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BRSKI-AE: Alternative Enrollment Protocols in BRSKI
draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae-13

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (anima WG)
Authors David von Oheimb , Steffen Fries , Hendrik Brockhaus
Last updated 2024-10-02 (Latest revision 2024-09-17)
Replaces draft-ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll
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draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae-13
ANIMA WG                                              D. von Oheimb, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  S. Fries
Intended status: Standards Track                            H. Brockhaus
Expires: 21 March 2025                                           Siemens
                                                       17 September 2024

          BRSKI-AE: Alternative Enrollment Protocols in BRSKI
                      draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae-13

Abstract

   This document defines enhancements to the Bootstrapping Remote Secure
   Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol, known as BRSKI-AE (Alternative
   Enrollment).
   BRSKI-AE extends BRSKI to support certificate enrollment mechanisms
   instead of the originally specified use of EST.  It supports
   certificate enrollment protocols, such as CMP, that use authenticated
   self-contained signed objects for certification messages, allowing
   for flexibility in network device onboarding scenarios.
   The enhancements address use cases where the existing enrollment
   mechanism may not be feasible or optimal, providing a framework for
   integrating suitable alternative enrollment protocols.
   This document also updates the BRSKI reference architecture to
   accommodate these alternative methods, ensuring secure and scalable
   deployment across a range of network environments.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-brski-ae/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the anima Working Group
   mailing list (mailto:anima@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/anima/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/anima-wg/anima-brski-ae.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Supported Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Terminology and abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Basic Requirements and Mapping to Solutions . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.1.  Solution Options for Proof of Possession  . . . . . . . .   9
     3.2.  Solution Options for Proof of Identity  . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Adaptations to BRSKI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Message Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.2.1.  Pledge - Registrar Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.2.2.  Pledge - Registrar - MASA Voucher Exchange  . . . . .  15
       4.2.3.  Pledge - Registrar - MASA Voucher Status Telemetry  .  15
       4.2.4.  Pledge - Registrar - RA/CA Certificate Enrollment . .  16
       4.2.5.  Pledge - Registrar Enrollment Status Telemetry  . . .  19
     4.3.  Enhancements to the Endpoint Addressing Scheme of
           BRSKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   5.  Instantiation with Existing Enrollment Protocols  . . . . . .  21
     5.1.  BRSKI-CMP: BRSKI-AE instantiated with CMP . . . . . . . .  21
     5.2.  Support of Other Enrollment Protocols . . . . . . . . . .  23
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23

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   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Appendix A.  Application Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     A.1.  Rolling Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     A.2.  Building Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     A.3.  Substation Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     A.4.  Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure  . . . . . . . .  30
     A.5.  Infrastructure Isolation Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
     A.6.  Sites with Insufficient Level of Operational Security . .  31
   Appendix B.  History of Changes TBD RFC Editor: please delete . .  31
   Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42

1.  Introduction

   BRSKI [RFC8995] is typically used with Enrollment over Secure
   Transport (EST, [RFC7030]) as the enrollment protocol for operator-
   specific device certificates, employing HTTP over TLS for secure
   message transfer.  BRSKI-AE is a variant using alternative enrollment
   protocols with authenticated self-contained objects for the device
   certificate enrollment.

   This approach offers several distinct advantages.  It allows for the
   authentication of the origin of requests and responses independently
   of message transfer mechanisms.  This capability facilitates end-to-
   end authentication (i.e., end-to-end proof of origin) across multiple
   transport hops and supports the asynchronous operation of certificate
   enrollment.  Consequently, this provides architectural flexibility in
   determining the location and timing for the ultimate authentication
   and authorization of certification requests, while ensuring that the
   integrity and authenticity of the enrollment messages is maintained
   with full cryptographic strength.

   This specification carries over the main characteristics of BRSKI,
   namely:

   *  The pledge is assumed to have received its Initial Device
      IDentifier (IDevID, [IEEE_802.1AR-2018]) credentials during its
      manufacturing.  It uses them to authenticate itself to the
      Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA, [RFC8995]), and
      to the registrar, which is the access point of the target domain,
      and to possibly further components of the domain where it will be
      operated.

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   *  The pledge first obtains via the voucher [RFC8366] exchange a
      trust anchor for authenticating entities in the domain such as the
      domain registrar.

   *  The pledge then obtains its Locally significant Device IDentifier
      (IDevID, [IEEE_802.1AR-2018]).  To this end, the pledge generates
      a private key, called LDevID secret, and requests via the domain
      registrar from the PKI of its new domain a domain-specific device
      certificate, called LDevID certificate.  On success, it receives
      the LDevID certificate along with its certificate chain.

   The objectives of BRSKI-AE are to enhance BRSKI by enabling LDevID
   certificate enrollment through the use of an alternative protocol to
   EST that:

   *  Supports end-to-end authentication over multiple transport hops.

   *  Facilitates secure message exchange over any type of transfer
      mechanism, including asynchronous delivery.

   It may be observed that the BRSKI voucher exchange between the
   pledge, registrar, and MASA involves the use of authenticated self-
   contained objects, which inherently possess these properties.

   The existing well-known URI structure used for BRSKI and EST messages
   is extended by introducing an additional path element that specifies
   the enrollment protocol being employed.

   This specification allows the registrar to offer multiple enrollment
   protocols, enabling pledges and their developers to select the most
   appropriate one based on the defined overall approach and specific
   endpoints.

   It may be important to note that BRSKI (RFC 8995) specifies the use
   of HTTP over TLS, but variations such as Constrained BRSKI
   [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] which uses CoAP over DTLS, are
   possible as well.  In this context, 'HTTP' and 'TLS' are used as
   references to the most common implementation, though variants using
   CoAP and/or DTLS are implied where applicable, as the distinctions
   are not pertinent here.

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   This specification, together with its referenced documents, is
   sufficient to support BRSKI with the Certificate Management Protocol
   (CMP, [RFC9480]) as profiled in the Lightweight CMP Profile (LCMPP,
   [RFC9483]).  Integrating BRSKI with an enrollment protocol or profile
   other than LCMPP will necessitate additional IANA registrations, as
   detailed in this document.  Furthermore, additional specifications
   may be required for the details of the protocol or profile, which
   fall outside the scope of this document.

1.1.  Supported Scenarios

   BRSKI-AE is designed for use in scenarios such as the following:

   *  Pledges and/or the target domain leverage an existing certificate
      enrollment protocol other than EST, such as CMP.

   *  The application context precludes the use of EST for certificate
      enrollment due to factors such as:

      -  The Registration Authority (RA) is not co-located with the
         registrar and requires end-to-end authentication of requesters,
         which EST does not support over multiple transport hops.

      -  The RA or Certification Authority (CA) operator mandates
         auditable proof of origin for Certificate Signing Requests
         (CSRs), which cannot be provided by TLS as it only offers
         transient source authentication.

      -  Certificates are requested for key types, such as Key
         Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) keys, that do not support signing
         or other single-shot proof-of-possession methods, as those
         described in [RFC6955].  EST, which relies on CSRs in PKCS #10
         [RFC2986] format, does not accommodate these key types because
         it necessitates proof-of-possession methods that operate within
         a single message, whereas proof of possession for KEM keys
         requires prior receipt of a fresh challenge value.

      -  The pledge implementation employs security libraries that do
         not support EST or uses a TLS library lacking support for the
         "tls-unique" value [RFC5929], which EST requires for the strong
         binding of source authentication.

   *  Full RA functionality is not available on-site within the target
      domain, and connectivity to an off-site RA may be intermittent or
      entirely offline.

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   *  Authoritative actions by a local RA at the registrar are
      insufficient for fully and reliably authorizing pledge
      certification requests, potentially due to a lack of access to
      necessary data or inadequate security measures, such as the local
      storage of private keys.

   Bootstrapping may be managed in various ways depending on the
   application domain.  Appendix A provides illustrative examples from
   different industrial control system environments and operational
   contexts that motivate the support of alternative enrollment
   protocols.

2.  Terminology and abbreviations

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document relies on the terminology defined in [RFC8995],
   [RFC5280], and [IEEE_802.1AR-2018], partly repeated here.  Also
   several further terms are described here.

