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Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-14

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Document	Type	This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
	Authors	Michael Richardson , Peter Van der Stok , Panos Kampanakis , Esko Dijk
	Last updated	2021-10-25 (Latest revision 2021-07-25)
	Replaces	draft-richardson-anima-ace-constrained-voucher
	RFC stream	Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-14

anima Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works
Updates: 8366, 8995 (if approved) P. van der Stok
Intended status: Standards Track vanderstok consultancy
Expires: 28 April 2022 P. Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
E. Dijk
IoTconsultancy.nl
25 October 2021

Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-14

Abstract

This document defines a protocol to securely assign a Pledge to an
owner and to enroll it into the owner's network. The protocol uses
an artifact that is signed by the Pledge's manufacturer. This
artifact is known as a "voucher".

This document builds upon the work in [RFC8366] and [BRSKI], but
defines an encoding of the voucher in CBOR rather than JSON, and
enables the Pledge to perform its transactions using CoAP rather than
HTTPS.

The use of Raw Public Keys instead of X.509 certificates for security
operations is also explained.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022.

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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Overview of Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Updates to RFC8366 and RFC8995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. BRSKI-EST Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Registrar and the Server Name Indicator (SNI) . . . . . . 8
6.2. TLS Client Certificates: IDevID authentication . . . . . 9
6.3. Discovery, URIs and Content Formats . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3.1. RFC8995 Telemetry Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.4. Join Proxy options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.5. Extensions to BRSKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.5.1. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.5.2. CoAP responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.6. Extensions to EST-coaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.6.1. Pledge Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.6.2. EST-client Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.6.3. Registrar Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.7. DTLS handshake fragmentation Considerations . . . . . . . 18
7. BRSKI-MASA Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. Protocol and Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. Registrar Voucher Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.3. MASA and the Server Name Indicator (SNI) . . . . . . . . 19
7.3.1. Registrar Certificate Requirement . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. Pinning in Voucher Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.1. Registrar Identity Selection and Encoding . . . . . . . . 20
8.2. MASA Pinning Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.3. Pinning of Raw Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.4. Considerations for use of IDevID-Issuer . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.1. Voucher Request artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.1.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

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9.1.2. SID values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.1.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.1.4. Example voucher request artifact . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.2. Voucher artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.2.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.2.2. SID values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9.2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
9.2.4. Example voucher artifacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9.3. Signing voucher and voucher-request artifacts with
COSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10. Deployment specific Discovery Considerations . . . . . . . . 38
10.1. 6TSCH Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10.2. Generic networks using GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10.3. Generic networks using mDNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10.4. Thread networks using Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) . . 39
10.5. Non-mesh networks using CoAP Discovery . . . . . . . . . 39
11. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12. Raw Public Key Use Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12.1. The Registrar Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12.2. The Pledge Voucher Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
12.3. The Voucher Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
13.1. Duplicate serial-numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
13.2. IDevID security in Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
13.3. Security of CoAP and UDP protocols . . . . . . . . . . . 42
13.4. Registrar Certificate may be self-signed . . . . . . . . 42
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
14.1. Resource Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
14.2. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
14.3. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
14.4. The RFC SID range assignment sub-registry . . . . . . . 43
14.5. Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
14.5.1. application/voucher-cose+cbor . . . . . . . . . . . 44
14.6. CoAP Content-Format Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
16. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix A. Library support for BRSKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.1. OpensSSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A.2. mbedTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.3. wolfSSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix B. Constrained BRSKI-EST messages . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B.1. enrollstatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B.2. voucher_status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Appendix C. COSE examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
C.1. Pledge, Registrar and MASA keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

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C.1.1. Pledge private key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
C.1.2. Registrar private key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
C.1.3. MASA private key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
C.2. Pledge, Registrar and MASA certificates . . . . . . . . . 59
C.2.1. Pledge IDevID certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
C.2.2. Registrar Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C.2.3. MASA Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
C.3. COSE signed voucher request from Pledge to Registrar . . 65
C.4. COSE signed voucher request from Registrar to MASA . . . 67
C.5. COSE signed voucher from MASA to Pledge via Registrar . . 69
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

1. Introduction

Secure enrollment of new nodes into constrained networks with
constrained nodes presents unique challenges. As explained in
[RFC7228], the networks are challenged and the nodes are constrained
by energy, memory space, and code size.

The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol
described in [RFC8995] provides a solution for secure zero-touch
(automated) bootstrap of new (unconfigured) devices. In it, new
devices, such as IoT devices, are called "pledges", and equipped with
a factory-installed Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) (see
[ieee802-1AR]), they are enrolled into a network.

The BRSKI solution described in [RFC8995] was designed to be modular,
and this document describes a version scaled to the constraints of
IoT deployments.

Therefore, this document defines a constrained version of the voucher
artifact (described in [RFC8366]), along with a constrained version
of BRSKI. This constrained-BRSKI protocol makes use of the
constrained CoAP-based version of EST (EST-coaps from
[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]) rather than the EST over HTTPS [RFC7030].

In BRSKI, the the [RFC8366] voucher is by default serialized to JSON
with a signature in CMS [RFC5652]. This document defines a new
voucher serialization to CBOR [RFC8949] with a signature in COSE
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct].

This COSE-signed CBOR-encoded voucher is transported using secured
CoAP and HTTPS.

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The CoAP connection (between Pledge and Registrar) is to be protected
by either OSCORE+EDHOC [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc] or DTLS (CoAPS). The
HTTP connection (between Registrar and MASA) is to be protected using
TLS (HTTPS).

This document specifies a constrained voucher-request artifact based
on Section 3 of [RFC8995], and voucher(-request) transport over CoAP
based on Section 3 of [RFC8995] and on [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].

The CBOR definitions for the constrained voucher format are defined
using the mechanism described in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] using the
SID mechanism explained in [I-D.ietf-core-sid]. As the tooling to
convert YANG documents into a list of SID keys is still in its
infancy, the table of SID values presented here MUST be considered
normative rather than the output of the pyang tool.

There is additional work when the voucher is integrated into the key-
exchange, described in [I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz]. This work is
not in scope for this document.

2. Terminology

The following terms are defined in [RFC8366], and are used
identically as in that document: artifact, domain, imprint, Join
Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing
Authority (MASA), Pledge, Registrar, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and
Voucher.

The following terms from [RFC8995] are used identically as in that
document: Domain CA, enrollment, IDevID, Join Proxy, LDevID,
manufacturer, nonced, nonceless, PKIX.

The term Pledge Voucher Request, or acronym PVR, is introduced to
refer to the voucher request between the pledge and the Registrar.

The term Registrar Voucher Request, or acronym RVR, is introduced to
refer to the voucher request between the Registrar and the MASA.

3. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

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4. Overview of Protocol

[RFC8366] provides for vouchers that assert proximity, that
authenticate the Registrar and that can offer varying levels of anti-
replay protection.

The proximity proof provided for in [RFC8366], is an assertion that
the Pledge and the Registrar are believed to be in close together,
from a network topology point of view. Like in [RFC8995], proximity
shown by making TLS connections between the Pledge and Registrar
using IPv6 Link-Local addresses.

The TLS connection is used to make a Voucher Request. This request
is verified by the an agent of the Pledge's manufacturer, which then
issues a voucher. The voucher provides an authorization statement
from the manufacturer indicating that the Registrar is the intended
owner of the device. The voucher refers to the Registrar through
pinning of the Registrar's identity.

This document does not make any extensions to the semantic meaning of
vouchers, only the encoding has been changed to optimize for
constrained devices and networks. The two main parts of the BRSKI
protocol are named separately in this document: BRSKI-EST for the
protocol between Pledge and Registrar, and BRSKI-MASA for the
protocol between the Registrar and the MASA.

Time-based vouchers are supported in this definition, but given that
constrained devices are extremely unlikely to have accurate time,
their use will be uncommon. Most Pledges using constrained vouchers
will be online during enrollment and will use live nonces to provide
anti-replay protection rather than expiry times.

[RFC8366] defines the voucher artifact, while the Voucher Request
artifact was defined in [RFC8995]. This document defines both a
constrained voucher and a constrained voucher-request. They are
presented in the order "voucher-request", followed by a "voucher"
response as this is the order that they occur in the protocol.

The constrained voucher request MUST be signed by the Pledge. It
signs using the private key associated with its IDevID X.509
certificate, or if an IDevID is not available, then the private key
associated with its manufacturer-installed raw public key (RPK).
Section 12 provides additional details on PKIX-less operations.

The constrained voucher MUST be signed by the MASA.

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For the constrained voucher request this document defines two
distinct methods for the Pledge to identify the Registrar: using
either the Registrar's X.509 certificate, or using a raw public key
(RPK) of the Registrar.

For the constrained voucher also these two methods are supported to
indicate (pin) a trusted domain identity: using either a pinned
domain X.509 certificate, or a pinned raw public key (RPK).

The BRSKI architectures mandates that the MASA be aware of the
capabilities of the pledge. This is not a hardship as the pledges
are constructed by a manufacturer who also arranges for the MASA to
be aware of the inventory of devices.

The MASA therefore knows if the pledge supports PKIX operations, PKIX
format certificates, or if the pledge is limited to Raw Public Keys
(RPK). Based upon this, the MASA can select which attributes to use
in the voucher for certain operations, like the pinning of the
Registrar identity. This is described in more detail in
Section 9.2.3, Section 8 and Section 8.3 (for RPK specifically).

5. Updates to RFC8366 and RFC8995

This section details the ways in which this document Updates. The
terminology for Updates is taken from [I-D.kuehlewind-update-tag].

This document Updates [RFC8366]. It Extends [RFC8366] by creating a
new serialization format.

This document Updates [RFC8995]. It Amends [RFC8995] by clarifying
how pinning is done, and ???.

6. BRSKI-EST Protocol

This section describes the constrained BRSKI extensions to EST-coaps
[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] to transport the voucher between Registrar
and Pledge (optionally via a Join Proxy) over CoAP. The extensions
are targeting low-resource networks with small packets.

The constrained BRSKI-EST protocol described in this section is
between the Pledge and the Registrar only.

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6.1. Registrar and the Server Name Indicator (SNI)

A DTLS connection is established between the pledge and the
Registrar. As described in Section 5.1 of [RFC8995] the pledge
establishes a TLS connection to the Registrar. This occurs via a
variety of Join Proxy mechanisms described in Section 6.4.
Regardless of the mechanism, the DTLS connection should operate
identically.

This issue affects [RFC8995] as well, and is reported in errata:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6648

As the Registrar is discovered by IP address, and connected via the
Join proxy, the name of the Registrar is not known to the Pledge.
The Pledge will not know what the hostname for the Registrar is, so
the pledge can not do RFC6125 DNS-ID validation on the Registrar's
certificate. That is the purpose of the RFC8366 voucher.

As the Pledge does not know the name of the Registrar, the Pledge
cannot put any reasonable value into the [RFC6066] Server Name
Indicator (SNI). The pledge SHOULD omit the SNI extension as per
Section 9.2 of [RFC8446].

In some cases, particularly when debugging and doing interoperability
testing, a Pledge may be given the hostname of a particular Registrar
to connect to. Such a bypass of the discovery process may result in
the Pledge taking a different path to DTLS connection, and may result
in the SNI being inserted by a library. The Registrar MUST ignore
any SNI seen.

A primary motivation for making the SNI ubiquitous in the public web
is because it allows for multi-tenant hosting of HTTPS sites on a
single (scarce) IPv4 address. This consideration does not apply to
the Registrar because:

* it uses DTLS and CoAP, not HTTPS

* it uses IPv6, often [RFC4193] Unique Local Address, which are
plentiful

* the port number number is discovered, so multiple tenants can be
accomodate via unique port numbers.

As per Section 3.6.1 of [RFC7030], the Registrar certificate MUST
have the Extended Key Usage (EKU) id-kp-cmcRA. This certificate is
also used as a TLS Server Certificate, so it must also have the EKU
id-kp-serverAuth.

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6.2. TLS Client Certificates: IDevID authentication

As described in Section 5.1 of [RFC8995], the Pledge makes a
connection to the Registrar using TLS Client Certificate for
authentication.

Subsequently the pledge will send a Pledge Voucher Request (PVR).

