EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP
draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (ace WG)
Authors Rafael Marin-Lopez  , Dan Garcia-Carrillo 
Last updated 2021-02-22
Stream Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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ACE Working Group                                               R. Marin
Internet-Draft                                      University of Murcia
Intended status: Standards Track                               D. Garcia
Expires: August 26, 2021                            University of Oviedo
                                                       February 22, 2021

               EAP-based Authentication Service for CoAP
                     draft-ietf-ace-wg-coap-eap-00

Abstract

   This document describes an authentication service that uses EAP
   transported by means of CoAP messages with the following purposes:

   o  Authenticate a CoAP-enabled device that enters a new security
      domain managed by a domain Controller.

   o  Derive key material to protect CoAP messages exchanged between
      them, enabling the establishment of a security association between
      them.

   o  Optionally, to generate key material for other types of Security
      Associations.

   Generally speaking, this document is specifying an EAP lower layer
   based on CoAP, to bring the benefits of EAP to IoT.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 26, 2021.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  General Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  General Flow Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  EAP over CoAP flow of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  The SeqNum Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Key Derivation for protecting CoAP messages . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.1.  Deriving the OSCORE Security Context  . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  Deriving DTLS_PSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Examples of Use Case Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Example 1:  CoAP-EAP in ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  Example 2: Multi-domain with AAA infrastructures  . . . .  13
     5.3.  Example 3: Single domain with AAA infrastructure  . . . .  13
     5.4.  Example 4: Single domain without AAA infrastructure . . .  13
     5.5.  Other use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.5.1.  CoAP-EAP for network access control . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.5.2.  CoAP-EAP for service authentication . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  CoAP as EAP lower-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  Need for SeqNum Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.3.  Size of the EAP lower-layer vs EAP method size  . . . . .  15
     6.4.  Controller as the CoAP Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     6.5.  Possible Optimizations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.5.1.  Empty Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.5.2.  Removing SeqNum Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.5.3.  Further re-authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.2.  Cryptographic suite selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.3.  Freshness of the key material . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     7.4.  Additional Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

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