   To be independent of the terminology of a specific enrollment
   protocol, this document utilizes generic terminology regarding PKI
   management operations.

   asynchronous:  time-wise interrupted delivery of messages,
      here between a pledge and some backend system (e.g., an RA)

   attribute request:  message requesting content to be included in the
      certification request

   attribute response:  message providing the answer to the attribute
      request

   authenticated self-contained object:  a data structure that is
      cryptographically bound to the identity of its originator by an
      attached digital signature on the actual object, using a private
      key of the originator such as the IDevID secret.

   backend:  placement of a domain component separately from the domain
      registrar; may be on-site or off-site

   BRSKI:  Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure [RFC8995]

   BRSKI-AE:  BRSKI with *A*lternative *E*nrollment, a variation of

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      BRSKI [RFC8995] in which BRSKI-EST, the enrollment protocol
      between pledge and the registrar, is replaced by enrollment
      protocols that support end-to-end authentication of the pledge to
      the RA, such as Lightweight CMP (see LCMPP).

   CA certs request:  message requesting CA certificates

   CA certs response:  message providing the answer to a CA certs
      request

   certificate confirm:  message stating to the backend PKI that the
      requester of a certificate received the new certificate and
      accepted it

   certification request:  message requesting a certificate with proof
      of identity

   certification response:  message providing the answer to a
      certification request

   CMP:  Certificate Management Protocol [RFC4210] [RFC9480]

   CSR:  Certificate Signing Request

   EST:  Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030]

   IDevID:  Initial Device IDentifier of a pledge, provided by the
      manufacturer and comprising a private key and the related X.509
      certificate with its chain

   LCMPP:  Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483]

   LDevID:  Locally significant Device IDentifier of a pledge, provided
      by its target domain and comprising a private key and the related
      X.509 certificate with its chain

   local RA (LRA):  a subordinate RA that is close to entities being
      enrolled and separate from a subsequent RA.  In BRSKI-AE it is
      needed if a backend RA is used, and in this case, the LRA is co-
      located with the registrar.

   MASA:  Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority, provides vouchers

   off-site:  locality of component or service or functionality, such as
      RA or CA, not at the site of the registrar.  This may be a central
      site or a cloud service, to which connection may be intermittent.

   on-site:  locality of a component or service or functionality at the

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      site of the registrar

   PKI/registrar confirm:  acknowledgment of the PKI on the certificate
      confirm

   pledge:  device that is to be bootstrapped into a target domain.  It
      requests an LDevID using IDevID credentials installed by its
      manufacturer.

   RA:  Registration Authority, the PKI component to which a CA
      typically delegates certificate management functions such as
      authenticating pledges and performing authorization checks on
      certification requests

   registrar:  short for domain registrar

   site:  the locality where an entity, such as a pledge, registrar, or
      PKI component is deployed.  The target domain may have multiple
      sites.

   synchronous:  time-wise uninterrupted delivery of messages, here
      between a pledge and a registrar or backend system (e.g., the
      MASA)

   target domain:  the domain that a pledge is going to be bootstrapped
      into

3.  Basic Requirements and Mapping to Solutions

   Based on the intended target scenarios described in Section 1.1 and
   the application examples described in Appendix A, the following
   requirements are derived to support authenticated self-contained
   objects as containers carrying certification requests.

   The following properties are required for a certification request:

   *  Proof of possession: demonstrates access to the private key
      corresponding to the public key contained in a certification
      request.  This is typically achieved by a self-signature using the
      corresponding private key but can also be achieved indirectly, see
      [RFC4210], Section 4.3.

   *  Proof of identity, also called proof of origin: provides data
      origin authentication of the certification request.  Typically,
      this is achieved by a signature using the pledge IDevID secret
      over some data, which needs to include a sufficiently strong
      identifier of the pledge, such as the device serial number
      typically included in the subject of the IDevID certificate.

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   The remainder of this section gives a non-exhaustive list of solution
   examples, based on existing technology described in IETF documents.

3.1.  Solution Options for Proof of Possession

   Certificate signing request (CSR) objects: CSRs are data structures
   protecting only the integrity of the contained data and providing
   proof of possession for a (locally generated) private key.  Important
   types of CSR data structures are:

   *  PKCS #10 [RFC2986].  This very common form of CSR is self-signed
      to protect its integrity and to prove possession of the private
      key that corresponds to the public key included in the request.

   *  Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF, [RFC4211]).  This less
      common but more general CSR format supports several ways of
      integrity protection and proof of possession.  Typically a self-
      signature is used, which is generated over (part of) the structure
      with the private key corresponding to the included public key.
      CRMF also supports further proof-of-possession methods for types
      of keys that do not have signing capability.  For details see
      [RFC4211], Section 4.

   It should be noted that the integrity protection of CSRs includes the
   public key because it is part of the data signed by the corresponding
   private key.  Yet this signature does not provide data origin
   authentication, i.e., proof of identity of the requester because the
   key pair involved is new and therefore does not yet have a confirmed
   identity associated with it.

3.2.  Solution Options for Proof of Identity

   Binding a certificate signing request (CSR) to an existing
   authenticated credential (the BRSKI context, the IDevID certificate)
   enables proof of origin, which in turn supports an authorization
   decision on the CSR.

   The binding of data origin authentication to the CSR is typically
   delegated to the protocol used for certificate management.  This
   binding may be achieved through security options in an underlying
   transport protocol such as TLS if the authorization of the
   certification request is (sufficiently) done at the next
   communication hop.  Depending on the key type, the binding can also
   be done in a stronger, transport-independent way by wrapping the CSR
   with a signature.

   This requirement is addressed by existing enrollment protocols in
   various ways, such as:

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   *  EST [RFC7030], also its variant EST-coaps [RFC9148], utilizes PKCS
      #10 to encode Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs).  While such a
      CSR has not been designed to include proof of origin, there is a
      limited, indirect way of binding it to the source authentication
      of the underlying TLS session.  This is achieved by including in
      the CSR the tls-unique value [RFC5929] resulting from the TLS
      handshake.  As this is optionally supported by the EST
      "/simpleenroll" endpoint used in BRSKI and the TLS handshake
      employed in BRSKI includes certificate-based client authentication
      of the pledge with its IDevID credentials, the proof of pledge
      identity being an authenticated TLS client can be bound to the
      CSR.

      Yet this binding is only valid in the context of the TLS session
      established with the registrar acting as the EST server and
      typically also as an RA.  So even such a cryptographic binding of
      the authenticated pledge identity to the CSR is not visible nor
      verifiable to authorization points outside the registrar, such as
      a (second) RA in the backend.  What the registrar needs to do is
      to authenticate and pre-authorize the pledge and to indicate this
      to the (second) RA by signing the forwarded certification request
      with its private key and a related certificate that has the id-kp-
      cmcRA extended key usage attribute.

      [RFC7030], Section 2.5 sketches wrapping PKCS #10-formatted CSRs
      with a Full PKI Request message sent to the "/fullcmc" endpoint.
      This would allow for source authentication at the message level,
      such that the registrar could forward it to external RAs in a
      meaningful way.  This approach is so far not sufficiently
      described and likely has not been implemented.

   *  SCEP [RFC8894] supports using a shared secret (passphrase) or an
      existing certificate to protect CSRs based on SCEP Secure Message
      Objects using CMS wrapping ([RFC5652]).  Note that the wrapping
      using an existing IDevID in SCEP is referred to as 'renewal'.
      This way SCEP does not rely on the security of the underlying
      message transfer.

   *  CMP [RFC4210] [RFC9480] supports using a shared secret
      (passphrase) or an existing certificate, which may be an IDevID
      credential, to authenticate certification requests via the
      PKIProtection structure in a PKIMessage.  The certification
      request is typically encoded utilizing CRMF, while PKCS #10 is
      supported as an alternative.  Thus, CMP does not rely on the
      security of the underlying message transfer.

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   *  CMC [RFC5272] also supports utilizing a shared secret (passphrase)
      or an existing certificate to protect certification requests,
      which can be either in CRMF or PKCS #10 structure.  The proof of
      identity can be provided as part of a FullCMCRequest, based on CMS
      [RFC5652] and signed with an existing IDevID secret.  Thus, CMC
      does not rely on the security of the underlying message transfer.

   To sum up, EST does not meet the requirements for authenticated self-
   contained objects, but SCEP, CMP, and CMC do.  This document
   primarily focuses on CMP as it has more industry adoption than CMC
   and SCEP has issues not detailed here.

4.  Adaptations to BRSKI

   To enable using alternative certificate enrollment protocols
   supporting end-to-end authentication, asynchronous enrollment, and
   more general system architectures, BRSKI-AE provides some
   generalizations on BRSKI [RFC8995].  This way, authenticated self-
   contained objects such as those described in Section 3 above can be
   used for certificate enrollment, and RA functionality can be deployed
   freely in the target domain.  Parts of the RA functionality can even
   be distributed over several nodes.