As explained below in Section 8.1, the "x5bag" may be used in the RVR
to communicate identity of the Registrar to MASA. The Pledge SHOULD
NOT use the x5bag attribute in this way in the PVR. A Registrar that
processes a PVR with an x5bag attribute MUST ignore it, and MUST use
only the TLS Client Certificate extension for authentication of the
Pledge.

A situation where the pledge MAY use the x5bag is for communications
of certificate chains to the MASA. This would arise in some vendor
specific situations involving outsourcing of MASA functionality, or
rekey of IDevID certification authority.

6.3. Discovery, URIs and Content Formats

To keep the protocol messages small the EST-coaps and constrained-
BRSKI URIs are shorter than the respective EST and BRSKI URIs.

The EST-coaps server URIs differ from the EST URIs by replacing the
scheme https by coaps and by specifying shorter resource path names.
Below are some examples; the first two using a discovered short path
name and the last one using the well-known URI of EST which requires
no discovery.

coaps://server.example.com/est/<short-name>
coaps://server.example.com/e/<short-name>
coaps://server.example.com/.well-known/est/<short-name>

Similarly the constrained BRSKI server URIs differ from the BRSKI
URIs by replacing the scheme https by coaps and by specifying shorter
resource path names. Below are some examples; the first two using a
discovered short path name and the last one using the well-known URI
prefix which requires no discovery. This is the same "/.well-known/
brski" prefix as defined in Section 5 of [RFC8995].

coaps://server.example.com/brski/<short-name>
coaps://server.example.com/b/<short-name>
coaps://server.example.com/.well-known/brski/<short-name>

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Figure 5 in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations
supported by EST, for which Table 1 in Section 5.1 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] enumerates the corresponding EST-coaps short
path names. Similarly, Table 1 provides the mapping from the
supported BRSKI extension URI paths to the constrained-BRSKI URI
paths.

+=================+============================+
| BRSKI resource | constrained-BRSKI resource |
+=================+============================+
| /requestvoucher | /rv |
+-----------------+----------------------------+
| /voucher_status | /vs |
+-----------------+----------------------------+
| /enrollstatus | /es |
+-----------------+----------------------------+

Table 1: BRSKI URI paths mapping to
constrained BRSKI URI paths

Note that /requestvoucher indicated above occurs between the Pledge
and Registrar (in scope of the BRSKI-EST protocol), but it also
occurs between Registrar and MASA. However, as described in
Section 6, this section and above table addresses only the BRSKI-EST
protocol.

Pledges that wish to discover the available BRSKI bootstrap options/
formats, or reduce the size of the CoAP headers by eliminating the
"/.well-known/brski" path, can do a discovery operation using
[RFC6690] Section 4 by sending a discovery query to the Registrar.

For example, if the Registrar supports a short BRSKI URL (/b) and
supports the voucher format "application/voucher-cose+cbor" (TBD3),
and status reporting in both CBOR and JSON formats:

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*

RES: 2.05 Content
Content-Format: 40
Payload:
</b>;rt=brski,
</b/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct=TBD3,
</b/vs>;rt=brski.vs;ct="50 60",
</b/es>;rt=brski.es;ct="50 60"

The Registrar is under no obligation to provide shorter URLs, and MAY
respond to this query with only the "/.well-known/brski/<short-name>"
end points for the short names as defined in Table 1.

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Registrars that have implemented shorter URLs MUST also respond in
equivalent ways to the corresponding "/.well-known/brski/<short-
name>" URLs, and MUST NOT distinguish between them. In particular, a
Pledge MAY use the longer and shorter URLs in any combination.

When responding to a discovery request for BRSKI resources, the
server MAY in addition return the full resource paths and the content
types which are supported at those end-points as shown in above
example. This is useful when multiple content types are specified
for a particular resource on the server. The server responds with
only the root path for the BRSKI resource (rt=brski, resource /b in
above example) and no others in case the client queries for only
rt=brski type resources. (So, a query for rt=brski, without the
wildcard character.)

Without discovery, a longer well-known URL can only be used, such as:

REQ: GET /.well-known/brski/rv

while with discovery of shorter URLs, a request such as:

REQ: GET /b/rv

is possible.

The return of multiple content-types in the "ct" attribute allows the
Pledge to choose the most appropriate one. Note that Content-Format
TBD3 ("application/voucher-cose+cbor") is defined in this document.

Content-Format TBD3 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv
resource. If the "ct" attribute is not indicated for the /rv
resource in the link format description, this implies that at least
TBD3 is supported.

Note that this specification allows for voucher-cose+cbor format
requests and vouchers to be transmitted over HTTPS, as well as for
voucher-cms+json and other formats yet to be defined over CoAP. The
burden for this flexibility is places upon the Registrar. The pledge
is expected to support a single format only.

The Pledge and MASA need to support one or more formats (at least
TBD3) for the voucher and for the voucher request. The MASA needs to
support all formats that the Pledge, produced by that manufacturer,
supports.

Section 10 details how the Pledge discovers the Registrar and Join
Proxy in different deployment scenarios.

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6.3.1. RFC8995 Telemetry Returns

[RFC8995] defines two telemetry returns from the Pledge which are
sent to the Registrar. These are the BRSKI Status Telemetry
[RFC8995], Section 5.7 and the Enrollment Status Telemetry [RFC8995],
Section 5.9.4. These are two POST operations made the by Pledge at
two key steps in the process.

[RFC8995] defines the content of these POST operations in CDDL, which
are serialized as JSON. This document extends the list of acceptable
formats to CBOR as well as JSON, using the rules from [RFC8610].

The existing JSON format is described as CoAP Content-Format 50
("application/json"), and it MAY be supported. The new CBOR format
is described using CoAP Content-Format 60 ("application/cbor") MUST
be supported by the Registrar for both the /vs and /es resources.

6.4. Join Proxy options

TBD; reference other documents.

6.5. Extensions to BRSKI

6.5.1. Discovery

The Pledge discovers an IP address and port number that connects to
the Registrar (possibly via a Join Proxy), and it establishes a DTLS
connection.

No further discovery of hosts or port numbers is required, but a
pledge that can do more than one kind of enrollment (future work
offers protocols other than [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]), then a pledge
may need to use CoAP Discovery to determine what other protocols are
available.

A Pledge that only supports the EST-coaps enrollment method SHOULD
NOT use discovery for BRSKI resources. It is more efficient to just
try the supported enrollment method via the well-known BRSKI/EST-
coaps resources. This also avoids the Pledge doing any CoRE Link
Format parsing, which is specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est],
Section 4.1.

In order to support this, the Registrar MUST support all of the EST
resources at their default ".well-known" locations (on the port
number discovered) as well as any server-specific shorter form that
might also be supported.

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However, when discovery is being done by the Pledge, it is possible
for the Registrar to return references to resources which are on
different port numbers. The Registrar SHOULD NOT use different ports
numbers by default, because a Pledge that is connected via a Join
Proxy can only access a single UDP port. A Registrar configured to
never use Join Proxies MAY be configured to use multiple port
numbers. Therefore a Registrar MUST host all discoverable BRSKI
resources on the same (UDP) server port that the Pledge's DTLS
connection is using. In addition to avoiding the problem of being
unable to connect to other ports, using the same UDP server port
allows the Pledge to continue to use the same DTLS connection which
is more efficient.

6.5.2. CoAP responses

[RFC8995], Section 5 defines a number of HTTP response codes that the
Registrar is to return when certain conditions occur.

The 401, 403, 404, 406 and 415 response codes map directly to CoAP
codes 4.01, 4.03, 4.04, 4.06 and 4.15.

The 202 Retry process which occurs in the voucher request, is to be
handled in the same way as Section 5.7 of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]
process for Delayed Responses.

6.6. Extensions to EST-coaps

This document extends [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est], and it inherits the
functions described in that document: specifically, the mandatory
Simple (Re-)Enrollment (/sen and /sren) and Certification Authority
certificates request (/crts). Support for CSR Attributes Request
(/att) and server-side key generation (/skg, /skc) remains optional
for the EST server.

Collecting both [RFC8995] and [RFC7030], [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] and
this document results in the following shorter forms of URI paths for
the commonly used resources:

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6.6.1. Pledge Extensions

This section defines extensions to the BRSKI Pledge, which are
applicable during the BRSKI bootstrap procedure. A Pledge that
already is DTLS-connected to either a Join Proxy or Registrar, and
which only supports the EST-coaps enrollment method, SHOULD NOT use
discovery for EST-coaps resources. This is because it is more
efficient to just try its supported enrollment method (e.g. /sen) via
the well-known EST resource on the current DTLS connection. This
avoids an additional round-trip of packets and avoids the Pledge
having to unnecessarily implement CoRE Link Format parsing.

A constrained Pledge SHOULD NOT perform the optional EST "CSR
attributes request" (/att) to minimize network traffic and reduce
code size.

When creating the CSR, the Pledge selects which attributes to
include. One or more Subject Distinguished Name fields MUST be
included. If the Pledge has no specific information on what
attributes/fields are desired in the CSR, it MUST use the Subject
Distinguished Name fields from its IDevID unmodified. The Pledge can
receive such information via the voucher (encoded in a vendor-
specific way) or some other, out-of-band means.

A constrained Pledge MAY use the following optimized EST-coaps
procedure to minimize both network traffic and code size:

1. if the voucher, that validates the current Registrar, contains a
single pinned domain CA certificate, the Pledge provisionally
considers this certificate as the EST trust anchor, in other
words, it provisionally accepts this CA certificate as if it were
the result of "CA certificates request" (/crts) to the Registrar.

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2. Using this CA certificate as trust anchor it proceeds with EST
simple enrollment (/sen) to obtain its provisionally trusted
LDevID.

3. If the Pledge validates that the trust anchor CA was used to sign
its LDevID, the Pledge accepts the pinned domain CA certificate
as the legitimate trust anchor CA for the Registrar's domain and
accepts the associated LDevID.

4. If the trust anchor CA was NOT used to sign its LDevID, the
Pledge MUST perform an actual "CA certificates request" (/crts)
to the EST server to obtain the EST CA trust anchor(s) since
these differ from the (temporary) pinned domain CA.

5. When doing this /crts request, the Pledge MAY use a CoAP Accept
Option with value TBD287 ("application/pkix-cert") to limit the
number of returned EST CA trust anchors to only one. A
constrained Pledge MAY support only this format in a /crts
response, per Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].

6. If the Pledge cannot obtain the single CA certificate or the
finally validated CA certificate cannot be chained to the LDevID,
then the Pledge MUST abort the enrollment process and report the
error using the enrollment status telemetry (/es).

Note that even though the Pledge may avoid the initial /crts request,
it SHOULD support retrieval of the trust anchor CA periodically. A
pledge that has an idea of the current time (internally, or via NTP)
SHOULD consider the validity time of the trust anchor CA, and MAY
begin requesting a new trust anchor CA when the CA has 50% of it's
validity time (notAfter - notBefore) left. A pledge that has no idea
of the current time will have no idea if the trust anchor CA has
expired. Such a device SHOULD poll periodically for a new trust
anchor at an interval of approximately 1 month. The Pledge SHOULD
use GET-with-ETag, and servers SHOULD support it.

6.6.2. EST-client Extensions

This section defines extensions to EST-coaps clients, used after the
BRSKI bootstrap procedure is completed. (Note that such client is
not called "Pledge" in this section, since it is already enrolled
into the domain.) A constrained EST-coaps client MAY support only
the Content-Format TBD287 ("application/pkix-cert") in a /crts
response, per Section 5.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].

In this case, it can only store one trust anchor of the domain.
Although this is not an issue in case the domain trust anchor remains
stable, special consideration is needed for cases where the domain

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trust anchor can change over time. Such a change may happen due to
relocation of the client device to a new domain, or due to key update
of the trust anchor as described in [RFC4210], Section 4.4.

The trust anchor change may happen during EST re-enrollment:
typically, a change of domain CA requires all devices operating under
the old domain CA to acquire a new LDevID issued by the new domain
CA. A client's re-enrollment may be triggered by various events,
such as imminent expiry of its LDevID. How the re-enrollment is
explicitly triggered on the client by a domain entity, such as a
commissioner or a Registrar, is out of scope of this specification.

