Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Renewal Information (ARI) Extension
draft-ietf-acme-ari-06
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 9773.
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Aaron Gable | ||
| Last updated | 2024-12-06 (Latest revision 2024-10-17) | ||
| Replaces | draft-aaron-acme-ari | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
GENART IETF Last Call review
(of
-07)
by Sue Hares
Ready w/issues
TSVART IETF Last Call review
by Michael Tüxen
Ready w/issues
SECDIR IETF Last Call review
by Shawn Emery
Has issues
DNSDIR IETF Last Call review
by Geoff Huston
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||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Associated WG milestone |
|
||
| Document shepherd | Yoav Nir | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2024-11-04 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Became RFC 9773 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Deb Cooley | ||
| Send notices to | ynir.ietf@gmail.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA - Not OK | |
| IANA expert review state | Reviews assigned |
draft-ietf-acme-ari-06
ACME Working Group A. Gable
Internet-Draft Internet Security Research Group
Intended status: Standards Track 17 October 2024
Expires: 20 April 2025
Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Renewal Information
(ARI) Extension
draft-ietf-acme-ari-06
Abstract
This document specifies how an ACME server may provide suggestions to
ACME clients as to when they should attempt to renew their
certificates. This allows servers to mitigate load spikes, and
ensures clients do not make false assumptions about appropriate
certificate renewal periods.
Current Implementations
Draft note: this section will be removed by the editor before final
publication.
Let's Encrypt's Boulder (https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder)
software fully implements the server side of an earlier version of
this draft, and that implementation is deployed in both the
Production (https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory) and
Staging (https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory)
environments. Google Trust Services has done the same
(https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-
api_0503894189.html). Client implementations include Lego
(https://github.com/go-acme/lego), eggsampler
(https://github.com/eggsampler/acme), ACMEz
(https://github.com/mholt/acmez), and win-acme (https://github.com/
win-acme/win-acme).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 April 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Extensions to the Directory Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Getting Renewal Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. The "renewalInfo" Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. RenewalInfo Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Extensions to the Order Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. ACME Resource Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. ACME Renewal Info Object Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.3. ACME Order Object Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.4. ACME Error Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Example Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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1. Introduction
Most ACME [RFC8555] clients today choose when to attempt to renew a
certificate in one of three ways. They may be configured to renew at
a specific interval (e.g. via cron); they may parse the issued
certificate to determine its expiration date and renew a specific
amount of time before then; or they may parse the issued certificate
and renew when some percentage of its validity period has passed.
The first two techniques create significant barriers against the
issuing Certification Authority (CA) changing certificate lifetimes.
All three techniques lead to load clustering for the issuing CA.
Allowing issuing CAs to suggest a period in which clients should
renew their certificates enables for dynamic time-based load
balancing. This allows a CA to better respond to exceptional
circumstances. For example, a CA could suggest that clients renew
prior to a mass-revocation event to mitigate the impact of the
revocation, or a CA could suggest that clients renew earlier than
they normally would to reduce the size of an upcoming mass-renewal
spike.
This document specifies ACME Renewal Information (ARI), a mechanism
by which ACME servers may provide suggested renewal windows to ACME
clients, and by which ACME clients may inform ACME servers that a
certificate has been renewed and replaced.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Throughout this document, the word "renewal" and its variants are
taken to encompass any combination of "Renewal", "Re-Key", and
"Modification" as defined in [RFC3647].
This document assumes that the certificates being issued by the ACME
server are in compliance with [RFC5280], and in particular contain
the Authority Key Identifier extension and the keyIdentifier field
within that extension.
3. Extensions to the Directory Object
An ACME server which wishes to provide renewal information MUST
include a new field, renewalInfo, in its directory object.
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+=============+==============+
| Field | URL in Value |
+=============+==============+
| renewalInfo | Renewal info |
+-------------+--------------+
Table 1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{
"newNonce": "https://example.com/acme/new-nonce",
"newAccount": "https://example.com/acme/new-account",
"newOrder": "https://example.com/acme/new-order",
"newAuthz": "https://example.com/acme/new-authz",
"revokeCert": "https://example.com/acme/revoke-cert",
"keyChange": "https://example.com/acme/key-change",
"renewalInfo": "https://example.com/acme/renewal-info",
"meta": {
"termsOfService": "https://example.com/acme/terms/2021-10-05",
"website": "https://www.example.com/",
"caaIdentities": ["example.com"],
"externalAccountRequired": false
}
}
4. Getting Renewal Information
4.1. The "renewalInfo" Resource
The "renewalInfo" resource is a new resource type introduced to ACME
protocol. This new resource allows clients to query the server for
suggestions on when they should renew certificates.
To request the suggested renewal information for a certificate, the
client sends a GET request to a path under the server's renewalInfo
URL.