   The enhancements are kept to a minimum to ensure the reuse of already
   defined architecture elements and interactions.  In general, the
   communication follows the BRSKI model and utilizes the existing BRSKI
   architecture elements.  In particular, the pledge initiates
   communication with the domain registrar and interacts with the MASA
   as usual for voucher request and response processing.

4.1.  Architecture

   The key element of BRSKI-AE is that the authorization of a
   certification request MUST be performed based on an authenticated
   self-contained object.  The certification request is bound in a self-
   contained way to a proof of origin based on the IDevID credentials.
   Consequently, the certification request MAY be transferred using any
   mechanism or protocol.  Authentication and authorization of the
   certification request can be done by the domain registrar and/or by
   backend domain components.  As mentioned in Section 1.1, these
   components may be offline or off-site.  The registrar and other on-
   site domain components may have no or only temporary (intermittent)
   connectivity to them.

   This leads to generalizations in the placement and enhancements of
   the logical elements as shown in Figure 1.

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                                            +------------------------+
      +--------------Drop-Ship--------------| Vendor Service         |
      |                                     +------------------------+
      |                                     | M anufacturer|         |
      |                                     | A uthorized  |Ownership|
      |                                     | S igning     |Tracker  |
      |                                     | A uthority   |         |
      |                                     +--------------+---------+
      |                                                      ^
      |                                                      |
      V                                                      | BRSKI-
   +--------+     .........................................  | MASA
   |        |     .                                       .  |
   |        |     .  +-------+          +--------------+  .  |
   | Pledge |     .  | Join  |          | Domain       |<----+
   |        |<------>| Proxy |<-------->| Registrar    |  .
   |        |     .  |       |          | w/ LRA or RA |  .
   | IDevID |     .  +-------+          +--------------+  .
   |        |   BRSKI-AE over TLS                ^        .
   +--------+   using, e.g., LCMPP               |        .
                  .                              |        .
                  ...............................|.........
               on-site (local) domain components |
                                                 |
                                                 | e.g., LCMPP
                                                 |
    .............................................|...............
    . Public-Key Infrastructure                  v              .
    . +---------+     +---------------------------------------+ .
    . |         |<----+   Registration Authority RA           | .
    . |    CA   +---->|   (unless part of Domain Registrar)   | .
    . +---------+     +---------------------------------------+ .
    .............................................................
            backend (central or off-site) domain components

        Figure 1: Architecture Overview Using Backend PKI Components

   The architecture overview in Figure 1 has the same logical elements
   as BRSKI, but with a more flexible placement of the authentication
   and authorization checks on certification requests.  Depending on the
   application scenario, the registrar MAY still do all of these checks
   (as is the case in BRSKI), or part of them.

   The following list describes the on-site components in the target
   domain of the pledge shown in Figure 1.

   *  Join Proxy: same requirements as in BRSKI, see [RFC8995],
      Section 4

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   *  Domain Registrar including LRA or RA functionality: in BRSKI-AE,
      the domain registrar has mostly the same functionality as in
      BRSKI, namely to act as the gatekeeper of the domain for
      onboarding new devices and to facilitate the communication of
      pledges with their MASA and the domain PKI.  Yet there are some
      generalizations and specific requirements:

      1.  The registrar MUST support at least one certificate enrollment
          protocol with authenticated self-contained objects for
          certification requests.  To this end, the URI scheme for
          addressing endpoints at the registrar is generalized (see
          Section 4.3).

      2.  Rather than having full RA functionality, the registrar MAY
          act as a local registration authority (LRA) and delegate part
          of its involvement in certificate enrollment to a backend RA.
          In such scenarios, the registrar optionally checks
          certification requests it receives from pledges and forwards
          them to the backend RA, which performs the remaining parts of
          the enrollment request validation and authorization.  Note
          that to this end the backend RA may need information regarding
          the authorization of pledges from the registrar or from other
          sources.  On the way back, the registrar forwards responses by
          the PKI to the pledge on the same channel.

          To support end-to-end authentication of the pledge across the
          registrar to the backend RA, the certification request signed
          by the pledge needs to be upheld and forwarded by the
          registrar.  Therefore, the registrar cannot use for its
          communication with the PKI an enrollment protocol that is
          different from the enrollment protocol used between the pledge
          and the registrar.

      3.  The use of a certificate enrollment protocol with
          authenticated self-contained objects gives freedom how to
          transfer enrollment messages between the pledge and an RA.
          BRSKI demands that the RA accept certification requests for
          LDevIDs only with the consent of the registrar.  BRSKI-AE
          guarantees this also in case that the RA is not part of the
          registrar, even if the message exchange with backend systems
          is unprotected and involves further transport hops.  See
          Section 7 for details on how this can be achieved.

   Despite the above generalizations to the enrollment phase, the final
   step of BRSKI, namely the enrollment status telemetry, is kept as it
   is.

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   The following list describes the components provided by the vendor or
   manufacturer outside the target domain.

   *  MASA: functionality as described in BRSKI [RFC8995].  The voucher
      exchange with the MASA via the domain registrar is performed as
      described in BRSKI.

      Note: From the definition of the interaction with the MASA in
      [RFC8995], Section 5 follows that it may be synchronous (using
      voucher request with nonces) or asynchronous (using nonceless
      voucher requests).

   *  Ownership tracker: as defined in BRSKI.

   The following list describes backend target domain components, which
   may be located on-site or off-site in the target domain.

   *  RA: performs centralized certificate management functions as a
      public-key infrastructure for the domain operator.  As far as not
      already done by the domain registrar, it performs the final
      validation and authorization of certification requests.
      Otherwise, the RA co-located with the domain registrar directly
      connects to the CA.

   *  CA, also called domain CA: generates domain-specific certificates
      according to certification requests that have been authenticated
      and authorized by the registrar and/or an extra RA.

   Based on the diagram in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 2.1 and the
   architectural changes, the original protocol flow is divided into
   several phases showing commonalities and differences to the original
   approach as follows.

   *  Discovery phase: mostly as in BRSKI step (1).  For details see
      Section 4.2.1.

   *  Identification phase: same as in BRSKI step (2).

   *  Voucher exchange phase: same as in BRSKI steps (3) and (4).

   *  Voucher status telemetry: same as in BRSKI directly after step
      (4).

   *  Certificate enrollment phase: the use of EST in step (5) is
      changed to employing a certificate enrollment protocol that uses
      an authenticated self-contained object for requesting the LDevID
      certificate.

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      For transporting the certificate enrollment request and response
      messages, the (D)TLS channel established between pledge and
      registrar is REQUIRED to use.  To this end, the enrollment
      protocol, the pledge, and the registrar need to support the use of
      this existing channel for certificate enrollment.  Due to this
      architecture, the pledge does not need to establish additional
      connections for certificate enrollment and the registrar retains
      full control over the certificate enrollment traffic.

   *  Enrollment status telemetry: the final exchange of BRSKI step (5).

4.2.  Message Exchange

   The behavior of a pledge described in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 2.1 is
   kept, with one major exception.  After finishing the Imprint step
   (4), the Enroll step (5) MUST be performed with an enrollment
   protocol utilizing authenticated self-contained objects, as explained
   in Section 3.  Section 5 discusses selected suitable enrollment
   protocols and options applicable.

   An abstract overview of the BRSKI-AE protocol can be found at
   [BRSKI-AE-overview].

4.2.1.  Pledge - Registrar Discovery

   Discovery as specified in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 4 does not support
   the discovery of registrars with enhanced feature sets.  A pledge can
   not find out in this way whether discovered registrars support the
   certificate enrollment protocol it expects, such as CMP.

   As a more general solution, the BRSKI discovery mechanism can be
   extended to provide up-front information on the capabilities of
   registrars.  For further discussion, see
   [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery].

   In the absence of such a generally applicable solution, BRSKI-AE
   deployments may use their particular way of doing discovery.
   Section 5.1 defines a minimalist approach that MAY be used for CMP.

4.2.2.  Pledge - Registrar - MASA Voucher Exchange

   The voucher exchange is performed as specified in [RFC8995].

4.2.3.  Pledge - Registrar - MASA Voucher Status Telemetry

   The voucher status telemetry is performed as specified in [RFC8995],
   Section 5.7.

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4.2.4.  Pledge - Registrar - RA/CA Certificate Enrollment

   This replaces the EST integration for PKI bootstrapping described in
   [RFC8995], Section 5.9 (while [RFC8995], Section 5.9.4 remains as the
   final phase, see below).

