Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (anima WG)
Last updated 2019-06-04 (latest revision 2019-05-11)
Replaces draft-pritikin-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra
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Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Document shepherd Toerless Eckert
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2018-08-21)
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Send notices to "Toerless Eckert" <tte+ietf@cs.fau.de>
IANA IANA review state IANA - Not OK
ANIMA WG                                                     M. Pritikin
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                           M. Richardson
Expires: November 12, 2019                                     Sandelman
                                                            M. Behringer

                                                            S. Bjarnason
                                                          Arbor Networks
                                                               K. Watsen
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                            May 11, 2019

        Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
               draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-20

Abstract

   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic
   Control Plane.  To do this a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI)
   is created using manufacturer installed X.509 certificate, in
   combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online
   and offline.  Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable
   address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity,
   or on limited/disconnected networks.  Support for lower security
   models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for
   legacy reasons but not encouraged.  Bootstrapping is complete when
   the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is
   successfully deployed to the device but the established secure
   connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the
   device as well.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 12, 2019.

Pritikin, et al.        Expires November 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                    BRSKI                         May 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Prior Bootstrapping Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.3.  Scope of solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       1.3.1.  Support environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       1.3.2.  Constrained environments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       1.3.3.  Network Access Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       1.3.4.  Bootstrapping is not Booting  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     1.4.  Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps  . . .  11
     1.5.  Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI)
           devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   2.  Architectural Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.1.  Behavior of a Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.2.  Secure Imprinting using Vouchers  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     2.3.  Initial Device Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.3.1.  Identification of the Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       2.3.2.  MASA URI extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     2.4.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     2.5.  Architectural Components  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.5.1.  Pledge  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.5.2.  Join Proxy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.5.3.  Domain Registrar  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.5.4.  Manufacturer Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       2.5.5.  Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) . . . . . . . . . . .  21
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