The mechanism described in [RFC4210], Section 4.4 for Root CA key
update requires four certificates: OldWithOld, OldWithNew,
NewWithOld, and NewWithNew. The OldWithOld certificate is already
stored in the EST client's trust store. The NewWithNew certificate
will be distributed as the single certificate in a /crts response,
during EST re-enrollment. Since the EST client can only accept a
single certificate in a /crts response it implies that the EST client
cannot obtain the certificates OldWithNew and NewWithOld in this way,
to perform the complete verification of the new domain CA. Instead,
the client only verifies the EST server (Registrar) using its old
domain CA certificate in its trust store as detailed below, and based
on this trust in the active and valid DTLS connection it
automatically trusts the new (NewWithNew) domain CA certificate that
the EST server provides in the /crts response.

In this manner, even during rollover of trust anchors, it is possible
to have only a single trust anchor provided in a /crts response.

During the period of the certificate renewal, it is not possible to
create new communication channels between devices with NewCA
certificates devices with OldCA certificates. One option is that
devices should avoid restarting existing DTLS or OSCORE connections
during this interval that new certificates are being deployed. The
recommended period for certificate renewal is 24 hours. For re-
enrollment, the constrained EST-coaps client MUST support the
following EST-coaps procedure, where optional re-enrollment to a new
domain is under control of the Registrar:

1. The client connects with DTLS to the Registrar, and authenticates
with its present domain certificate (LDevID) as usual. The
Registrar authenticates itself with its domain certificate that
is trusted by the client, i.e. it chains to the single trust
anchor that the client has stored. This is the "old" trust
anchor, the one that will be eventually replaced in case the
Registrar decides to re-enroll the client into a new domain.

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2. The client performs the simple re-enrollment request (/sren) and
upon success it obtains a new LDevID.

3. The client verifies the new LDevID against its (single) existing
domain trust anchor. If it chains successfully, this means the
trust anchor did not change and the client MAY skip retrieving
the current CA certificate using the "CA certificates request"
(/crts). If it does not chain successfully, this means the trust
anchor was changed/updated and the client then MUST retrieve the
new domain trust anchor using the "CA certificates request"
(/crts).

4. If the client retrieved a new trust anchor in step 3, then it
MUST verify that the new trust anchor chains with the new LDevID
it obtained in step 2. If it chains successfully, the client
stores both, accepts the new LDevID and stops using it prior
LDevID. If it does not chain successfully, the client MUST NOT
update its LDevID, it MUST NOT update its (single) domain trust
anchor, and the client MUST abort the enrollment process and
report the error to the Registrar using enrollment status
telemetry (/es).

6.6.3. Registrar Extensions

A Registrar SHOULD host any discoverable EST-coaps resources on the
same (UDP) server port that the Pledge's DTLS initial connection is
using. This avoids the Pledge having to reconnect using DTLS, in
order to proceed with EST enrollment after the BRSKI bootstrap. [TBD
EDNOTE: a Registrar that does host EST resources on another port
won't be able to onboard Pledges that skip the discovery, so not
interoperable. Should we fix this?]

The Content-Format 50 (application/json) MUST be supported and 60
(application/cbor) MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /vs and
/es resources.

Content-Format TBD3 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv
resource.

When a Registrar receives a "CA certificates request" (/crts) request
with a CoAP Accept Option with value TBD287 ("application/pkix-cert")
it SHOULD return only the single CA certificate that is the
envisioned or actual authority for the current, authenticated Pledge
making the request.

If the Pledge included in its request an Accept Option for only the
TBD287 ("application/pkix-cert") Content Format, but the domain has
been configured to operate with multiple CA trust anchors only, then

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the Registrar returns a 4.06 Not Acceptable error to signal that the
Pledge needs to use the Content Format 281 ("application/pkcs7-mime;
smime-type=certs-only") to retrieve all the certificates.

If the current authenticated client is an EST-coaps client that was
already enrolled in the domain, and the Registrar is configured to
assign this client to a new domain CA trust anchor during the next
EST re-enrollment procedure, then the Registrar MUST respond with the
new domain CA certificate in case the client performs the "CA
Certificates request" (/crts) with an Accept Option for TBD287 only.
This signals the client that a new domain is assigned to it. The
client follows the procedure as defined in Section 6.6.2.

6.7. DTLS handshake fragmentation Considerations

DTLS includes a mechanism to fragment the handshake messages. This
is described in Section 4.4 of [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]. The protocol
described in this document will often be used with a Join Proxy
described in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy]. The Join Proxy
will need some overhead, while the maximum packet sized guaranteed on
802.15.4 networks is 1280 bytes. It is RECOMMENDED that a PMTU of
1024 bytes be assumed for the DTLS handshake. It is unlikely that
any Packet Too Big indications [RFC4443] will be relayed by the Join
Proxy.

During the operation of the constrained BRSKI-EST protocol, the CoAP
Blockwise transfer mechanism will be used when message sizes exceed
the PMTU. A Pledge/EST-client on a constrained network MUST use the
(D)TLS maximum fragment length extension ("max_fragment_length")
defined in Section 4 of [RFC6066] with the maximum fragment length
set to a value of either 2^9 or 2^10.

7. BRSKI-MASA Protocol

This section describes extensions to and clarifications of the BRSKI-
MASA protocol between Registrar and MASA.

7.1. Protocol and Formats

Section 5.4 of [RFC8995] describes a connection between the Registrar
and the MASA as being a normal TLS connection using HTTPS. This
document does not change that. The Registrar MAY use the new format
"application/voucher-cose+cbor" in its voucher request to MASA, or
the existing BRSKI format "application/voucher-cms+json" defined by
[RFC8995].

The MASA only needs to support formats for which there are Pledges
that use that format.

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The Registrar MUST use the same format for the RVR as the Pledge used
for its PVR.

The Registrar indicates the voucher format it wants to receive from
MASA using the HTTP Accept header. This format MUST be the same as
the format of the PVR, so that the Pledge can parse it.

At the moment of writing the creation of coaps based MASAs is deemed
unrealistic. The use of CoAP for the BRSKI-MASA connection can be
the subject of another document. Some consideration was made to
specify CoAP support for consistency, but:

* the Registrar is not expected to be so constrained that it cannot
support HTTPS client connections.

* the technology and experience to build Internet-scale HTTPS
responders (which the MASA is) is common, while the experience
doing the same for CoAP is much less common.

* in many Enterprise networks, outgoing UDP connections are often
treated as suspicious, and there seems to be no advantage to using
CoAP in that environment.

* a Registrar is likely to provide onboarding services to both
constrained and non-constrained devices. Such a Registrar would
need to speak HTTPS anyway.

* similarly, a manufacturer is likely to offer both constrained and
non-constrained devices, so there may in practice be no situation
in which the MASA could be CoAP-only. Additionally, as the MASA
is intended to be a function that can easily be oursourced to a
third-party service provider, reducing the complexity would also
seem to reduce the cost of that function.

7.2. Registrar Voucher Request

If the PVR contains a proximity assertion, the Registrar MUST
propagate this assertion into the RVR by including the "assertion"
field with the value "proximity". This conforms to the example in
Section 3.3 of [RFC8995] of carrying the assertion forward.

7.3. MASA and the Server Name Indicator (SNI)

A TLS/HTTPS connection is established between the Registrar and MASA.

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Section 5.4 of [RFC8995] explains this process, and there are no
externally visible changes. A MASA that supports the unconstrained
voucher formats should be able to support constrained vouchers
requests equally well.

There is no requirement that a single MASA be used for both
constrained and unconstrained voucher requests: the choice of MASA is
determined by the id-mod-MASAURLExnn2016 extension contained in the
IDevID.

The Registrar MUST do [RFC6125] DNS-ID checks on the contents of the
certificate provided by the MASA.

In constrast to the Pledge/Registrar situation, the Registrar always
knows the name of the MASA, and MUST always include an [RFC6066]
Server Name Indicator. The SNI is optional in TLS1.2, but common.
The SNI it considered mandatory with TLS1.3, so this requirement is
not unusual.

The presence of the SNI is need by the MASA in order for the MASA to
host multiple tenants (for different customers).

The Registrar SHOULD use a TLS Client Certificate to authenticate to
the MASA. If the certificate that the Registrar uses is marked as a
cmcRA certificate, via Extended Key Usage, then it MUST also have the
id-kp-clientAuth EKU attribute set.

7.3.1. Registrar Certificate Requirement

In summary for typical Registrar use, where a single Registrar
certificate is used, then the certificate MUST have EKU of: id-kp-
cmcRA, id-kp-serverAuth, id-kp-clientAuth.

8. Pinning in Voucher Artifacts

The voucher is a statement by the MASA for use by the Pledge that
provide the identity of the Pledge's owner. This section describes
how the owner's identity is determined and how it is encoded within
the voucher.

8.1. Registrar Identity Selection and Encoding

Section 5.5 of [RFC8995] describes BRSKI policies for selection of
the owner identity. It indicates some of the flexibility that is
possible for the Registrar.

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The recommendation made there is for the Registrar to include only
certificates in the voucher request (CMS) signing structure that
participate in the certificate chain that is to be pinned.

The MASA is expected to evaluate the certificates included by the
Registrar in its voucher request, forming them into a chain with the
Registrar's (signing) identity on one end. Then, it pins a
certificate selected from the chain. For instance, for a domain with
a two-level certification authority (see Figure 1), where the
voucher-request has been signed by "Registrar", its signing structure
includes two additional CA certificates. The arrows in the figure
indicate the issuer of a certificate, i.e. (1) issued (2) and (2)
issued (3).

.------------------.
| domain CA (1) |
| trust anchor |
'------------------'
|
v
.------------.
| domain (2) |
| Sub-CA |
'------------'
|
|
v
.----------------.
| domain |
| Registrar (3) |
| EE certificate |
'----------------'

Figure 1: Two-Level CA PKI

When the Registrar is using a COSE-signed constrained voucher request
towards MASA, instead of a regular CMS-signed voucher request, the
COSE_Sign1 object contains a protected and an unprotected header.
The Registrar MUST place all the certificates needed to validate the
signature chain from the Registrar on the RVR in an "x5bag" attribute
in the unprotected header [I-D.ietf-cose-x509].

The "x5bag" attribute is very important as it provides the required
signals from the Registrar to control what identity is pinned in the
resulting voucher. This is explained in the next section.

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8.2. MASA Pinning Policy

The MASA, having assembled and verified the chain in the signing
structure of the voucher request, will now need to select a
certificate to pin. (For the case that only the Registrar's End-
Entity certificate is included, only this certificate can be selected
and this section does not apply.) The BRSKI policy for pinning by
the MASA as described in Section 5.5.2 of [RFC8995] leaves much
flexibility to the manufacturer.

The present document adds the following rules to the MASA pinning
policy to reduce the network load:

1. for a voucher containing a nonce, it SHOULD select the most
specific (lowest-level) CA certificate in the chain.

2. for a nonceless voucher, it SHOULD select the least-specific
(highest-level) CA certificate in the chain that is allowed under
the MASA's policy for this specific domain.

The rationale for 1. is that in case of a voucher with nonce, the
voucher is valid only in scope of the present DTLS connection between
Pledge and Registrar anyway, so it would have no benefit to pin a
higher-level CA. By pinning the most specific CA the constrained
Pledge can validate its DTLS connection using less crypto operations.
The rationale for pinning a CA instead of the Registrar's End-Entity
certificate directly is the following benefit on constrained
networks: the pinned certificate in the voucher can in common cases
be re-used as a Domain CA trust anchor during the EST enrollment and
during the operational phase that follows after EST enrollment, as
explained in Section 6.6.1.

The rationale for 2. follows from the flexible BRSKI trust model for,
and purpose of, nonceless vouchers (Sections 5.5.* and 7.4.1 of
[RFC8995]).

Using the previous example of a domain with a two-level certification
authority, the most specific CA ("Sub-CA") is the identity that is
pinned by MASA in a nonced voucher. A Registrar that wished to have
only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate pinned would omit the
"domain CA" and "Sub-CA" certificates from the voucher-request.