   The certificate enrollment phase may involve the transmission of
   several messages.  Details can depend on the application scenario,
   the employed enrollment protocol, and other factors.

   The only message exchange REQUIRED is for the actual certification
   request and response.  Further message exchanges MAY be performed as
   needed.

   Note: The message exchanges marked OPTIONAL in the below Figure 2
   cover all those supported by the use of EST in BRSKI.  The last
   OPTIONAL one, namely certificate confirmation, is not supported by
   EST, but by CMP and other enrollment protocols.

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   +------+                          +---------+              +--------+
   |Pledge|                          |Domain   |              |Operator|
   |      |                          |Registrar|              |RA/CA   |
   |      |                          |(JRC)    |              |(PKI)   |
   +------+                          +---------+              +--------+
    |                                     |                           |
    |[OPTIONAL request of CA certificates]|                           |
    |------- CA Certs Request (1) ------->|                           |
    |                                     | [OPTIONAL forwarding]     |
    |                                     |--- CA Certs Request ----->|
    |                                     |<-- CA Certs Response -----|
    |<------ CA Certs Response (2) -------|                           |
    |                                     |                           |
    |[OPTIONAL request of attributes      |                           |
    | to include in Certification Request]|                           |
    |------- Attribute Request (3) ------>|                           |
    |                                     | [OPTIONAL forwarding]     |
    |                                     |--- Attribute Request ---->|
    |                                     |<-- Attribute Response ----|
    |<------ Attribute Response (4) ------|                           |
    |                                     |                           |
    |[REQUIRED certification request]     |                           |
    |------- Certification Request (5) -->|                           |
    |                                     | [OPTIONAL forwarding]     |
    |                                     |---Certification Request-->|
    |                                     |<--Certification Resp.  ---|
    |<----- Certification Response (6) ---|                           |
    |                                     |                           |
    |[OPTIONAL certificate confirmation]  |                           |
    |------- Certificate Confirm (7) ---->|                           |
    |                                     | [OPTIONAL forwarding]     |
    |                                     |--- Certificate Confirm--->|
    |                                     |<-- PKI Confirm -----------|
    |<------ PKI/Registrar Confirm (8) ---|                           |

               Figure 2: Certificate Enrollment Message Flow

   It may be noted that connections between the registrar and the PKI
   components of the operator (RA, CA, etc.) may be intermittent or off-
   line.  Messages should be sent as soon as sufficient transfer
   capacity is available.

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   The label [OPTIONAL forwarding] in Figure 2 means that on receiving
   from a pledge a request message of the given type, the registrar MAY
   answer the request directly.  In this case, it MUST authenticate its
   responses with the same credentials as used for authenticating itself
   at the TLS level for the voucher exchange.  Otherwise, the registrar
   MUST forward the request to the RA and forward any resulting response
   back to the pledge.

   The decision of whether to forward a request or to answer it directly
   can depend on various static and dynamic factors.  They include the
   application scenario, the capabilities of the registrar and of the
   local RA possibly co-located with the registrar, the enrollment
   protocol being used, and the specific contents of the request.

   Note that there are several options for how the registrar could be
   able to directly answer requests for CA certificates or for
   certification request attributes.  It could cache responses obtained
   from the domain PKI and later use their contents for responding to
   requests asking for the same data.  The contents could also be
   explicitly provisioned at the registrar.

   Further note that certification requests typically need to be handled
   by the backend PKI, but the registrar can answer them directly with
   an error response in case it determines that such a request should be
   rejected, for instance, because is not properly authenticated or not
   authorized.Also, certificate confirmation messages will usually be
   forwarded to the backend PKI, but if the registrar knows that they
   are not needed or wanted there it can acknowledge such messages
   directly.

   The following list provides an abstract description of the flow
   depicted in Figure 2.

   *  CA Certs Request (1): The pledge optionally requests the latest
      relevant CA certificates.  This ensures that the pledge has the
      complete set of current CA certificates beyond the pinned-domain-
      cert (which is contained in the voucher and which may be just the
      domain registrar certificate).

   *  CA Certs Response (2): This MUST contain any intermediate CA
      certificates that the pledge may need to validate certificates and
      MAY contain the LDevID trust anchor.

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   *  Attribute Request (3): Typically, the automated bootstrapping
      occurs without local administrative configuration of the pledge.
      Nevertheless, there are cases in which the pledge may also include
      in the Certification Request (5) additional attributes that are
      specific to the target domain.  To get these attributes in
      advance, the attribute request may be used.

   *  Attribute Response (4): This MUST contain the attributes requested
      in (3) to be included in the subsequent Certification Request (5).

      For example, [RFC8994], Section 6.11.7.2 specifies how the
      attribute request is used to signal to the pledge the acp-node-
      name field required for enrollment into an ACP domain.

   *  Certification Request (5): This MUST contain the authenticated
      self-contained object ensuring both the proof of possession of the
      corresponding private key and the proof of identity of the
      requester.

   *  Certification Response (6): This MUST contain on success the
      requested certificate and MAY include further information, like
      certificates of intermediate CAs and any additional trust anchors.

   *  Certificate Confirm (7): An optional confirmation sent after the
      requested certificate has been received and validated.  If sent,
      it MUST contain a positive or negative confirmation by the pledge
      to the PKI whether the certificate was successfully enrolled and
      fits its needs.

   *  PKI/Registrar Confirm (8): An acknowledgment by the PKI that MUST
      be sent on reception of the Certificate Confirm.

   The generic messages described above may be implemented using any
   certificate enrollment protocol that supports authenticated self-
   contained objects for the certification request as described in
   Section 3.  Examples are available in Section 5.

   Note that the optional certificate confirmation by the pledge to the
   PKI described above is independent of the mandatory enrollment status
   telemetry done between the pledge and the registrar in the final
   phase of BRSKI-AE, described next.

4.2.5.  Pledge - Registrar Enrollment Status Telemetry

   The enrollment status telemetry is performed as specified in
   [RFC8995], Section 5.9.4.

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   In BRSKI this is described as part of the certificate enrollment
   step, but due to the generalization on the enrollment protocol
   described in this document it is regarded as a separate phase here.

4.3.  Enhancements to the Endpoint Addressing Scheme of BRSKI

   BRSKI-AE extends the addressing scheme outlined in [RFC8995],
   Section 5, to support alternative enrollment protocols that utilize
   authenticated, self-contained objects for certification requests --
   see also Section 5).  These extensions are designed to be compatible
   with existing Registration Authorities (RAs) and Certification
   Authorities (CAs) that already support such enrollment protocols,
   enabling their use without requiring any modifications.

   The addressing scheme in BRSKI for certification requests and the
   related CA certificates and CSR attributes retrieval functions uses
   the definition from EST [RFC7030].  Here is the example of simple
   enrollment: "/.well-known/est/simpleenroll".  This approach is
   generalized to the following notation: "/.well-known/<enrollment-
   protocol>/<request>" in which <enrollment-protocol> refers to a
   certificate enrollment protocol.  Note that enrollment is considered
   here a message sequence that contains at least a certification
   request and a certification response.  The following conventions are
   used to provide maximal compatibility with BRSKI:

   *  <enrollment-protocol>: MUST reference the protocol being used.
      Existing values include 'est' [RFC7030] as in BRSKI and 'cmp' as
      in [RFC9483] and Section 5.1 below.  Values for other existing
      protocols such as CMC and SCEP, as well as for newly defined
      protocols are outside the scope of this document.  For use of the
      <enrollment-protocol> and <request> URI components, they would
      need to be specified in a suitable RFC and placed into the Well-
      Known URIs registry, just as EST in [RFC7030].

   *  <request>: if present, this path component MUST describe,
      depending on the enrollment protocol being used, the operation
      requested.  Enrollment protocols are expected to define their
      request endpoints, as done by existing protocols (see also
      Section 5).

   Well-known URIs for various endpoints on the domain registrar are
   already defined as part of the base BRSKI specification or indirectly
   by EST.  In addition, alternative enrollment endpoints MAY be
   supported by the registrar.

   A pledge SHOULD use the endpoints defined for the enrollment
   protocol(s) that it can use.  It will recognize whether the protocol
   it uses and the specific request it wants to perform are understood

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   and supported by the domain registrar by sending the request to the
   respective endpoint according to the above addressing scheme and then
   evaluating the HTTP status code of the response.  If the pledge uses
   endpoints that are not standardized, it risks that the registrar does
   not recognize a request and thus may reject it, even if the registrar
   supports the intended protocol and operation.