The path component is a unique identifier for the certificate in
question. The unique identifier is constructed by concatenating the
base64url-encoding [RFC4648] of the bytes of the keyIdentifier field
of certificate's Authority Key Identifier (AKI) [RFC5280] extension,
a literal period, and the base64url-encoding of the bytes of the DER
encoding of the certificate's Serial Number (without the tag and
length bytes). All trailing "=" characters MUST be stripped from
both parts of the unique identifier.
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Thus the full request url is constructed as follows (split onto
multiple lines for readability), where the "||" operator indicates
string concatenation and the renewalInfo url is taken from the
Directory object:
url = renewalInfo || '/' ||
base64url(AKI keyIdentifier) || '.' || base64url(Serial)
For example, to request renewal information for the end-entity
certificate given in Appendix A, the client would make the request as
follows:
1. The keyIdentifier field of the certificate's AKI extension has
the hexadecimal bytes
69:88:5B:6B:87:46:40:41:E1:B3:7B:84:7B:A0:AE:2C:DE:01:C8:D4 as
its ASN.1 Octet String value. The base64url encoding of those
bytes is aYhba4dGQEHhs3uEe6CuLN4ByNQ=.
2. The certificate's Serial Number field has the hexadecimal bytes
00:87:65:43:21 as its DER encoding (note the leading zero byte to
ensure the serial number remains positive despite the leading 1
bit in 0x87). The base64url encoding of those bytes is AIdlQyE=.
3. Stripping the trailing padding characters and concatenating with
the separator, the unique identifier is therefore
aYhba4dGQEHhs3uEe6CuLN4ByNQ.AIdlQyE, and the client makes the
request (split onto multiple lines for readability):
GET https://example.com/acme/renewal-info/
aYhba4dGQEHhs3uEe6CuLN4ByNQ.AIdlQyE
4.2. RenewalInfo Objects
The structure of an ACME renewalInfo resource is as follows:
suggestedWindow (object, required): A JSON object with two keys,
"start" and "end", whose values are timestamps, encoded in the format
specified in [RFC3339], which bound the window of time in which the
CA recommends renewing the certificate.
explanationURL (string, optional): A URL pointing to a page which may
explain why the suggested renewal window is what it is. For example,
it may be a page explaining the CA's dynamic load-balancing strategy,
or a page documenting which certificates are affected by a mass
revocation event. Conforming clients SHOULD provide this URL to
their operator, if present.
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Retry-After: 21600
{
"suggestedWindow": {
"start": "2021-01-03T00:00:00Z",
"end": "2021-01-07T00:00:00Z"
},
"explanationURL": "https://example.com/docs/ari"
}
The server SHOULD include a Retry-After header [RFC7231] indicating
the polling interval that the ACME server recommends. Servers should
select a value for this header based on their own operational
capabilities (e.g. how many requests per second they can handle) and
the regulatory enviornment in which they operate (e.g. mandated
revocation timelines). Conforming clients SHOULD query the
renewalInfo URL again when the Retry-After period has passed, as the
server may provide a different suggestedWindow.
Conforming clients MUST attempt renewal at a time of their choosing
based on the suggested renewal window. The following algorithm is
RECOMMENDED for choosing a renewal time:
1. Query the renewalInfo resource to get a suggested renewal window.
2. Select a uniform random time within the suggested window.
3. If the selected time is in the past, attempt renewal immediately.
4. Otherwise, if the client can schedule itself to attempt renewal
at exactly the selected time, do so.
5. Otherwise, if the selected time is before the next time that the
client would wake up normally, attempt renewal immediately.
6. Otherwise, sleep until the Retry-After period has passed, or
until the next normal wake time, and return to Step 1.
In all cases, renewal attempts are subject to the client's existing
error backoff and retry intervals.
In particular, cron-based clients may find they need to increase
their run frequency to check ARI more frequently. Those clients will
need to store information about failures so that increasing their run
frequency doesn't lead to retrying failures without proper backoff.
Typical information stored should include: number of failures for a
given order (defined by the set of names on the order), and time of
the most recent failure.
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If the client receives no response or a malformed response (e.g. an
end timestamp which is equal to or precedes the start timestamp), it
SHOULD make its own determination of when to renew the certificate,
and MAY retry the renewalInfo request with appropriate exponential
backoff behavior.
5. Extensions to the Order Object
In order to convey information regarding which certificate requests
represent renewals of previous certificates, a new field is added to
the Order object:
replaces (string, optional): A string uniquely identifying a
previously-issued certificate which this order is intended to
replace. This unique identifier is constructed in the same way as
the path component for GET requests described above.
Clients SHOULD include this field in New Order requests if there is a
clear predecessor certificate, as is the case for most certificate
renewals. Clients SHOULD NOT include this field if the ACME Server
has not indicated that it supports this protocol by advertising the
renewalInfo resource in its Directory.
POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
{
"protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
"nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/new-order"
}),
"payload": base64url({
"identifiers": [
{ "type": "dns", "value": "example.com" }
],
"replaces": "aYhba4dGQEHhs3uEe6CuLN4ByNQ.AIdlQyE"
}),
"signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
}
Servers SHOULD check that the identified certificate and the New
Order request correspond to the same ACME Account, that they share at
least one identifier, and that the identified certificate has not
already been marked as replaced by a different Order that is not
"invalid". Correspondence checks beyond this (such as requiring
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exact identifier matching) are left up to Server policy. If any of
these checks fail, the Server SHOULD reject the new-order request.
If the Server rejects the request because the identified certificate
has already been marked as replaced, it MUST return an HTTP 409
(Conflict) with a problem document of type "alreadyReplaced" (see
Section 7.4).
If the Server accepts a new-order request with a "replaces" field, it
MUST reflect that field in the response and in subsequent requests
for the corresponding Order object.
This replacement information may serve many purposes, including but
not limited to:
* granting New Order requests which arrive during the suggested
renewal window of their identified predecessor certificate higher
priority or allow them to bypass rate limits, if the Server's
policy uses such;
* tracking the replacement of certificates which have been affected
by a compliance incident, so that they can be revoked immediately
after they are replaced; and
* tying together certificates issued under the same contract with an
entity identified by External Account Binding.
6. Security Considerations
The extensions to the ACME protocol described in this document build
upon the Security Considerations and threat model defined in
[RFC8555], Section 10.1.
This document specifies that renewalInfo resources MUST be exposed
and accessed via unauthenticated GET requests, a departure from
RFC8555's requirement that clients must send POST-as-GET requests to
fetch resources from the server. This is because the information
contained in renewalInfo resources is not considered confidential,
and because allowing renewalInfo to be easily cached is advantageous
to shed load from clients which do not respect the Retry-After
header.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. ACME Resource Type
IANA will add the following entry to the "ACME Resource Types"
registry within the "Automated Certificate Management Environment
(ACME) Protocol" registry group at https://www.iana.org/assignments/
acme (https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme):
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+=============+=====================+===============+
| Field Name | Resource Type | Reference |
+=============+=====================+===============+
| renewalInfo | Renewal Info object | This document |
+-------------+---------------------+---------------+
Table 2
7.2. ACME Renewal Info Object Fields
IANA will add the following new registry to the "Automated
Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Protocol" registry group at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme):
Registry Name: ACME Renewal Info Object Fields
Registration Procedure: Specification Required
Template:
* Field name: The string to be used as a field name in the JSON
object
* Field type: The type of value to be provided, e.g., string,
boolean, array of string
* Reference: Where this field is defined
Initial contents:
+=================+============+===============+
| Field Name | Field type | Reference |
+=================+============+===============+
| suggestedWindow | object | This document |
+-----------------+------------+---------------+
| explanationURL | string | This document |
+-----------------+------------+---------------+
Table 3
7.3. ACME Order Object Fields
IANA will add the following entry to the "ACME Order Object Fields"
registry within the "Automated Certificate Management Environment
(ACME) Protocol" registry group at https://www.iana.org/assignments/
acme (https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme):
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+============+============+==============+===============+
| Field Name | Field Type | Configurable | Reference |
+============+============+==============+===============+
| replaces | string | true | This document |
+------------+------------+--------------+---------------+
Table 4
7.4. ACME Error Types
IANA will add the following entry to the "ACME Error Types" registry
within the "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)
Protocol" registry group at https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme):
+=================+===================================+===========+
| Type | Description | Reference |
+=================+===================================+===========+
| alreadyReplaced | The request specified a | This |
| | predecessor certificate which has | document |
| | already been marked as replaced | |
+-----------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
Table 5
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
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[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3647, November 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
Appendix A. Example Certificate
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBQzCB66ADAgECAgUAh2VDITAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAVMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpFeGFt
cGxlIENBMCIYDzAwMDEwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMDAwMTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMBYxFDAS
BgNVBAMTC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEeBZu
7cbpAYNXZLbbh8rNIzuOoqOOtmxA1v7cRm//AwyMwWxyHz4zfwmBhcSrf47NUAFf
qzLQ2PPQxdTXREYEnKMjMCEwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUaYhba4dGQEHhs3uEe6CuLN4B
yNQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDRwAwRAIge09+S5TZAlw5tgtiVvuERV6cT4mfutXIlwTb
+FYN/8oCIClDsqBklhB9KAelFiYt9+6FDj3z4KGVelYM5MdsO3pK
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Acknowledgments
My thanks to Roland Shoemaker and Jacob Hoffman-Andrews for coming up
with the initial idea of ARI and for helping me learn the IETF
process. Thanks also to Samantha Frank, Matt Holt, Ilari Liusvaara,
and Wouter Tinus for contributing client implementations, and to
Freddy Zhang for contributing an independent server implementation.
Finally, thanks to Rob Stradling, Andrew Ayer, and J.C. Jones for
providing meaningful feedback and suggestions which significantly
improved this specification.
Author's Address
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A. Gable
Internet Security Research Group
Email: aaron@letsencrypt.org
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