EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP
draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-00
ACE Working Group R. Marin
Internet-Draft University of Murcia
Intended status: Standards Track D. Garcia
Expires: August 26, 2021 University of Oviedo
February 22, 2021
EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP
draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-00
Abstract
This document describes an authentication service that uses EAP
transported by means of CoAP messages with the following purposes:
o Authenticate a CoAP-enabled device that enters a new security
domain managed by a domain Controller.
o Derive key material to protect CoAP messages exchanged between
them, enabling the establishment of a security association between
them.
o Optionally, to generate key material for other types of Security
Associations.
Generally speaking, this document is specifying an EAP lower layer
based on CoAP, to bring the benefits of EAP to IoT.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 26, 2021.
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Internet-Draft CoAP-EAP February 2021
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. General Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. General Flow Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. EAP over CoAP flow of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. The SeqNum Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Key Derivation for protecting CoAP messages . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Deriving the OSCORE Security Context . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Deriving DTLS_PSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Examples of Use Case Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Example 1: CoAP-EAP in ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Example 2: Multi-domain with AAA infrastructures . . . . 13
5.3. Example 3: Single domain with AAA infrastructure . . . . 13
5.4. Example 4: Single domain without AAA infrastructure . . . 13
5.5. Other use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5.1. CoAP-EAP for network access control . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5.2. CoAP-EAP for service authentication . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. CoAP as EAP lower-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Need for SeqNum Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3. Size of the EAP lower-layer vs EAP method size . . . . . 15
6.4. Controller as the CoAP Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5. Possible Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.1. Empty Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.2. Removing SeqNum Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.3. Further re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. Cryptographic suite selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. Freshness of the key material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.4. Additional Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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