   The following list of endpoints provides an illustrative example of a
   domain registrar supporting several options for EST as well as for
   CMP to be used in BRSKI-AE.  The listing contains the supported
   endpoints to which the pledge may connect for bootstrapping.  This
   includes the voucher handling as well as the enrollment endpoints.
   The CMP-related enrollment endpoints are defined as well-known URIs
   in CMP Updates [RFC9480] and the Lightweight CMP Profile [RFC9483].

     /.well-known/brski/voucherrequest
     /.well-known/brski/voucher_status
     /.well-known/brski/enrollstatus
     /.well-known/est/cacerts
     /.well-known/est/csrattrs
     /.well-known/est/fullcmc
     /.well-known/cmp/getcacerts
     /.well-known/cmp/getcertreqtemplate
     /.well-known/cmp/initialization
     /.well-known/cmp/pkcs10

5.  Instantiation with Existing Enrollment Protocols

   This section maps the generic requirements to support proof of
   possession and proof of identity to selected existing certificate
   enrollment protocols and specifies further aspects of using such
   enrollment protocols in BRSKI-AE.

5.1.  BRSKI-CMP: BRSKI-AE instantiated with CMP

   In this document, references to CMP follow the Lightweight CMP
   Profile (LCMPP) [RFC9483] rather than [RFC4210] and [RFC9480], as the
   subset of CMP defined in LCMPP sufficiently meets the required
   functionality.

   Adherence to the LCMPP [RFC9483] is REQUIRED when using CMP.  The
   following specific requirements apply (refer to Figure 2):

   *  The validation of server response messages performed by the CMP
      client within the pledge MUST be based on the trust anchor
      established beforehand via the BRSKI voucher, i.e., on the pinned-
      domain-cert.

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      Note that the integrity and authenticity checks on the RA/CA by
      the CMP client can be stronger than for EST because they do not
      need to be performed hop-by-hop, but are usually end-to-end.

   *  CA Certs Request (1) and Response (2):
      Requesting CA certificates is OPTIONAL.
      If supported, it SHALL be implemented as specified in [RFC9483],
      Section 4.3.1.

   *  Attribute Request (3) and Response (4):
      Requesting certification request attributes is OPTIONAL.
      If supported, it SHALL be implemented as specified in [RFC9483],
      Section 4.3.3.

      Alternatively, the registrar MAY modify the requested certificate
      contents as specified in [RFC9483], Section 5.2.3.2.

   *  Certification Request (5) and Response (6):
      Certificates SHALL be requested and provided as specified in LCMPP
      [RFC9483], Section 4.1.1 (based on CRMF) or [RFC9483],
      Section 4.1.4 (based on PKCS #10).

      Proof of possession SHALL be provided in a manner suitable for the
      key type.  Proof of identity SHALL be provided by signature-based
      protection of the certification request message as outlined in
      [RFC9483], Section 3.2, using the IDevID secret.

      When the registrar forwards a certification request from the
      pledge to a backend RA/CA, it is RECOMMENDED that the registrar
      wraps the original certification request in a nested message
      signed with its own credentials, as described in [RFC9483],
      Section 5.2.2.1.  This approach explicitly conveys the registrar's
      consent to the RA while retaining the original certification
      request with the proof of origin provided by the pledge's
      signature.

      If additional trust anchors, beyond the pinned-domain-cert, need
      to be conveyed to the pledge, this SHOULD be done in the caPubs
      field of the certification response rather than through a CA Certs
      Response.

   *  Certificate Confirm (7) and PKI/Registrar Confirm (8):
      Explicit confirmation of new certificates to the RA/CA MAY be used
      as specified in [RFC9483], Section 4.1.1.

      Note that independent of the certificate confirmation within CMP,
      enrollment status telemetry with the registrar at the BRSKI level
      will be performed as described in [RFC8995], Section 5.9.4.

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   *  If delayed delivery of CMP messages is needed (e.g., to support
      enrollment over an asynchronous channel), it SHALL be performed as
      specified in Section 4.4 and Section 5.1.2 of [RFC9483].

   The mechanisms for exchanging messages between the registrar and
   backend PKI components (i.e., RA and/or CA) are outside the scope of
   this document.  CMP's independence from the message transfer
   mechanism allows for flexibility in choosing the appropriate exchange
   method based on the application scenario.  For the applicable
   security and privacy considerations, refer to Section 7 and
   Section 8.  Further guidance can be found in [RFC9483], Section 6.

   BRSKI-AE with CMP can also be combined with Constrained BRSKI
   [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher], using CoAP for enrollment
   message transport as described by CoAP Transport for CMP [RFC9482].
   In such scenarios, the EST-specific parts of
   [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] do not apply.

   For BRSKI-AE scenarios where a general solution for discovering
   registrars with CMP support is not available (cf.  Section 4.2.1),
   the following minimalist approach MAY be used: perform discovery as
   defined in BRSKI [RFC8995], Appendix B, but use the service name
   "brski-reg-cmp" (as defined in Section 6) instead of "brski-
   registrar" (as defined in [RFC8995], Section 8.6).  Note that this
   approach does not support join proxies.

5.2.  Support of Other Enrollment Protocols

   Further instantiations of BRSKI-AE can be done.  They are left for
   future work.

   In particular, CMC [RFC5272] (using its in-band source authentication
   options) and SCEP [RFC8894] (using its 'renewal' option) could be
   used.

   The fullCMC variant of EST sketched in [RFC7030], Section 2.5 might
   also be used here.  For EST-fullCMC further specification is
   necessary.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires one IANA action: register in the Service Name
   and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry
   (https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-
   names-port-numbers.xhtml) the following service name.

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   *Service Name:* brski-reg-cmp
   *Transport Protocol(s):* tcp
   *Assignee:* IESG iesg@ietf.org (mailto:iesg@ietf.org)
   *Contact:* IETF chair@ietf.org (mailto:chair@ietf.org)
   *Description:* Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure
   registrar with CMP capabilities according to the Lightweight CMP
   Profile (LCMPP, [RFC9483])
   *Reference:* [THISRFC]

   Note: We chose here the suffix "cmp" rather than some other
   abbreviation like "lcmpp" mainly because this document defines the
   normative CMP instantiation of BRSKI-AE, which implies adherence to
   LCMPP is necessary and sufficient.

7.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations laid out in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 11
   apply to the discovery and voucher exchange as well as for the status
   exchange information.

   In particular, even if the registrar delegates part or all of its RA
   role during certificate enrollment to a separate system, it still
   must be made sure that the registrar takes part in the decision on
   accepting or declining a request to join the domain, as required in
   [RFC8995], Section 5.3.  As this pertains also to obtaining a valid
   domain-specific certificate, it must be made sure that a pledge can
   not circumvent the registrar in the decision of whether it is granted
   an LDevID certificate by the CA.  There are various ways how to
   fulfill this, including:

   *  implicit consent

   *  the registrar signals its consent to the RA out-of-band before or
      during the enrollment phase, for instance by entering the pledge
      identity in a database.

   *  the registrar provides its consent using an extra message that is
      transferred on the same channel as the enrollment messages,
      possibly in a TLS tunnel.

   *  the registrar explicitly states its consent by signing, in
      addition to the pledge, the authenticated self-contained
      certificate enrollment request message.

   Note: If EST was used, the registrar could give implicit consent on a
   certification request by forwarding the request to a PKI entity using
   a connection authenticated with a certificate containing an id-kp-
   cmcRA extension.

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   When CMP is used, the security considerations laid out in the LCMPP
   [RFC9483] apply.

8.  Privacy Considerations

   The privacy considerations laid out in BRSKI [RFC8995], Section 10
   apply as well.

   Note that CMP messages themselves are not encrypted.  This may give
   eavesdroppers insight into which devices are bootstrapped into the
   domain.  This in turn might also be used to selectively block the
   enrollment of certain devices.

   To prevent such issues, the underlying message transport channel can
   be encrypted.  This is already provided by TLS between the pledge and
   the registrar, and for the onward exchange with backend systems,
   encryption may need to be added.

9.  Acknowledgments

   We thank Eliot Lear for his contributions as a co-author at an
   earlier draft stage.

   We thank Brian E.  Carpenter, Michael Richardson, and Giorgio
   Romanenghi for their input and discussion on use cases and call
   flows.