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In case of a nonceless voucher, the MASA would depending on trust
level pin only "Registrar" certificate (low trust in customer), or
the "Sub-CA" certificate (in case of medium trust, implying that any
Registrar of that sub-domain is acceptable), or even the "domain CA"
certificate (in case of high trust in the customer, and possibly a
pre-agreed need of the customer to obtain flexible long-lived
vouchers).

8.3. Pinning of Raw Public Keys

Specifically for constrained use cases, the pinning of the raw public
key (RPK) of the Registrar is also supported in the constrained
voucher, instead of an X.509 certificate. If an RPK is pinned it
MUST be the RPK of the Registrar.

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support RPK but not X.509
certificates, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the RPK of the
Registrar in either the "pinned-domain-pubk" or "pinned-domain-pubk-
sha256" field of a voucher. This is described in more detail in
Section 9.2.3. A Pledge that does not support X.509 certificates
cannot use EST to enroll; it has to use another method for enrollment
without certificates and the Registrar has to support this method
also. It is possible that the Pledge will not enroll, but instead
only a network join operation will occur, such as described in
[RFC9031]. How the Pledge discovers this method and details of the
enrollment method are out of scope of this document.

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support PKIX format certificates,
the "pinned-domain-cert" field present in a voucher typically pins a
domain certificate. That can be either the End-Entity certificate of
the Registrar, or the certificate of a domain CA of the Registrar's
domain as specified in Section 8.2. However, if the Pledge is known
to also support RPK pinning and the MASA intends to identify the
Registrar in the voucher (not the CA), then MASA MUST pin the RPK
(RPK3 in Figure 2) of the Registrar instead of the Registrar's End-
Entity certificate to save space in the voucher.

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.------------.
| pub-CA (1) |
'------------'
|
v
.------------.
| sub-CA (2) |
'------------'
|
v
.--------------.
| Registrar(3) |
| RPK3 |
'--------------'

Figure 2: Raw Public Key pinning

8.4. Considerations for use of IDevID-Issuer

[RFC8366] and [RFC8995] defines the idevid-issuer attribute for
voucher and voucher-request (respectively), but they do not explain
that much about when to use it.

The use of idevid-issuer is provided so that the serial-number to
which the issued voucher pertains can be relative to the entity that
issued the devices' IDevID. In most cases there is a one to one
relationship between the trust anchor that signs vouchers (and is
trusted by the pledge), and the Certification Authority that signs
the IDevID. In that case, the serial-number in the voucher must
refer to the same device as the serial-number that is in IDevID
certificate.

However, there situations where the one to one relationship may be
broken. This occurs whenever a manufacturer has a common MASA, but
different producers (on different assembly lines) are produced with
identical serial numbers. A system of serial numbers which is just a
simple counter is a good example of this. A system of serial numbers
where there is some prefix relating the product type does not fit
into this, even if the lower digits are a counter.

It is not possible for the Pledge or the Registrar to know which
situation applies. The question to be answered is whether or not to
include the idevid-issuer in the PVR and the RVR. A second question
arose as to what the format of the idevid-issuer contents are.

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Analysis of the situation shows that the pledge never needs to
include the idevid-issuer in it's PVR, because the pledge's IDevID
certificate is available the Registrar, and the Authority Key
Identifier is contained within that. The pledge therefore has no
need to repeat this.

For the RVR, the Registrar has to examine the pledge's IDevID
certificate to discover the serial number for the Registrar's Voucher
Request (RVR). This is clear in Section 5.5 of [RFC8995]. That
section also clarifies that the idevid-issuer is to be included in
the RVR.

There has been some confusion as to how much of the Authority Key
Identifier is to be included. The explanation in the YANG module of
[RFC8366] is a bit vague as there are two different OCTET STRINGS
present in respectively Section 4.1 of [RFC5280] and Section 4.2.1.1
of [RFC5280] for this extension. The correct interpretation is that
[RFC8366] specifies that the entire object i.e. the extnValue OCTET
STRING is to be included: comprising the AuthorityKeyIdentifier,
SEQUENCE, Choice as well as the OCTET STRING that is the
keyIdentifier.

!-- ********************************************** -->

9. Artifacts

This section describes for both the voucher request and the voucher
first the abstract (tree) definition as explained in [RFC8340]. This
provides a high-level view of the contents of each artifact.

Then the assigned SID values are presented. These have been assigned
using the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-sid].

9.1. Voucher Request artifact

9.1.1. Tree Diagram

The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of
[RFC8366], with the addition of the fields proximity-registrar-pubk,
proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256, proximity-registrar-cert, and prior-
signed-voucher-request.

prior-signed-voucher-request is only used between the Registrar and
the MASA. proximity-registrar-pubk or proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256
optionally replaces proximity-registrar-cert for the most constrained
cases where RPK is used by the Pledge.

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module: ietf-constrained-voucher-request

grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping
+-- voucher
+-- created-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- assertion enumeration
+-- serial-number string
+-- idevid-issuer? binary
+-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+-- nonce? binary
+-- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
+-- proximity-registrar-pubk? binary
+-- proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256? binary
+-- proximity-registrar-cert? binary
+-- prior-signed-voucher-request? binary

9.1.2. SID values

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SID Assigned to
--------- --------------------------------------------------
2519 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher
2520 data .../assertion
2521 data .../created-on
2522 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2523 data .../expires-on
2524 data .../idevid-issuer
2525 data .../last-renewal-date
2526 data /ietf-constrained-voucher-request:voucher/nonce
2527 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2528 data .../prior-signed-voucher-request
2529 data .../proximity-registrar-cert
2530 data .../proximity-registrar-pubk
2531 data .../proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256
2532 data .../serial-number
2501 data /ietf-voucher-request-constrained:voucher
2502 data .../assertion
2503 data .../created-on
2504 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2505 data .../expires-on
2506 data .../idevid-issuer
2507 data .../last-renewal-date
2508 data /ietf-voucher-request-constrained:voucher/nonce
2509 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2510 data .../prior-signed-voucher-request
2511 data .../proximity-registrar-cert
2513 data .../proximity-registrar-pubk
2512 data .../proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256
2514 data .../serial-number

WARNING, obsolete definitions

9.1.3. YANG Module

In the constrained-voucher-request YANG module, the voucher is
"augmented" within the "used" grouping statement such that one
continuous set of SID values is generated for the constrained-
voucher-request module name, all voucher attributes, and the
constrained-voucher-request attributes. Two attributes of the
voucher are "refined" to be optional.

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher-request-constrained@2021-04-15.yang"
module ietf-constrained-voucher-request {
yang-version 1.1;

namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request";

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prefix "constrained";

import ietf-restconf {
prefix rc;
description
"This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}

import ietf-voucher {
prefix "v";
}

organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";

contact
"WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Michael Richardson
<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Author: Peter van der Stok
<mailto: consultancy@vanderstok.org>
Author: Panos Kampanakis
<mailto: pkampana@cisco.com>";

description
"This module defines the format for a voucher request,
which is produced by a pledge to request a voucher.
The voucher-request is sent to the potential owner's
Registrar, which in turn sends the voucher request to
the manufacturer or its delegate (MASA).

A voucher is then returned to the pledge, binding the
pledge to the owner. This is a constrained version of the
voucher-request present in
{{I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrap-keyinfra}}

This version provides a very restricted subset appropriate
for very constrained devices.
In particular, it assumes that nonce-ful operation is
always required, that expiration dates are rather weak, as no
clocks can be assumed, and that the Registrar is identified
by either a pinned Raw Public Key of the Registrar, or by a
pinned X.509 certificate of the Registrar or domain CA.

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',

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'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119.";

revision "2021-04-15" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
}

rc:yang-data voucher-request-constrained-artifact {
// YANG data template for a voucher.
uses voucher-request-constrained-grouping;
}

// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-request-constrained-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";

uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {

refine voucher/created-on {
mandatory false;
}

refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert {
mandatory false;
}

augment "voucher" {
description "Base the constrained voucher-request upon the
regular one";

leaf proximity-registrar-pubk {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-pubk replaces
the proximity-registrar-cert in constrained uses of
the voucher-request.
The proximity-registrar-pubk is the
Raw Public Key of the Registrar. This field is encoded
as specified in RFC7250, section 3.
The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.

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Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY, but due to
size is discouraged.";
}

leaf proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256 {
type binary;
description
"The proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256
is an alternative to both
proximity-registrar-pubk and pinned-domain-cert.
In many cases the public key of the domain has already
been transmitted during the key agreement protocol,
and it is wasteful to transmit the public key another
two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specification which may define a new leaf for another
hash type.";
}

leaf proximity-registrar-cert {
type binary;
description
"An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by
RFC 5280,
Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.

The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server
certificate_list sequence (see [RFC5246]) presented by
the Registrar to the Pledge. This field or one of its
alternatives MUST be populated in a
Pledge's voucher request if the proximity assertion is
populated.";
}

leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {
type binary;
description
"If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and
forward a voucher that was previously provided along a
protocol path, then the previously signed voucher
SHOULD be included in this field.

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For example, a pledge might sign a proximity voucher,
which an intermediate registrar then re-signs to
make its own proximity assertion. This is a simple
mechanism for a chain of trusted parties to change a
voucher, while maintaining the prior signature
information.

The pledge MUST ignore all prior voucher information
when accepting a voucher for imprinting. Other
parties MAY examine the prior signed voucher
information for the purposes of policy decisions.
For example, this information could be useful to a
MASA to determine that both pledge and registrar
agree on proximity assertions. The MASA SHOULD
remove all prior-signed-voucher-request information when
signing a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize the
final voucher size.";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>

9.1.4. Example voucher request artifact

Below is a CBOR serialization of an example constrained voucher
request from a Pledge to a Registrar, shown in CBOR diagnostic
notation. The enum value of the assertion field is calculated to be
2 by following the algorithm described in section 9.6.4.2 of
[RFC7950]. Four dots ("....") in a CBOR byte string denotes a
sequence of bytes that are not shown for brevity.

{
2501: {
+2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID=2503, created-on /
+4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID=2505, expires-on /
+1 : 2, / SID=2502, assertion "proximity" /
+13: "JADA123456789", / SID=2514, serial-number /
+5 : h'08C2BF36....B3D2B3', / SID=2506, idevid-issuer /
+10: h'30820275....82c35f', / SID=2511, proximity-registrar-cert/
+3 : true, / SID=2504, domain-cert
-revocation-checks/
+6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z" / SID=2507, last-renewal-date /
}
}
<CODE ENDS>

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9.2. Voucher artifact

The voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign a Pledge to an
owner. The voucher informs the Pledge which entity it should
consider to be its owner.

9.2.1. Tree Diagram

The following diagram is largely a duplicate of the contents of
[RFC8366], with only the addition of the fields pinned-domain-pubk
and pinned-domain-pubk-sha256.

module: ietf-constrained-voucher

grouping voucher-constrained-grouping
+-- voucher
+-- created-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
+-- assertion enumeration
+-- serial-number string
+-- idevid-issuer? binary
+-- pinned-domain-cert? binary
+-- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+-- nonce? binary
+-- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
+-- pinned-domain-pubk? binary
+-- pinned-domain-pubk-sha256? binary
<CODE ENDS>

9.2.2. SID values

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SID Assigned to
--------- --------------------------------------------------
2467 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher
2468 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/assertion
2469 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/created-on
2470 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2471 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/expires-on
2472 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/idevid-issuer
2473 data .../last-renewal-date
2474 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/nonce
2475 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2476 data .../pinned-domain-pubk
2477 data .../pinned-domain-pubk-sha256
2478 data /ietf-constrained-voucher:voucher/serial-number
2451 data /ietf-voucher-constrained:voucher
2452 data /ietf-voucher-constrained:voucher/assertion
2453 data /ietf-voucher-constrained:voucher/created-on
2454 data .../domain-cert-revocation-checks
2455 data /ietf-voucher-constrained:voucher/expires-on
2456 data /ietf-voucher-constrained:voucher/idevid-issuer
2457 data .../last-renewal-date
2458 data /ietf-voucher-constrained:voucher/nonce
2459 data .../pinned-domain-cert
2460 data .../pinned-domain-pubk
2461 data .../pinned-domain-pubk-sha256
2462 data /ietf-voucher-constrained:voucher/serial-number

WARNING, obsolete definitions

9.2.3. YANG Module

In the constrained-voucher YANG module, the voucher is "augmented"
within the "used" grouping statement such that one continuous set of
SID values is generated for the constrained-voucher module name, all
voucher attributes, and the constrained-voucher attributes. Two
attributes of the voucher are "refined" to be optional.

