446].  For many constrained
   implementations, CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] is the first choice, but
   when deploying ACE in networks controlled by other entities (such as
   the Internet), UDP might be blocked on the path between the client
   and the RS, and the client might have to fall back to CoAP over TCP
   [RFC8323] for NAT or firewall traversal.  This feature is supported
   by the OSCORE profile [RFC9203] but is lacking in the DTLS profile.

   This document updates [RFC9202] by specifying that the profile
   applies to TLS as well as DTLS.  The same access rights are valid in
   case transport layer security is provided by either DTLS or TLS, and
   the same access token can be used.  Therefore, the value coap_dtls in
   the ace_profile parameter of an AS-to-Client response or in the
   ace_profile claim of an access token indicates that either DTLS or
   TLS can be used for transport layer security.

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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in [RFC9200] and [RFC9202].

3.  Connection Establishment

   Following the procedures defined in [RFC9202], a Client can retrieve
   an Access Token from an Authorization Server (AS) in order to
   establish a security association with a specific Resource Server.
   The ace_profile parameter in the Client-to-AS request and AS-to-
   client response is used to determine the ACE profile that the Client
   uses towards the Resource Server (RS).

   In case the ace_profile parameter indicates the use of the DTLS
   profile for ACE as defined in [RFC9202], the Client MAY try to
   connect to the Resource Server via TLS, or try TLS and DTLS in
   parallel to accelerate the session setup.

   As resource-constrained devices are not expected to support both
   transport layer security mechanisms, a Client that implements either
   TLS or DTLS but not both might fail in establishing a secure
   communication channel with the Resource Server altogether.  This
   error SHOULD be handled by the Client in the same way as unsupported
   ACE profiles.  If the Client is modified accordingly or it learns
   that the Resource Server has been, the Client may try to connect to
   the Resource Server using the transport layer security mechanism that
   was previously not mutually supported.

   Note that a communication setup with an a priori unknown Resource
   Server typically employs an initial unauthorized resource request as
   illustrated in Section 2 of [RFC9202].  If this message exchange
   succeeds, the Client SHOULD first use the same underlying transport
   protocol for the establishment of the security association as well
   (i.e., DTLS for UDP, and TLS for TCP).

   As a consequence, the selection of the transport protocol used for
   the initial unauthorized resource request also depends on the
   transport layer security mechanism supported by the Client.  Clients
   that support either DTLS or TLS but not both SHOULD use the transport
   protocol underlying the supported transport layer security mechanism
   also for an initial unauthorized resource request.

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4.  IANA Considerations

   The following updates have been done for the "ACE Profiles" registry
   for the profile with Profile ID 1 and Profile name coap_dtls:

   Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
   with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.

   Description: Profile for delegating client Authentication and
   Authorization for Constrained Environments by establishing a Datagram
   Transport Layer Security (DTLS) or Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   channel between resource-constrained nodes.

   Change Controller: IESG

   Reference: [RFC-XXXX]

5.  Security Considerations

   The security consideration and requirements in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and
   BCP 195 [RFC7525] [RFC8996] also apply to this document.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

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   [RFC8323]  Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
              Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, Ed., "CoAP (Constrained
              Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
              RFC 8323, DOI 10.17487/RFC8323, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8323>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.

   [RFC9200]  Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
              H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
              Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework
              (ACE-OAuth)", RFC 9200, DOI 10.17487/RFC9200, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200>.

   [RFC9202]  Gerdes, S., Bergmann, O., Bormann, C., Selander, G., and
              L. Seitz, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
              Profile for Authentication and Authorization for
              Constrained Environments (ACE)", RFC 9202,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9202, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9202>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

   [RFC8996]  Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
              1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.

   [RFC9203]  Palombini, F., Seitz, L., Selander, G., and M. Gunnarsson,
              "The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
              (OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization
              for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework", RFC 9203,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9203, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9203>.

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Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Marco Tiloca for reviewing this
   specification.

Authors' Addresses

   Olaf Bergmann
   Universität Bremen TZI
   Bremen, D-28359
   Germany
   Email: bergmann@tzi.org

   John Preuß Mattsson
   Ericsson AB
   SE-164 80 Stockholm
   Sweden
   Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com

   Göran Selander
   Ericsson AB
   SE-164 80 Stockholm
   Sweden
   Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com

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