   Moreover, we thank Toerless Eckert (document shepherd), Barry Leiba
   (SECdir review), Mahesh Jethanandani (IETF area director), Meral
   Shirazipour (Gen-ART reviewer), Reshad Rahman (YANGDOCTORS reviewer),
   Deb Cooley, Gunter Van de Velde, John Scudder, Murray Kucherawy,
   Roman Danyliw, and Éric Vyncke (IESG reviewers), Michael Richardson
   (ANIMA design team member), as well as Rajeev Ranjan, Rufus Buschart,
   Andreas Reiter, and Szofia Fazekas-Zisch (Siemens colleagues) for
   their reviews with suggestions for improvements.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [IEEE_802.1AR-2018]
              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
              Networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE 802.1AR-2018,
              DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8423794, August 2018,
              <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.

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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8995]  Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
              May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.

   [RFC9483]  Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
              Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9483>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [BRSKI-AE-overview]
              S. Fries and D. von Oheimb, "BRSKI-AE Protocol Overview",
              March 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/116/materials/
              slides-116-anima-update-on-brski-ae-alternative-
              enrollment-protocols-in-brski-00>.  Graphics on slide 4 of
              the status update on the BRSKI-AE draft 04 at IETF 116.

   [I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery]
              Eckert, T. T. and E. Dijk, "Discovery for BRSKI
              variations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              anima-brski-discovery-04, 25 July 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-
              brski-discovery-04>.

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   [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
              Richardson, M., Van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., and E.
              Dijk, "Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (cBRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-25, 8 July
              2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              anima-constrained-voucher-25>.

   [IEC-62351-9]
              International Electrotechnical Commission, "IEC 62351 -
              Power systems management and associated information
              exchange - Data and communications security - Part 9:
              Cyber security key management for power system equipment",
              IEC 62351-9, May 2017.

   [ISO-IEC-15118-2]
              International Standardization Organization / International
              Electrotechnical Commission, "ISO/IEC 15118-2 Road
              vehicles - Vehicle-to-Grid Communication Interface - Part
              2: Network and application protocol requirements", ISO/
              IEC 15118-2, April 2014.

   [NERC-CIP-005-5]
              North American Reliability Council, "Cyber Security -
              Electronic Security Perimeter", CIP 005-5, December 2013.

   [OCPP]     Open Charge Alliance, "Open Charge Point Protocol 2.0.1
              (Draft)", December 2019.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2986>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4210>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5272]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5272>.

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   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5929]  Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
              for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5929>.

   [RFC6955]  Schaad, J. and H. Prafullchandra, "Diffie-Hellman Proof-
              of-Possession Algorithms", RFC 6955, DOI 10.17487/RFC6955,
              May 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6955>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.

   [RFC8366]  Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
              RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8366>.

   [RFC8894]  Gutmann, P., "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol",
              RFC 8894, DOI 10.17487/RFC8894, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8894>.

   [RFC8994]  Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
              Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8994>.

   [RFC9148]  van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M., and S.
              Raza, "EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with
              the Secure Constrained Application Protocol", RFC 9148,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9148, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9148>.

   [RFC9480]  Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and J. Gray, "Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP) Updates", RFC 9480,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9480, November 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9480>.

   [RFC9482]  Sahni, M., Ed. and S. Tripathi, Ed., "Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP) Transfer for the Certificate
              Management Protocol", RFC 9482, DOI 10.17487/RFC9482,
              November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9482>.

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   [UNISIG-Subset-137]
              UNISIG, "Subset-137; ERTMS/ETCS On-line Key Management
              FFFIS; V1.0.0", December 2015,
              <https://www.era.europa.eu/sites/default/files/filesystem/
              ertms/ccs_tsi_annex_a_-_mandatory_specifications/
              set_of_specifications_3_etcs_b3_r2_gsm-r_b1/index083_-
              _subset-137_v100.pdf>.
              http://www.kmc-subset137.eu/index.php/download/

Appendix A.  Application Examples

   This informative annex provides some detail about application
   examples.

A.1.  Rolling Stock

   Rolling stock or railroad cars contain a variety of sensors,
   actuators, and controllers, which communicate within the railroad car
   but also exchange information between railroad cars forming a train,
   with track-side equipment, and/or possibly with backend systems.
   These devices are typically unaware of backend system connectivity.
   Enrolling certificates may be done during maintenance cycles of the
   railroad car, but can already be prepared during operation.  Such
   asynchronous enrollment will include generating certification
   requests, which are collected and later forwarded for processing
   whenever the railroad car gets connectivity with the backend PKI of
   the operator.  The authorization of the certification request is then
   done based on the operator's asset/inventory information in the
   backend.

   UNISIG has included a CMP profile for the enrollment of TLS client
   and server X.509 certificates of on-board and track-side components
   in the Subset-137 specifying the ETRAM/ETCS online key management for
   train control systems [UNISIG-Subset-137].

A.2.  Building Automation

   In building automation scenarios, a detached building or the basement
   of a building may be equipped with sensors, actuators, and
   controllers that are connected to each other in a local network but
   with only limited or no connectivity to a central building management
   system.  This problem may occur during installation time but also
   during operation.  In such a situation a service technician collects
   the necessary data and transfers it between the local network and the
   central building management system, e.g., using a laptop or a mobile
   phone.  This data may comprise parameters and settings required in
   the operational phase of the sensors/actuators, like a component
   certificate issued by the operator to authenticate against other

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   components and services.

   The collected data may be provided by a domain registrar already
   existing in the local network.  In this case connectivity to the
   backend PKI may be facilitated by the service technician's laptop.
   Alternatively, the data can also be collected from the pledges
   directly and provided to a domain registrar deployed in a different
   network in preparation for the operational phase.  In this case,
   connectivity to the domain registrar may also be facilitated by the
   service technician's laptop.

A.3.  Substation Automation

   In electrical substation automation scenarios, a control center
   typically hosts PKI services to issue certificates for Intelligent
   Electronic Devices operated in a substation.  Communication between
   the substation and control center is performed through a
   proxy/gateway/DMZ, which terminates protocol flows.  Note that
   [NERC-CIP-005-5] requires inspection of protocols at the boundary of
   a security perimeter (the substation in this case).  In addition,
   security management in substation automation assumes central support
   of several enrollment protocols to support the various capabilities
   of IEDs from different vendors.  The IEC standard IEC62351-9
   [IEC-62351-9] specifies for the infrastructure side mandatory support
   of two enrollment protocols: SCEP [RFC8894] and EST [RFC7030], while
   an Intelligent Electronic Device may support only one of them.

A.4.  Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

   For electric vehicle charging infrastructure, protocols have been
   defined for the interaction between the electric vehicle and the
   charging point (e.g., ISO 15118-2 [ISO-IEC-15118-2]) as well as
   between the charging point and the charging point operator (e.g.
   OCPP [OCPP]).  Depending on the authentication model, unilateral or
   mutual authentication is required.  In both cases, the charging point
   uses an X.509 certificate to authenticate itself in TLS channels
   between the electric vehicle and the charging point.  The management
   of this certificate depends, among others, on the selected backend
   connectivity protocol.  In the case of OCPP, this protocol is meant
   to be the only communication protocol between the charging point and
   the backend, carrying all information to control the charging
   operations and maintain the charging point itself.  This means that
   the certificate management needs to be handled in-band of OCPP.  This
   requires the ability to encapsulate the certificate management
   messages in a transport-independent way.  Authenticated self-
   containment will support this by allowing the transport without a
   separate enrollment protocol, binding the messages to the identity of
   the communicating endpoints.

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A.5.  Infrastructure Isolation Policy

   This refers to any case in which network infrastructure is normally
   isolated from the Internet as a matter of policy, most likely for
   security reasons.  In such a case, limited access to external PKI
   services will be allowed in carefully controlled short periods of
   time, for example when a batch of new devices is deployed, and
   forbidden or prevented at other times.

A.6.  Sites with Insufficient Level of Operational Security

   The RA performing (at least part of) the authorization of a
   certification request is a critical PKI component and therefore
   requires higher operational security than components utilizing the
   issued certificates for their security features.  CAs may also demand
   higher security in the registration procedures from RAs, which domain
   registrars with co-located RAs may not be able to fulfill.
   Especially the CA/Browser forum currently increases the security
   requirements in the certificate issuance procedures for publicly
   trusted certificates, i.e., those placed in trust stores of browsers,
   which may be used to connect with devices in the domain.  In case the
   on-site components of the target domain can not be operated securely
   enough for the needs of an RA, this service should be transferred to
   an off-site backend component that has a sufficient level of
   security.