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-constrained-voucher@2021-04-15.yang"
module ietf-constrained-voucher {
yang-version 1.1;

namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher";
prefix "constrained";

import ietf-restconf {

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prefix rc;
description
"This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}

import ietf-voucher {
prefix "v";
}

organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";

description
"This module defines the format for a voucher, which
is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or its delegate
(MASA) to securely assign one or more pledges to an 'owner',
so that a pledge may establish a secure connection to the
owner's network infrastructure.

The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY',
and 'OPTIONAL' in the module text are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119.";

revision "2021-04-15" {
description
"Initial version";
reference

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"RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Constrained Devices";
}

rc:yang-data voucher-constrained-artifact {
// YANG data template for a voucher.
uses voucher-constrained-grouping;
}

// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-constrained-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";

uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {

refine voucher/created-on {
mandatory false;
}

refine voucher/pinned-domain-cert {
mandatory false;
}

augment "voucher" {
description "Base the constrained voucher
upon the regular one";
leaf pinned-domain-pubk {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-domain-pubk may replace the
pinned-domain-cert in constrained uses of
the voucher. The pinned-domain-pubk
is the Raw Public Key of the Registrar.
This field is encoded as a Subject Public Key Info block
as specified in RFC7250, in section 3.
The ECDSA algorithm MUST be supported.
The EdDSA algorithm as specified in
draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-17 SHOULD be supported.
Support for the DSA algorithm is not recommended.
Support for the RSA algorithm is a MAY.";
}

leaf pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 {
type binary;
description
"The pinned-domain-pubk-sha256 is a second
alternative to pinned-domain-cert. In many cases the
public key of the domain has already been transmitted

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during the key agreement process, and it is wasteful
to transmit the public key another two times.
The use of a hash of public key info, at 32-bytes for
sha256 is a significant savings compared to an RSA
public key, but is only a minor savings compared to
a 256-bit ECDSA public-key.
Algorithm agility is provided by extensions to this
specification which can define a new leaf for another
hash type.";
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>

9.2.4. Example voucher artifacts

Below the CBOR serialization of an example constrained voucher is
shown in CBOR diagnostic notation. The enum value of the assertion
field is calculated to be zero by following the algorithm described
in section 9.6.4.2 of [RFC7950]. Four dots ("....") in a CBOR byte
string denotes a sequence of bytes that are not shown for brevity.

{
2451: {
+2 : "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2453, created-on /
+4 : "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z", / SID = 2455, expires-on /
+1 : 0, / SID = 2452, assertion "verified" /
+11: "JADA123456789", / SID = 2462, serial-number /
+5 : h'E40393B4....68A3', / SID = 2456, idevid-issuer /
+8 : h'30820275....C35F', / SID = 2459, pinned-domain-cert/
+3 : true, / SID = 2454, domain-cert /
/ -revocation-checks /
+6 : "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z" / SID = 2457, last-renewal-date /
}
}

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9.3. Signing voucher and voucher-request artifacts with COSE

The COSE_Sign1 structure is discussed in Section 4.2 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]. The CBOR object that carries the
body, the signature, and the information about the body and signature
is called the COSE_Sign1 structure. It is used when only one
signature is used on the body.

Support for ECDSA with SHA2-256 using curve secp256r1 (aka
prime256k1) is RECOMMENDED. Most current low power hardware has
support for acceleration of this algorithm. Future hardware designs
could omit this in favour of a newer algorithms. This is the ES256
keytype from Table 1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]. Support for
curve secp256k1 is OPTIONAL.

Support for EdDSA using Curve 25519 is RECOMMENDED in new designs if
hardware support is available. This is keytype EDDSA (-8) from
Table 2 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]. A "crv" parameter is
necessary to specify the Curve, which from Table 18. The 'kty' field
MUST be present, and it MUST be 'OKP'. (Table 17)

A transition towards EdDSA is occuring in the industry. Some
hardware can accelerate only some algorithms with specific curves,
other hardware can accelerate any curve, and still other kinds of
hardware provide a tool kit for acceleration of any eliptic curve
algorithm.

In general, the Pledge is expected to support only a single
algorithm, while the Registrar, usually not constrained, is expected
to support a wide variety of algorithms: both legacy ones and up-and-
coming ones via regular software updates.

An example of the supported COSE_Sign1 object structure is shown in
Figure 3.

COSE_Sign1(
[
h'A101382E', # protected header encoding: {1: -47} , which means { "alg": ES256K }
{
4 : h'7890A03F1234' # 4 is the "kid" binary key identifier
},
h'1234....5678', #voucher-request binary content (CBOR)
h'4567....1234' #voucher-request binary public signature
]
)

Figure 3: COSE_Sign1 example in CBOR diagnostic notation

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The [COSE-registry] specifies the integers/encoding for the "alg" and
"kid" fields in Figure 3. The "alg" field restricts the key usage
for verification of this COSE object to a particular cryptographic
algorithm.

The "kid" field is optionally present: it is an unprotected field
that identifies the public key of the key pair that was used to sign
this message. The value of the key identifier "kid" parameter is an
example value. Usually a hash of the public key is used to identify
the public key, but a device serial number may also be used. The
choice of key identifier method is vendor-specific. If "kid" is not
present, then a verifying party needs to use other context
information to retrieve the right public key to verify the COSE_Sign1
object against. For example, this context information may be a
unique serial number encoded in the binary content (CBOR) field.

A Registrar MAY use a "kid" parameter in its RVR to identify its
signing key as used to sign the RVR. The method of generating this
"kid" is vendor-specific and SHOULD be configurable in the Registrar
to support commonly used methods. In order to support future
business cases and supply chain integrations, a Registrar MUST be
configurable, on a per-manufacturer basis, to be able to configure
the "kid" to a particular value. Both binary and string values are
to be supported, each being inserted using a CBOR bstr or tstr. By
default, a Registrar does not include a "kid" parameter in its RVR
since the signing key is already identified by the included signing
certificates in the COSE "x5bag" structure.

A Pledge normally SHOULD NOT use a "kid" parameter in its PVR,
because its signing key is already identified by the Pledge's unique
serial number that is included in the PVR. Still, where needed the
Pledge MAY use a "kid" parameter in its PVR to help the MASA identify
the right public key to verify against. This can occur for example
if a Pledge has multiple IDevID identities. A Registrar normally
SHOULD ignore a "kid" parameter used in a received PVR, as this
information is intended for the MASA. In other words, there is no
need for the Registrar to verify the contents of this field, but it
may include it in an audit log.

In Appendix C a binary COSE_Sign1 object is shown based on the
voucher-request example of Section 9.1.4.

10. Deployment specific Discovery Considerations

This section details how discovery is done in a specific deployment
scenarios.

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10.1. 6TSCH Deployments

In 6TISCH networks, the Constrained Join Proxy (CoJP) mechanism is
described in [RFC9031]. Such networks are expected to use a
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc] to do key management. This is the subject of
future work. The Enhanced Beacon has been extended in [RFC9032] to
allow for discovery of the Join Proxy.

10.2. Generic networks using GRASP

[RFC8995] defines a mechanism for the Pledge to discover a Join Proxy
by listening for [RFC8990] GRASP messages. This mechanism can be
used on any network which does not have another more specific
mechanism. This mechanism supports mesh networks, and can also be
used over unencrypted WIFI.

10.3. Generic networks using mDNS

[RFC8995] also defines a non-normative mechanism for the Pledge to
discover a Join Proxy by doing mDNS queries. This mechanism can be
used on any network which does not have another recommended
mechanism. This mechanism does not easily support mesh networks. It
can be used over unencrypted WIFI.

10.4. Thread networks using Mesh Link Establishment (MLE)

TBD.

10.5. Non-mesh networks using CoAP Discovery

On unencrypted constrained networks such as 802.15.4, CoAP discover
may be done using the mechanism detailed in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]
section 5.1.

11. Design Considerations

The design considerations for the CBOR encoding of vouchers are much
the same as for JSON vouchers in [RFC8366]. One key difference is
that the names of the leaves in the YANG definition do not affect the
size of the resulting CBOR, as the SID translation process assigns
integers to the names.

Any POST request to the Registrar with resource /vs or /es returns a
2.04 Changed response with empty payload. The client should be aware
that the server may use a piggybacked CoAP response (ACK, 2.04) but
may also respond with a separate CoAP response, i.e. first an (ACK,
0.0) that is an acknowledgement of the request reception followed by
a (CON, 2.04) response in a separate CoAP message.

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12. Raw Public Key Use Considerations

This section explains techniques to reduce the number of bytes that
are sent over the wire during the BRSKI bootstrap. The use of a raw
public key (RPK) in the pinning process can significantly reduce the
number of bytes and round trips, but it comes with a few significant
operational limitations.

12.1. The Registrar Trust Anchor

When the Pledge first connects to the Registrar, the connection to
the Registrar is provisional, as explained in Section 5.6.2 of
[RFC8995]. The Registrar provides its public key in a
TLSServerCertificate, and the Pledge uses that to validate that
integrity of the (D)TLS connection, but it does not validate the
identity of the provided certificate.

As the TLSServerCertificate object is never verified directly by the
pledge, sending it can be considered superfluous. Instead of using a
(TLSServer)Certificate of type X509 (see section 4.4.2 of [RFC8446]),
a RawPublicKey object is used.

A Registrar operating in a mixed environment can determine whether to
send a Certificate or a Raw Public key: this is determined by the
pledge including the server_certificate_type of RawPublicKey. This
is shown in section 5 of [RFC7250].

The Pledge continues to send a client_certificate_type of X509, so
that the Registrar can properly identify the pledge and distill the
MASA URI information from its certificate.

12.2. The Pledge Voucher Request

The Pledge puts the Registrar's public key into the proximity-
registrar-pubk field of the voucher-request. (The proximity-
registrar-pubk-sha256 can also be used if the 32-bytes of a SHA256
hash turns out to be smaller than a typical ECDSA key.)

As the format of the pubk field is identical to the TLS Certificate
RawPublicKey, no manipulation at all is needed to insert this into a
voucher-request.

12.3. The Voucher Response

A returned voucher will have a pinned-domain-subk field with the
identical key as was found in the proximity-registrar-pubk field
above, as well as in the TLS connection.

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Validation of this key by the pledge is what takes the DTLS
connection out of the provisional state see Section 5.6.2 of
[RFC8995].

The voucher needs to be validated first. The Pledge needs to have a
public key to validate the signature from the MASA on the voucher.

In certain cases, the MASA's public key counterpart of the (private)
signing key is already installed in the Pledge at manufacturing time.
In other cases, if the MASA signing key is based upon a PKI (see
[I-D.richardson-anima-masa-considerations] Section 2.3), then a
certificate chain may need to be included with the voucher in order
for the pledge to validate the signature. In CMS signed artifacts,
the CMS structure has a place for such certificates.

In the COSE-signed Constrained Vouchers described in this document,
the x5bag attribute from [I-D.ietf-cose-x509] is to be used for this.

13. Security Considerations

13.1. Duplicate serial-numbers

In the absense of correct use of idevid-issuer by the Registrar as
detailed in Section 8.4, it would be possible for a malicious
Registrar to an unauthorized voucher for a device. This would apply
only to the case where a Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority
(MASA) is trusted by different products from the same manufacturer,
and the manufacturer has duplicated serial numbers as a result of a
merge, acquisition or mis-management.

For example, imagine the same manufacturer makes light bulbs as well
as gas centrofuges, and that said manufacturer does not uniquely
allocate product serial numbers. This attack only works for
nonceless vouchers. The attacker has obtained a light bulb which
happens to have the same serial-number as a gas centrofuge which it
wishes to obtain access. The attacker performs a normal BRSKI
onboarding for the light bulb, but then uses the resulting voucher to
onboard the gas centrofuge. The attack requires that the gas
centrofuge be returned to a state where it is willing to perform a
new onboarding operation.

This attack is prevented by the mechanism of having the Registrar
include the idevid-issuer in the RVR, and the MASA including it in
the resulting voucher. The idevid-issuer is not included by default:
a MASA needs to be aware if there are parts of the organization which
duplicates serial numbers, and if so, include it.

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13.2. IDevID security in Pledge

TBD.

13.3. Security of CoAP and UDP protocols

Section 7.1 explains that no CoAPS version of the BRSKI-MASA protocol
is proposed. The connection from the Registrar to the MASA continues
to be HTTPS as in [RFC8995]. This has been done as it simplifies the
MASA deployment for the manufacturer because no new protocol needs to
be enabled.

The use of UDP protocols across the open Internet is sometimes
fraught with security challenges. Denial of service attacks against
UDP based protocols is trivial as there is no three-way handshake as
done for TCP. The three-way handshake of TCP guarantees that the
node sending the connection request is reachable using the origin IP
address. While DTLS contains an option to do a stateless challenge
-- a process actually stronger than that done by TCP, it is not yet
common for this mechanism to be available in hardware at multigigabit
speeds. It is for this reason that this protocols sticks to using
HTTPS for the Registrar->MASA connection.

13.4. Registrar Certificate may be self-signed

The provisional (D)TLS connection formed by the Pledge with the
Registrar does not authenticate the Registrar's identity. This
Registrar's identity is validated by the [RFC8366] voucher that is
issued by the MASA, signed with an anchor that was built-in to the
Pledge.

The Registrar may therefore use any certificate, including a self-
signed one. The only restrictions on the certificate is that it MUST
have EKU bits set as detailed in Section 7.3.1.

A Registrar that uses a Raw Public Key (RPK) has no certificate
structure, and therefore has no EKU bits that can be set.

14. IANA Considerations

14.1. Resource Type Registry

Additions to the sub-registry "Resource Type Link Target Attribute
Values", within the "CoRE parameters" IANA registry are specified
below.

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brski needs registration with IANA
brski.rv needs registration with IANA
brski.vs needs registration with IANA
brski.es needs registration with IANA

14.2. The IETF XML Registry

This document registers two URIs in the IETF XML registry [RFC3688].
Following the format in [RFC3688], the following registration is
requested:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher
Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher-request
Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.

14.3. The YANG Module Names Registry

This document registers two YANG modules in the YANG Module Names
registry [RFC6020]. Following the format defined in [RFC6020], the
the following registration is requested:

name: ietf-constrained-voucher
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained-voucher
prefix: vch
reference: RFC XXXX

name: ietf-constrained-voucher-request
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-constrained
-voucher-request
prefix: vch
reference: RFC XXXX

14.4. The RFC SID range assignment sub-registry

------------ ------ --------------------------- ------------
Entry-point | Size | Module name | RFC Number
------------ ------ --------------------------- ------------
2450 50 ietf-voucher-constrained [ThisRFC]
2500 50 ietf-voucher-request [ThisRFC}
-constrained
----------- ------ --------------------------- ------------

Warning: These SID values are defined in [I-D.ietf-core-sid], not as
an Early Allocation.

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IANA: please update the names in the Registry to match these revised
names, if they have not already been revised.

14.5. Media Types Registry

This section registers the 'application/voucher-cose+cbor' in the
IANA "Media Types" registry. This media type is used to indicate
that the content is a CBOR voucher or voucher request signed with a
COSE_Sign1 structure [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct].

14.5.1. application/voucher-cose+cbor

Type name: application
Subtype name: voucher-cose+cbor
Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: none
Encoding considerations: binary (CBOR)
Security considerations: Security Considerations of THIS RFC.
Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be
broadly interoperable.
Published specification: THIS RFC.
Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and other
zero-touch onboarding systems Fragment identifier considerations: The syntax and semantics of
fragment identifiers specified for application/voucher-cose+cbor are
as specified for application/cbor. (At publication of this
document, there is no fragment identification syntax defined for
application/cbor.)
Additional information:
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .vch
Macintosh file type code(s): none
Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF
ANIMA Working Group (anima@ietf.org) or IETF Operations and
Management Area Working Group (opsawg@ietf.org)
Intended usage: LIMITED [^ouch2]
Restrictions on usage: NONE
Author: ANIMA WG
Change controller: IETF
Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO

14.6. CoAP Content-Format Registry

Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within the
"CoRE Parameters" registry are needed for two media types. These can
be registered either in the Expert Review range (0-255) or IETF
Review range (256-9999).

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Media type Encoding ID References
---------------------------- --------- ---- ----------
application/voucher-cose+cbor - TBD3 [This RFC]

15. Acknowledgements

We are very grateful to Jim Schaad for explaining COSE and CMS
choices. Also thanks to Jim Schaad for correcting earlier version of
the COSE Sign1 objects.

Michel Veillette did extensive work on _pyang_ to extend it to
support the SID allocation process, and this document was among its
first users.

16. Changelog

-10 Design considerations extended Examples made consistent

-08 Examples for cose_sign1 are completed and improved.

-06 New SID values assigned; regenerated examples

-04 voucher and request-voucher MUST be signed examples for signed
request are added in appendix IANA SID registration is updated SID
values in examples are aligned signed cms examples aligned with new
SIDs

-03

Examples are inverted.

-02

Example of requestvoucher with unsigned appllication/cbor is added
attributes of voucher "refined" to optional
CBOR serialization of vouchers improved
Discovery port numbers are specified

-01

application/json is optional, application/cbor is compulsory
Cms and cose mediatypes are introduced

17. References

17.1. Normative References

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[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]
Stok, P. V. D., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M. C., and S.
Raza, "EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-18, 6
January 2020, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
ace-coap-est-18.txt>.

[I-D.ietf-core-sid]
Veillette, M., Pelov, A., Petrov, I., and C. Bormann,
"YANG Schema Item iDentifier (YANG SID)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-sid-16, 24 June
2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-core-
sid-16.txt>.

[I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]
Veillette, M., Petrov, I., Pelov, A., and C. Bormann,
"CBOR Encoding of Data Modeled with YANG", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-yang-cbor-16, 24
June 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
core-yang-cbor-16.txt>.

[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Initial Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs-12, 24 September 2020,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-cose-
rfc8152bis-algs-12.txt>.

[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct-15, 1 February 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-cose-
rfc8152bis-struct-15.txt>.

[I-D.ietf-cose-x509]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Header parameters for carrying and referencing X.509
certificates", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-cose-x509-08, 14 December 2020,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-cose-
x509-08.txt>.

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[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
dtls13-43, 30 April 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-
dtls13-43.txt>.

[I-D.selander-ace-ake-authz]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., Vučinić, M., Richardson,
M., and A. Schellenbaum, "Lightweight Authorization for
Authenticated Key Exchange.", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-selander-ace-ake-authz-04, 22 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-selander-ace-ake-
authz-04.txt>.

[ieee802-1AR]
IEEE Standard, ., "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.

[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

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[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.

[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.

[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.

[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

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[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.

[RFC9031] Vučinić, M., Ed., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M.
Richardson, "Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) for 6TiSCH",
RFC 9031, DOI 10.17487/RFC9031, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9031>.

[RFC9032] Dujovne, D., Ed. and M. Richardson, "Encapsulation of
6TiSCH Join and Enrollment Information Elements",
RFC 9032, DOI 10.17487/RFC9032, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9032>.

17.2. Informative References

[COSE-registry]
IANA, ., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
registry", 2017,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml>.

[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy]
Richardson, M., Stok, P. V. D., and P. Kampanakis,
"Constrained Join Proxy for Bootstrapping Protocols", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-
join-proxy-05, 18 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-anima-
constrained-join-proxy-05.txt>.

[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., and F. Palombini,
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-12, 20
October 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-
lake-edhoc-12.txt>.

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[I-D.kuehlewind-update-tag]
Kuehlewind, M. and S. Krishnan, "Definition of new tags
for relations between RFCs", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-kuehlewind-update-tag-04, 12 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kuehlewind-update-
tag-04.txt>.

[I-D.richardson-anima-masa-considerations]
Richardson, M. and J. Yang, "Operatonal Considerations for
Voucher infrastructure for BRSKI MASA", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-anima-masa-
considerations-05, 12 March 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-richardson-anima-
masa-considerations-05.txt>.

[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.

[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.

[RFC8990] Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., Ed., and B. Liu, Ed., "GeneRic
Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", RFC 8990,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8990, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8990>.

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Appendix A. Library support for BRSKI

For the implementation of BRSKI, the use of a software library to
manipulate certificates and use crypto algorithms is often
beneficial. Two C-based examples are OPENSSL and mbedtls. Others
more targeted to specific platforms or languages exist. It is
important to realize that the library interfaces differ significantly
between libraries.

Libraries do not support all known crypto algorithms. Before
deciding on a library, it is important to look at their supported
crypto algorithms and the roadmap for future support. Apart from
availability, the library footprint, and the required execution
cycles should be investigated beforehand.

The handling of certificates usually includes the checking of a
certificate chain. In some libraries, chains are constructed and
verified on the basis of a set of certificates, the trust anchor
(usually self signed root CA), and the target certificate. In other
libraries, the chain must be constructed beforehand and obey order
criteria. Verification always includes the checking of the
signatures. Less frequent is the checking the validity of the dates
or checking the existence of a revoked certificate in the chain
against a set of revoked certificates. Checking the chain on the
consistency of the certificate extensions which specify the use of
the certificate usually needs to be programmed explicitly.

A libary can be used to construct a (D)TLS connection. It is useful
to realize that differences beetween (D)TLS implementations will
occur due to the differences in the certicate checks supported by the
library. On top of that, checks between client and server
certificates enforced by (D)TLS are not always helpful for a BRSKI
implementation. For example, the certificates of Pledge and
Registrar are usually not related when the BRSKI protocol is started.
It must be verified that checks on the relation between client and
server certificates do not hamper a succeful DTLS connection
establishment.

A.1. OpensSSL

from openssl's apps/verify.c

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X509 *x = NULL;
int i = 0, ret = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
int num_untrusted;

x = load_cert(file, "certificate file");
if (x == NULL)
goto end;

csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (csc == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error %s: X.509 store context"
"allocation failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
goto end;
}

X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) {
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"error %s: X.509 store context"
"initialization failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
goto end;
}
if (tchain != NULL)
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(csc, tchain);
if (crls != NULL)
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);

i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
<CODE ENDS>

A.2. mbedTLS

mbedtls_x509_crt cert;
mbedtls_x509_crt caCert;
uint32_t certVerifyResultFlags;
...
int result = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(&cert, &caCert, NULL, NULL,
&certVerifyResultFlags, NULL, NULL);

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A.3. wolfSSL

To be added (TBD).

Appendix B. Constrained BRSKI-EST messages

This section extends the examples from Appendix A of
[I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] with the constrained BRSKI requests. The
CoAP headers are only worked out for the enrollstatus example.

B.1. enrollstatus

A coaps enrollstatus message can be :

POST coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/b/es

The corresponding CoAP header fields are shown below.

Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
Code = 0x02 (0.02 is POST)
Options
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0xb (option nr = 11)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = "b"
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x0 (option nr = 11)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = "es"
Option (Content-Format)
Option Delta = 0x1 (option nr = 12)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 60 (application/cbor)
Payload Marker = 0xFF
Payload = <binary CBOR enrollstatus document>

The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are omitted because they coincide
with the transport protocol destination address and port
respectively. TBD - Show the binary CBOR payload of this example.

A 2.04 Changed response from the Registrar will then be:

2.04 Changed

With CoAP fields:

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Ver=1
T=2 (ACK)
Code = 0x44 (2.04 Changed)

B.2. voucher_status

A coaps voucher_status message can be:

POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]:61616/b/vs
Content-Format: 60 (application/cbor)
Payload =
a46776657273696f6e0166737461747573f466726561736f6e7828496e66
6f726d61746976652068756d616e2d7265616461626c65206572726f7220
6d6573736167656e726561736f6e2d636f6e74657874a100764164646974
696f6e616c20696e666f726d6174696f6e
<CODE ENDS>

The request payload above is binary CBOR but represented here in
hexadecimal for readability. Below is the equivalent CBOR diagnostic
format.