Appendix B.  History of Changes TBD RFC Editor: please delete

   List of reviewers:

   *  Toerless Eckert (document shepherd)

   *  Barry Leiba (SECdir)

   *  Mahesh Jethanandani (IETF area director)

   *  Meral Shirazipour (Gen-ART reviewer)

   *  Deb Cooley, Gunter Van de Velde, John Scudder, Murray Kucherawy,
      Roman Danyliw, and Éric Vyncke (IESG reviewers)

   *  Michael Richardson (ANIMA design team)

   *  Rajeev Ranjan, Rufus Buschart, Szofia Fazekas-Zisch, etc.
      (Siemens)

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   *  Reshad Rahman (YANGDOCTORS reviewer).  Note that YANGDOCTORS Early
      review of 2021-08-15 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/review-
      ietf-anima-brski-async-enroll-03-yangdoctors-early-rahman-
      2021-08-15/) referred to the PRM aspect of draft-ietf-anima-brski-
      async-enroll-03 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-
      anima-brski-async-enroll/03/).  This has been carved out of the
      draft to a different one and thus is no more applicable here.

   IETF draft ae-12 -> ae-13:

   *  Due to IANA requirement, shorten service name "brski-registrar-
      cmp" to "brski-reg-cmp"
      and change contact for service name registration from IESG to IETF

   *  Address Deb Cooley's DISCUSS by adding an item to the requirements
      list Section 5.1 making the source of the initial trust anchor
      explicit.
      Including the vouchers in Figure 2 would not fit because the
      figure has a different scope (namely, certificate enrollment) and
      would get overloaded.

   *  Address Gunter Van de Velde's comments by taking over essentially
      all his rewrites of text to help the structure and simplify
      reading the content, while keeping the original message, as it
      helps improve document quality

   *  Address John Scudder's comments by tweaking Section 2, fully
      alphabetizing terms

   *  Address Murray Kucherawy's comment by adapting terminology
      entries, leaving out 'communication' from 'asynchronous
      communication' and 'synchronous communication'

   *  Address Roman Danyliw's comments by updating reference
      I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery to I-D.ietf-anima-brski-discovery
      and adding Section 8, which refers to the BRSKI privacy
      considerations.

   *  Address Éric Vyncke's comment by replacing 'production' by
      'manufacturing'

   IETF draft ae-11 -> ae-12:

   *  Fix minor issues introduced during authors' response to the AD
      review,
      including nits spotted in the Gen-ART review by Meral Shirazipour

   IETF draft ae-10 -> ae-11:

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   *  In response to AD review by Mahesh Jethanandani,

      -  replace most occurrences of 'Note:' by 'Note that' or the like

      -  move 2nd paragraph of abstract to the introduction

      -  remove section 1.2 and merge its first paragraph with the
         preceding section

      -  reconsider normative language, replacing one 'may' by 'MAY' in
         section 4.1

      -  fix several ambiguities and hard-to-read sentences by re-
         phrasing them

      -  make wording more consistent, in particular: 'certification
         request'

      -  fix a number of (mostly grammar) nits

   *  Improve item on limitations of PKCS#10 regarding keys that cannot
      sign

   IETF draft ae-09 -> ae-10:

   *  Add reference to RFC 8633 at first occurrence of 'voucher' (fixes
      #37)

   *  Update reference of CoAP Transfer for CMP from I-D to RFC 9482

   *  Move RFC 4210 and RFC 9480 references from normative to
      informative

   *  Fix p10 vs. pkcs10 entry in list of example endpoints in
      Section 4.3

   *  Minor fix in Figure 1 and few text tweaks due to Siemens-internal
      review

   *  Extend the list of reviewers and acknowledgments by two Siemens
      colleagues

   IETF draft ae-08 -> ae-09:

   *  In response to review by Toerless,

      -  tweak abstract to make meaning of 'alternative enrollment' more
         clear

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      -  expand on first use not "well-known" abbreviations, such as
         'EST',
         adding also a references on their first use

      -  add summary and reason for choosing CMP at end of Section 3.2

      -  remove paragraph on optimistic discovery in controlled
         environments

      -  mention role of reviewers also in acknowledgments section

   *  A couple of grammar and spelling fixes

   IETF draft ae-07 -> ae-08:

   *  Update references to service names in Section 5.1

   IETF draft ae-06 -> ae-07:

   *  Update subsections on discovery according to discussion in the
      design team

   *  In Section 5.1, replace 'mandatory' by 'REQUIRED' regarding
      adherence to LCMPP,
      in response to SECDIR Last Call Review of ae-06 by Barry Leiba

   IETF draft ae-05 -> ae-06:

   *  Extend section on discovery according to discussion in the design
      team

   *  Make explicit that MASA voucher status telemetry is as in BRSKI

   *  Add note that on delegation, RA may need info on pledge
      authorization

   IETF draft ae-04 -> ae-05:

   *  Remove entries from the terminology section that should be clear
      from BRSKI

   *  Tweak use of the terms IDevID and LDevID and replace PKI RA/CA by
      RA/CA

   *  Add the abbreviation 'LCMPP' for Lightweight CMP Profile to the
      terminology section

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   *  State clearly in Section 5.1 that LCMPP is mandatory when using
      CMP

   *  Change URL of BRSKI-AE-overview graphics to slide on IETF 116
      meeting material

   IETF draft ae-03 -> ae-04:

   *  In response to SECDIR Early Review of ae-03 by Barry Leiba,

      -  replace 'end-to-end security' by the more clear 'end-to-end
         authentication'

      -  restrict the meaning of the abbreviation 'AE' to 'Alternative
         Enrollment'

      -  replace 'MAY' by 'may' in requirement on delegated registrar
         actions

      -  re-phrase requirement on certification request exchange,
         avoiding MANDATORY

      -  mention that further protocol names need be put in Well-Known
         URIs registry

      -  explain consequence of using non-standard endpoints, not
         following SHOULD

      -  remove requirement that 'caPubs' field in CMP responses SHOULD
         NOT be used

      -  add paragraph in security considerations on additional use of
         TLS for CMP

   *  In response to further internal reviews and suggestions for
      generalization,

      -  significantly cut down the introduction because the original
         motivations and most explanations are no more needed and would
         just make it lengthy to read

      -  sort out asynchronous vs. offline transfer, off-site vs.
         backend components

      -  improve description of CSRs and proof of possession vs. proof
         of origin

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      -  clarify that the channel between pledge and registrar is not
         restricted to TLS, but in connection with constrained BRSKI may
         also be DTLS.  Also move the references to Constrained BRSKI
         and CoAPS to better contexts.

      -  clarify that the registrar must not be circumvented in the
         decision to grant and LDevID, and give hints and
         recommendations how to make sure this

      -  clarify that the cert enrollment phase may involve additional
         messages and that BRSKI-AE replaces [RFC8995], Section 5.9
         (except Section 5.9.4)

      -  the certificate enrollment protocol needs to support transport
         over (D)TLS only as far as its messages are transported between
         pledge and registrar.

      -  the certificate enrollment protocol chosen between pledge and
         registrar needs to be used also for the upstream enrollment
         exchange with the PKI only if end-to-end authentication shall
         be achieved across the registrar to the PKI.

      -  add that with CMP, further trust anchors SHOULD be transported
         via caPubs

      -  remove the former Appendix A: "Using EST for Certificate
         Enrollment", moving relevant points to the list of scenarios in
         Section 1.1: "Supported Scenarios",

      -  streamline the item on EST in Section 3.2: "Solution Options
         for Proof of Identity",

      -  various minor editorial improvements like making the wording
         more consistent

   IETF draft ae-02 -> ae-03:

   *  In response to review by Toerless Eckert,

      -  many editorial improvements and clarifications as suggested,
         such as the comparison to plain BRSKI, the description of
         offline vs. synchronous message transfer and enrollment, and
         better differentiation of RA flavors.

      -  clarify that for transporting certificate enrollment messages
         between pledge and registrar, the TLS channel established
         between these two (via the join proxy) is used and the
         enrollment protocol MUST support this.

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      -  clarify that the enrollment protocol chosen between pledge and
         registrar MUST also be used for the upstream enrollment
         exchange with the PKI.

      -  extend the description and requirements on how during the
         certificate enrollment phase the registrar MAY handle requests
         by the pledge itself and otherwise MUST forward them to the PKI
         and forward responses to the pledge.

   *  Change "The registrar MAY offer different enrollment protocols" to
      "The registrar MUST support at least one certificate enrollment
      protocol ..."