{"version": 1, "status": false,
"reason": "Informative human-readable error message",
"reason-context": { 0: "Additional information" } }

A 2.04 Changed response without payload will then be sent by the
Registrar back to the Pledge.

2.04 Changed

Appendix C. COSE examples

These examples are generated on a Pi 4 and a PC running BASH. Keys
and Certificates have been generated with openssl with the following
shell script:

#!/bin/bash
#try-cert.sh
export dir=./brski/intermediate
export cadir=./brski
export cnfdir=./conf
export format=pem
export default_crl_days=30
sn=8

DevID=pledge.1.2.3.4

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serialNumber="serialNumber=$DevID"
export hwType=1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.10.1
export hwSerialNum=01020304 # Some hex
export subjectAltName="otherName:1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4;SEQ:hmodname"
echo $hwType - $hwSerialNum
echo $serialNumber
OPENSSL_BIN="openssl"

# remove all files
rm -r ./brski/*
#
# initialize file structure
# root level
cd $cadir
mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private
chmod 700 private
touch index.txt
touch serial
echo 11223344556600 >serial
echo 1000 > crlnumber
# intermediate level
mkdir intermediate
cd intermediate
mkdir certs crl csr newcerts private
chmod 700 private
touch index.txt
echo 11223344556600 >serial
echo 1000 > crlnumber
cd ../..

# file structure is cleaned start filling

echo "#############################"
echo "create registrar keys and certificates "
echo "#############################"

echo "create root registrar certificate using ecdsa with sha 256 key"
$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey \
-noout -out $cadir/private/ca-regis.key

$OPENSSL_BIN req -new -x509 \
-config $cnfdir/openssl-regis.cnf \
-key $cadir/private/ca-regis.key \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-regis.crt \
-extensions v3_ca\

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-days 365 \
-subj "/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=consultancy \
/CN=registrar.stok.nl"

# Combine authority certificate and key
echo "Combine authority certificate and key"
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\
-inkey $cadir/private/ca-regis.key \
-in $cadir/certs/ca-regis.crt -export \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.pfx

# converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem
echo "converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem"
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\
-in $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.pfx \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.crt -nodes

#show certificate in registrar combined certificate
$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $cadir/certs/ca-regis-comb.crt -text

#
# Certificate Authority for MASA
#
echo "#############################"
echo "create MASA keys and certificates "
echo "#############################"

echo "create root MASA certificate using ecdsa with sha 256 key"
$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout \
-out $cadir/private/ca-masa.key

$OPENSSL_BIN req -new -x509 \
-config $cnfdir/openssl-masa.cnf \
-days 1000 -key $cadir/private/ca-masa.key \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa.crt \
-extensions v3_ca\
-subj "/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=manufacturer\
/CN=masa.stok.nl"

# Combine authority certificate and key
echo "Combine authority certificate and key for masa"
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\
-inkey $cadir/private/ca-masa.key \
-in $cadir/certs/ca-masa.crt -export \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.pfx

# converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem for masa
echo "converteer authority pkcs12 file to pem for masa"

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$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\
-in $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.pfx \
-out $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.crt -nodes

#show certificate in pledge combined certificate
$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $cadir/certs/ca-masa-comb.crt -text

#
# Certificate for Pledge derived from MASA certificate
#
echo "#############################"
echo "create pledge keys and certificates "
echo "#############################"

# Pledge derived Certificate

echo "create pledge derived certificate using ecdsa with sha 256 key"
$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout \
-out $dir/private/pledge.key

echo "create pledge certificate request"
$OPENSSL_BIN req -nodes -new -sha256 \
-key $dir/private/pledge.key -out $dir/csr/pledge.csr \
-subj "/C=NL/ST=NB/L=Helmond/O=vanderstok/OU=manufacturing\
/CN=uuid:$DevID/$serialNumber"

# Sign pledge derived Certificate
echo "sign pledge derived certificate "
$OPENSSL_BIN ca -config $cnfdir/openssl-pledge.cnf \
-extensions 8021ar_idevid\
-days 365 -in $dir/csr/pledge.csr \
-out $dir/certs/pledge.crt

# Add pledge key and pledge certificate to pkcs12 file
echo "Add derived pledge key and derived pledge \
certificate to pkcs12 file"
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\
-inkey $dir/private/pledge.key \
-in $dir/certs/pledge.crt -export \
-out $dir/certs/pledge-comb.pfx

# converteer pledge pkcs12 file to pem
echo "converteer pledge pkcs12 file to pem"
$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs12 -passin pass:watnietweet -passout pass:watnietweet\
-in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.pfx \
-out $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -nodes

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#show certificate in pledge-comb.crt
$OPENSSL_BIN x509 -in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -text

#show private key in pledge-comb.crt
$OPENSSL_BIN ecparam -name prime256v1\
-in $dir/certs/pledge-comb.crt -text
<CODE ENDS>

The xxxx-comb certificates have been generated as required by libcoap
for the DTLS connection generation.

C.1. Pledge, Registrar and MASA keys

This first section documents the public and private keys used in the
subsequent test vectors below. These keys come from test code and
are not used in any production system, and should only be used only
to validate implementations.

C.1.1. Pledge private key

Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
9b:4d:43:b6:a9:e1:7c:04:93:45:c3:13:d9:b5:f0:
41:a9:6a:9c:45:79:73:b8:62:f1:77:03:3a:fc:c2:
9c:9a
pub:
04:d6:b7:6f:74:88:bd:80:ae:5f:28:41:2c:72:02:
ef:5f:98:b4:81:e1:d9:10:4c:f8:1b:66:d4:3e:5c:
ea:da:73:e6:a8:38:a9:f1:35:11:85:b6:cd:e2:04:
10:be:fe:d5:0b:3b:14:69:2e:e1:b0:6a:bc:55:40:
60:eb:95:5c:54
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
<CODE ENDS>

C.1.2. Registrar private key

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Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
81:df:bb:50:a3:45:58:06:b5:56:3b:46:de:f3:e9:
e9:00:ae:98:13:9e:2f:36:68:81:fc:d9:65:24:fb:
21:7e
pub:
04:50:7a:c8:49:1a:8c:69:c7:b5:c3:1d:03:09:ed:
35:ba:13:f5:88:4c:e6:2b:88:cf:30:18:15:4f:a0:
59:b0:20:ec:6b:eb:b9:4e:02:b8:93:40:21:89:8d:
a7:89:c7:11:ce:a7:13:39:f5:0e:34:8e:df:0d:92:
3e:d0:2d:c7:b7
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
<CODE ENDS>

C.1.3. MASA private key

Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
c6:bb:a5:8f:b6:d3:c4:75:28:d8:d3:d9:46:c3:31:
83:6d:00:0a:9a:38:ce:22:5c:e9:d9:ea:3b:98:32:
ec:31
pub:
04:59:80:94:66:14:94:20:30:3c:66:08:85:55:86:
db:e7:d4:d1:d7:7a:d2:a3:1a:0c:73:6b:01:0d:02:
12:15:d6:1f:f3:6e:c8:d4:84:60:43:3b:21:c5:83:
80:1e:fc:e2:37:85:77:97:94:d4:aa:34:b5:b6:c6:
ed:f3:17:5c:f1
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
<CODE ENDS>

C.2. Pledge, Registrar and MASA certificates

Below the certificates that accompany the keys. The certificate
description is followed by the hexadecimal DER of the certificate

C.2.1. Pledge IDevID certificate

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Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 4822678189204992 (0x11223344556600)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=manufacturer,
CN=masa.stok.nl
Validity
Not Before: Dec 9 10:02:36 2020 GMT
Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=manufacturing,
CN=uuid:pledge.1.2.3.4/serialNumber=pledge.1.2.3.4
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:d6:b7:6f:74:88:bd:80:ae:5f:28:41:2c:72:02:
ef:5f:98:b4:81:e1:d9:10:4c:f8:1b:66:d4:3e:5c:
ea:da:73:e6:a8:38:a9:f1:35:11:85:b6:cd:e2:04:
10:be:fe:d5:0b:3b:14:69:2e:e1:b0:6a:bc:55:40:
60:eb:95:5c:54
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
E4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:46:02:21:00:d2:e6:45:3b:b0:c3:00:b3:25:8d:f1:83:fe:
d9:37:c1:a2:49:65:69:7f:6b:b9:ef:2c:05:07:06:31:ac:17:
bd:02:21:00:e2:ce:9e:7b:7f:74:50:33:ad:9e:ff:12:4e:e9:
a6:f3:b8:36:65:ab:7d:80:bb:56:88:bc:03:1d:e5:1e:31:6f

This is the hexadecimal representation in (request-)voucher examples
referred to as pledge-cert-hex.

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30820226308201cba003020102020711223344556600300a06082a8648ce3d04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<CODE ENDS>

C.2.2. Registrar Certificate

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Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
70:56:ea:aa:30:66:d8:82:6a:55:5b:90:88:d4:62:bf:9c:f2:8c:fd
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=consultancy,
CN=registrar.stok.nl
Validity
Not Before: Dec 9 10:02:36 2020 GMT
Not After : Dec 9 10:02:36 2021 GMT
Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok, OU=consultancy,
CN=registrar.stok.nl
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:50:7a:c8:49:1a:8c:69:c7:b5:c3:1d:03:09:ed:
35:ba:13:f5:88:4c:e6:2b:88:cf:30:18:15:4f:a0:
59:b0:20:ec:6b:eb:b9:4e:02:b8:93:40:21:89:8d:
a7:89:c7:11:ce:a7:13:39:f5:0e:34:8e:df:0d:92:
3e:d0:2d:c7:b7
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
08:C2:BF:36:88:7F:79:41:21:85:87:2F:16:A7:AC:A6:EF:B3:D2:B3
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
08:C2:BF:36:88:7F:79:41:21:85:87:2F:16:A7:AC:A6:EF:B3:D2:B3

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
CMC Registration Authority, TLS Web Server
Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment,
Data Encipherment, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:44:02:20:74:4c:99:00:85:13:b2:f1:bc:fd:f9:02:1a:46:
fb:17:4c:f8:83:a2:7c:a1:d9:3f:ae:ac:f3:1e:4e:dd:12:c6:
02:20:11:47:14:db:f5:1a:5e:78:f5:81:b9:42:1c:6e:47:02:
ab:53:72:70:c5:ba:fb:2d:16:c3:de:9a:a1:82:c3:5f

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This the hexadecimal representation, in (request-)voucher examples
referred to as regis-cert-hex

308202753082021ca00302010202147056eaaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9c
f28cfd300a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b
300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330
11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e
73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f
6b2e6e6c301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d323131323039313030
3233365a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e42
3110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e
64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a30
1806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a
8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004507ac8491a8c69c7b5c31d03
09ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018154fa059b020ec6bebb94e02b8934021898d
a789c711cea71339f50e348edf0d923ed02dc7b7a3818d30818a301d0603551d
0e0416041408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d23
04183016801408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d
130101ff040530030101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c
06082b0601050507030106082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404
030201f6300a06082a8648ce3d04030203470030440220744c99008513b2f1bc
fdf9021a46fb174cf883a27ca1d93faeacf31e4edd12c60220114714dbf51a5e
78f581b9421c6e4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c35f<CODE ENDS>

C.2.3. MASA Certificate

Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
14:26:b8:1c:ce:d8:c3:e8:14:05:cb:87:67:0d:be:ef:d5:81:25:b4
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,
OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl

Validity
Not Before: Dec 9 10:02:36 2020 GMT
Not After : Sep 5 10:02:36 2023 GMT
Subject: C=NL, ST=NB, L=Helmond, O=vanderstok,
OU=manufacturer, CN=masa.stok.nl
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:59:80:94:66:14:94:20:30:3c:66:08:85:55:86:
db:e7:d4:d1:d7:7a:d2:a3:1a:0c:73:6b:01:0d:02:
12:15:d6:1f:f3:6e:c8:d4:84:60:43:3b:21:c5:83:
80:1e:fc:e2:37:85:77:97:94:d4:aa:34:b5:b6:c6:

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ed:f3:17:5c:f1
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
E4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
E4:03:93:B4:C3:D3:F4:2A:80:A4:77:18:F6:96:49:03:01:17:68:A3

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
CMC Registration Authority,
TLS Web Server Authentication,
TLS Web Client Authentication
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment,
Data Encipherment, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:44:02:20:2e:c5:f2:24:72:70:20:ea:6e:74:8b:13:93:67:
8a:e6:fe:fb:8d:56:7f:f5:34:18:a9:ef:a5:0f:c3:99:ca:53:
02:20:3d:dc:91:d0:e9:6a:69:20:01:fb:e4:20:40:de:7c:7d:
98:ed:d8:84:53:61:84:a7:f9:13:06:4c:a9:b2:8f:5c

This is the hexadecimal representation, in (request-)voucher examples
referred to as masa-cert-hex.