   *  In response to review by Michael Richardson,

      -  slightly improve the structuring of the Message Exchange
         Section 4.2 and add some detail on the request/response
         exchanges for the enrollment phase

      -  merge the 'Enhancements to the Addressing Scheme' Section 4.3
         with the subsequent one: 'Domain Registrar Support of
         Alternative Enrollment Protocols'

      -  add reference to SZTP (RFC 8572)

      -  extend venue information

      -  convert output of ASCII-art figures to SVG format

      -  various small other text improvements as suggested/provided

   *  Remove the tentative informative application to EST-fullCMC

   *  Move Eliot Lear from co-author to contributor, add Eliot to the
      acknowledgments

   *  Add explanations for terms such as 'target domain' and 'caPubs'

   *  Fix minor editorial issues and update some external references

   IETF draft ae-01 -> ae-02:

   *  Architecture: clarify registrar role including RA/LRA/enrollment
      proxy

   *  CMP: add reference to CoAP Transport for CMPV2 and Constrained
      BRSKI

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   *  Include venue information

   From IETF draft 05 -> IETF draft ae-01:

   *  Renamed the repo and files from 'anima-brski-async-enroll' to
      'anima-brski-ae'

   *  Added graphics for abstract protocol overview as suggested by
      Toerless Eckert

   *  Balanced (sub-)sections and their headers

   *  Added details on CMP instance, now called BRSKI-CMP

   From IETF draft 04 -> IETF draft 05:

   *  David von Oheimb became the editor.

   *  Streamline wording, consolidate terminology, improve grammar, etc.

   *  Shift the emphasis towards supporting alternative enrollment
      protocols.

   *  Update the title accordingly - preliminary change to be approved.

   *  Move comments on EST and detailed application examples to
      informative annex.

   *  Move the remaining text of section 3 as two new sub-sections of
      section 1.

   From IETF draft 03 -> IETF draft 04:

   *  Moved UC2-related parts defining the pledge in responder mode to a
      separate document.  This required changes and adaptations in
      several sections.  Main changes concerned the removal of the
      subsection for UC2 as well as the removal of the YANG model
      related text as it is not applicable in UC1.

   *  Updated references to the Lightweight CMP Profile (LCMPP).

   *  Added David von Oheimb as co-author.

   From IETF draft 02 -> IETF draft 03:

   *  Housekeeping, deleted open issue regarding YANG voucher-request in
      UC2 as voucher-request was enhanced with additional leaf.

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   *  Included open issues in YANG model in UC2 regarding assertion
      value agent-proximity and CSR encapsulation using SZTP sub
      module).

   From IETF draft 01 -> IETF draft 02:

   *  Defined call flow and objects for interactions in UC2.  Object
      format based on draft for JOSE signed voucher artifacts and
      aligned the remaining objects with this approach in UC2 .

   *  Terminology change: issue #2 pledge-agent -> registrar-agent to
      better underline agent relation.

   *  Terminology change: issue #3 PULL/PUSH -> pledge-initiator-mode
      and pledge-responder-mode to better address the pledge operation.

   *  Communication approach between pledge and registrar-agent changed
      by removing TLS-PSK (former section TLS establishment) and
      associated references to other drafts in favor of relying on
      higher layer exchange of signed data objects.  These data objects
      are included also in the pledge-voucher-request and lead to an
      extension of the YANG module for the voucher-request (issue #12).

   *  Details on trust relationship between registrar-agent and
      registrar (issue #4, #5, #9) included in UC2.

   *  Recommendation regarding short-lived certificates for registrar-
      agent authentication towards registrar (issue #7) in the security
      considerations.

   *  Introduction of reference to agent signing certificate using SKID
      in agent signed data (issue #11).

   *  Enhanced objects in exchanges between pledge and registrar-agent
      to allow the registrar to verify agent-proximity to the pledge
      (issue #1) in UC2.

   *  Details on trust relationship between registrar-agent and pledge
      (issue #5) included in UC2.

   *  Split of use case 2 call flow into sub sections in UC2.

   From IETF draft 00 -> IETF draft 01:

   *  Update of scope in Section 1.1 to include in which the pledge acts
      as a server.  This is one main motivation for use case 2.

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   *  Rework of use case 2 to consider the transport between the pledge
      and the pledge-agent.  Addressed is the TLS channel establishment
      between the pledge-agent and the pledge as well as the endpoint
      definition on the pledge.

   *  First description of exchanged object types (needs more work)

   *  Clarification in discovery options for enrollment endpoints at the
      domain registrar based on well-known endpoints in Section 4.3 do
      not result in additional /.well-known URIs.  Update of the
      illustrative example.  Note that the change to /brski for the
      voucher-related endpoints has been taken over in the BRSKI main
      document.

   *  Updated references.

   *  Included Thomas Werner as additional author for the document.

   From individual version 03 -> IETF draft 00:

   *  Inclusion of discovery options of enrollment endpoints at the
      domain registrar based on well-known endpoints in Section 4.3 as
      replacement of section 5.1.3 in the individual draft.  This is
      intended to support both use cases in the document.  An
      illustrative example is provided.

   *  Missing details provided for the description and call flow in
      pledge-agent use case UC2, e.g. to accommodate distribution of CA
      certificates.

   *  Updated CMP example in Section 5 to use Lightweight CMP instead of
      CMP, as the draft already provides the necessary /.well-known
      endpoints.

   *  Requirements discussion moved to separate section in Section 3.
      Shortened description of proof-of-identity binding and mapping to
      existing protocols.

   *  Removal of copied call flows for voucher exchange and registrar
      discovery flow from [RFC8995] in Section 4 to avoid doubling or
      text or inconsistencies.

   *  Reworked abstract and introduction to be more crisp regarding the
      targeted solution.  Several structural changes in the document to
      have a better distinction between requirements, use case
      description, and solution description as separate sections.
      History moved to appendix.

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   From individual version 02 -> 03:

   *  Update of terminology from self-contained to authenticated self-
      contained object to be consistent in the wording and to underline
      the protection of the object with an existing credential.  Note
      that the naming of this object may be discussed.  An alternative
      name may be attestation object.

   *  Simplification of the architecture approach for the initial use
      case having an off-site PKI.

   *  Introduction of a new use case utilizing authenticated self-
      contain objects to onboard a pledge using a commissioning tool
      containing a pledge-agent.  This requires additional changes in
      the BRSKI call flow sequence and led to changes in the
      introduction, the application example,and also in the related
      BRSKI-AE call flow.

   *  Update of provided examples of the addressing approach used in
      BRSKI to allow for support of multiple enrollment protocols in
      Section 4.3.

   From individual version 01 -> 02:

   *  Update of introduction text to clearly relate to the usage of
      IDevID and LDevID.

   *  Definition of the addressing approach used in BRSKI to allow for
      support of multiple enrollment protocols in Section 4.3.  This
      section also contains a first discussion of an optional discovery
      mechanism to address situations in which the registrar supports
      more than one enrollment approach.  Discovery should avoid that
      the pledge performs a trial and error of enrollment protocols.

   *  Update of description of architecture elements and changes to
      BRSKI in Section 4.1.

   *  Enhanced consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the
      context of mapping the requirements to existing solutions in
      Section 3 and in Section 5.

   From individual version 00 -> 01:

   *  Update of examples, specifically for building automation as well
      as two new application use cases in Appendix A.

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   *  Deletion of asynchronous interaction with MASA to not complicate
      the use case.  Note that the voucher exchange can already be
      handled in an asynchronous manner and is therefore not considered
      further.  This resulted in removal of the alternative path the
      MASA in Figure 1 and the associated description in Section 4.1.

   *  Enhancement of description of architecture elements and changes to
      BRSKI in Section 4.1.

   *  Consideration of existing enrollment protocols in the context of
      mapping the requirements to existing solutions in Section 3.

   *  New section starting Section 5 with the mapping to existing
      enrollment protocols by collecting boundary conditions.

Contributors

   Eliot Lear
   Cisco Systems
   Richtistrasse 7
   CH-8304 Wallisellen
   Switzerland
   Phone: +41 44 878 9200
   Email: lear@cisco.com

Authors' Addresses

   David von Oheimb (editor)
   Siemens AG
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   81739 Munich
   Germany
   Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/

   Steffen Fries
   Siemens AG
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   81739 Munich
   Germany
   Email: steffen.fries@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/

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   Hendrik Brockhaus
   Siemens AG
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   81739 Munich
   Germany
   Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/

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