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3082026d30820214a00302010202141426b81cced8c3e81405cb87670dbeefd5
8125b4300a06082a8648ce3d040302306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b
300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330
11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e
7566616374757265723115301306035504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c
301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d3233303930353130303233365a
306f310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e423110300e
06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273
746f6b31153013060355040b0c0c6d616e756661637475726572311530130603
5504030c0c6d6173612e73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d02010608
2a8648ce3d0301070342000459809466149420303c6608855586dbe7d4d1d77a
d2a31a0c736b010d021215d61ff36ec8d48460433b21c583801efce237857797
94d4aa34b5b6c6edf3175cf1a3818d30818a301d0603551d0e04160414e40393
b4c3d3f42a80a47718f6964903011768a3301f0603551d23041830168014e403
93b4c3d3f42a80a47718f6964903011768a3300f0603551d130101ff04053003
0101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b0601050507
030106082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404030201f6300a0608
2a8648ce3d040302034700304402202ec5f224727020ea6e748b1393678ae6fe
fb8d567ff53418a9efa50fc399ca5302203ddc91d0e96a692001fbe42040de7c
7d98edd884536184a7f913064ca9b28f5c<CODE ENDS>

C.3. COSE signed voucher request from Pledge to Registrar

In this example the voucher request has been signed by the Pledge,
and has been sent to the JRC over CoAPS. The Pledge uses the
proximity assertion together with an included proximity-registrar-
cert field to inform MASA about its proximity to the specific
Registrar.

POST coaps://registrar.example.com/b/rv
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor)
signed_request_voucher

The payload signed_request_voucher is shown as hexadecimal dump (with
lf added):

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d28444a101382ea104582097113db094eee8eae48683e7337875c0372164
be89d023a5f3df52699c0fbfb55902d2a11909c5a60274323032302d3132
2d32335431323a30353a32325a0474323032322d31322d32335431323a30
353a32325a01020750684ca83e27230aff97630cf2c1ec409a0d6e706c65
6467652e312e322e332e340a590279308202753082021ca0030201020214
7056eaaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9cf28cfd300a06082a8648ce3d04
03023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e42
3110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a76
616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e63
79311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c30
1e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d323131323039313030323336
5a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906035504080c024e4231
10300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011060355040a0c0a7661
6e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f6e73756c74616e6379
311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e73746f6b2e6e6c3059
301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004507ac8491a
8c69c7b5c31d0309ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018154fa059b020ec6beb
b94e02b8934021898da789c711cea71339f50e348edf0d923ed02dc7b7a3
818d30818a301d0603551d0e0416041408c2bf36887f79412185872f16a7
aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d2304183016801408c2bf36887f7941218587
2f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d130101ff040530030101ff30270603
551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b0601050507030106082b
06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff0404030201f6300a06082a8648
ce3d04030203470030440220744c99008513b2f1bcfdf9021a46fb174cf8
83a27ca1d93faeacf31e4edd12c60220114714dbf51a5e78f581b9421c6e
4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c35f58473045022063766c7bbd1b
339dbc398e764af3563e93b25a69104befe9aac2b3336b8f56e1022100cd
0419559ad960ccaed4dee3f436eca40b7570b25a52eb60332bc1f2991484
e9
<CODE ENDS>

The representiation of signed_voucher_request in CBOR diagnostic
format is:

Richardson, et al. Expires 28 April 2022 [Page 66]
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Diagnose(signed_request_voucher) =
18([
h'A101382E', // {"alg": -47}
{4: h'97113DB094EEE8EAE48683E7337875C0372164B
E89D023A5F3DF52699C0FBFB5'},
h'1234', // request_voucher
h'3045022063766C7BBD1B339DBC398E764AF3563E93B
25A69104BEFE9AAC2B3336B8F56E1022100CD0419559A
D960CCAED4DEE3F436ECA40B7570B25A52EB60332BC1F
2991484E9'
])

Diagnose(request_voucher) =
{2501: {2: "2020-12-23T12:05:22Z",
4: "2022-12-23T12:05:22Z",
1: 2,
7: h'684CA83E27230AFF97630CF2C1EC409A',
13: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
10: h'1234' // regis-cert-hex
}}
<CODE ENDS>

C.4. COSE signed voucher request from Registrar to MASA

TBD - modify example to use full paths to MASA, not short-names.
Also not use CoAP but HTTP protocol.

In this example the voucher request has been signed by the JRC using
the private key from Appendix C.1.2. Contained within this voucher
request is the voucher request from the Pledge to JRC.

POST coaps://masa.example.com/b/rv
(Content-Format: application/voucher-cose+cbor)
signed_masa_request_voucher

The payload signed_masa_voucher_request is shown as hexadecimal dump
(with lf added):

Richardson, et al. Expires 28 April 2022 [Page 67]
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d28444a101382ea1045820e8735bc4b470c3aa6a7aa9aa8ee584c09c1113
1b205efec5d0313bad84c5cd05590414a11909c5a60274323032302d3132
2d32385431303a30333a33355a0474323032322d31322d32385431303a30
333a33355a07501551631f6e0416bd162ba53ea00c2a050d6e706c656467
652e312e322e332e3405587131322d32385431303a30333a33355a075015
51631f6e0416bd162ba53ea00c2a050d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e
3405587131322d32385431303a300000000000000000000000000416bd16
2ba53ea00c2a050d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e3405587131322d32
385431303a09590349d28444a101382ea104582097113db094eee8eae486
83e7337875c0372164be89d023a5f3df52699c0fbfb55902d2a11909c5a6
0274323032302d31322d32385431303a30333a33355a0474323032322d31
322d32385431303a30333a33355a010207501551631f6e0416bd162ba53e
a00c2a050d6e706c656467652e312e322e332e340a590279308202753082
021ca00302010202147056eaaa3066d8826a555b9088d462bf9cf28cfd30
0a06082a8648ce3d0403023073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b3009
06035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e64311330
11060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b63
6f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c11726567697374726172
2e73746f6b2e6e6c301e170d3230313230393130303233365a170d323131
3230393130303233365a3073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b300906
035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431133011
060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c0b636f
6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c117265676973747261722e
73746f6b2e6e6c3059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107
03420004507ac8491a8c69c7b5c31d0309ed35ba13f5884ce62b88cf3018
154fa059b020ec6bebb94e02b8934021898da789c711cea71339f50e348e
df0d923ed02dc7b7a3818d30818a301d0603551d0e0416041408c2bf3688
7f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3301f0603551d2304183016801408c2
bf36887f79412185872f16a7aca6efb3d2b3300f0603551d130101ff0405
30030101ff30270603551d250420301e06082b0601050507031c06082b06
01050507030106082b06010505070302300e0603551d0f0101ff04040302
01f6300a06082a8648ce3d04030203470030440220744c99008513b2f1bc
fdf9021a46fb174cf883a27ca1d93faeacf31e4edd12c60220114714dbf5
1a5e78f581b9421c6e4702ab537270c5bafb2d16c3de9aa182c35f584730
45022063766c7bbd1b339dbc398e764af3563e93b25a69104befe9aac2b3
336b8f56e1022100cd0419559ad960ccaed4dee3f436eca40b7570b25a52
eb60332bc1f2991484e958473045022100e6b45558c1b806bba23f4ac626
c9bdb6fd354ef4330d8dfb7c529f29cca934c802203c1f2ccbbac89733d1
7ee7775bc2654c5f1cc96afba2741cc31532444aa8fed8

The representiation of signed_masa_voucher_request in CBOR diagnostic
format is:

Richardson, et al. Expires 28 April 2022 [Page 68]
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Diagnose(signed_registrar_request-voucher)
18([
h'A101382E', // {"alg": -47}
h'E8735BC4B470C3AA6A7AA9AA8EE584C09C11131B205EFEC5D0313BAD84
C5CD05'},
h'1234', // registrar_request_voucher',
h'3045022100E6B45558C1B806BBA23F4AC626C9BDB6FD354EF4330D8DFB
7C529F29CCA934C802203C1F2CCBBAC89733D17EE7775BC2654C5F1CC96A
FBA2741CC31532444AA8FED8'
])

Diagnose(registrar_request_voucher)
{2501:
{2: "2020-12-28T10:03:35Z",
4: "2022-12-28T10:03:35Z",
7: h'1551631F6E0416BD162BA53EA00C2A05',
13: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
5: h'31322D32385431303A30333A33355A07501551631F6E0416BD
162BA53EA00C2A050D6E706C656467652E312E322E332E3405
587131322D32385431303A3000000000000000000000000004
16BD162BA53EA00C2A050D6E706C656467652E312E322E332E
3405587131322D32385431303A',
9: h'1234' // signature
}}
<CODE ENDS>

C.5. COSE signed voucher from MASA to Pledge via Registrar

The resulting voucher is created by the MASA and returned via the JRC
to the Pledge. It is signed by the MASA's private key Appendix C.1.3
and can be verified by the Pledge using the MASA's public key
contained within the MASA certificate.

This is the raw binary signed_voucher, encoded in hexadecimal (with
lf added):

Richardson, et al. Expires 28 April 2022 [Page 69]
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d28444a101382ea104582039920a34ee92d3148ab3a729f58611193270c9
029f7784daf112614b19445d5158cfa1190993a70274323032302d31322d
32335431353a30333a31325a0474323032302d31322d32335431353a3233
3a31325a010007506508e06b2959d5089d7a3169ea889a490b6e706c6564
67652e312e322e332e340858753073310b3009060355040613024e4c310b
300906035504080c024e423110300e06035504070c0748656c6d6f6e6431
133011060355040a0c0a76616e64657273746f6b31143012060355040b0c
0b636f6e73756c74616e6379311a301806035504030c1172656769737472
61722e73746f6b2e6e6c03f458473045022022515d96cd12224ee5d3ac67
3237163bba24ad84815699285d9618f463ee73fa022100a6bff9d8585c1c
9256371ece94da3d26264a5dfec0a354fe7b3aef58344c512f

The representiation of signed_voucher in CBOR diagnostic format is:

Diagnose(signed_voucher) =
18([
h'A101382E', # {"alg": -47}
{4: h'39920A34EE92D3148AB3A729F58611193270C9029F7784DAF112614B194
45D51'},
h'voucher',
h'3045022022515D96CD12224EE5D3AC673237163BBA24AD84815699285D9618F
463EE73FA022100A6BFF9D8585C1C9256371ECE94DA3D26264A5DFEC0A354FE7B
3AEF58344C512F'
])

Diagnose(voucher) =
{2451:
{2: "2020-12-23T15:03:12Z",
4: "2020-12-23T15:23:12Z",
1: 0,
7: h'6508E06B2959D5089D7A3169EA889A49',
11: "pledge.1.2.3.4",
8: h'regis-cert-hex',
3: false}}
<CODE ENDS>

Contributors

Russ Housley

Email: housley@vigilsec.com

Authors' Addresses

Richardson, et al. Expires 28 April 2022 [Page 70]
Internet-Draft Constrained BRSKI October 2021

Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works

Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

Peter van der Stok
vanderstok consultancy

Email: stokcons@bbhmail.nl

Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems

Email: pkampana@cisco.com

Esko Dijk
IoTconsultancy.nl

Email: esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl

Richardson, et al. Expires 28 April 2022 [Page 71]

Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-14

Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-14