Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.

(Terry Manderson) Yes

Alvaro Retana (was Discuss) Yes

(Alia Atlas) No Objection

(Deborah Brungard) No Objection

(Ben Campbell) No Objection

Comment (2018-01-10 for -07)
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I am skeptical that there are no normative references at all. Is it reasonable that a reader could skip all the references and still fully understand this document?

(Alissa Cooper) No Objection

Comment (2018-01-11 for -07)
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The Gen-ART reviewer identified a bunch of nits that should be addressed.

(Spencer Dawkins) No Objection

(Suresh Krishnan) No Objection

Comment (2018-01-10 for -07)
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* The first paragraph of Section 2.1.4. is extremely difficult to read and the sentences seem incomplete/malformed. Please consider rewording

"  ACP does not support IPv4: Single stack IPv6 management of the
   network via ACP and (as needed) data plane.  Independent of whether
   the data plane is dual-stack, has IPv4 as a service or is single
   stack IPv6.  Dual plane management, IPv6 for ACP, IPv4 for the data
   plane is likewise an architecturally simple option."

(Mirja K├╝hlewind) (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2018-02-09)
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Thanks for addressing my discuss by rather describing requirements for the transport than scratching out an MPTCP-based solution! I like the new text! Also thanks again to Yoshi for the TSV review!

(Kathleen Moriarty) No Objection

(Eric Rescorla) No Objection

Comment (2018-01-10 for -07)
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 secure ACP was extendable via untrusted routers then it would be a
   lot more verify the secure domain assertion.  Therefore the ACP edge
   devices are not supposed to redistribute routes from non-ACP routers
There's something grammatically wrong here and I can't make sense of this sentence.

   TLS/DTLS ([RFC5246])/([RFC6347]) with mutual AN-domain certificate
   authentication - and does not incur new key management.
This isn't entirely clear to me. What are the identities that these devices are using to talk to each other? Are they always FQDNs?

   into IPv4 support for ACP will have a longer term benefit or enough
   critical short-term use-cases.  Support for IPv4-only for ACP is
   purely a strategic choice to focus on the known important long term
I think this probably should say IPv6 only

   address collision even though there is no central assignment
   authority.  This is helped by the expectation, that ACPs are never
   expected to connect all together, but only few ACPs may ever need to
Nit: no comma between "expectation" and "that"

   ACP packets can be recognized to come from you, you may need to list
   your prefixes in multiple of those sites.
As I read this, it helps others to list, not yourself, right?

   Any current and future protocols must rely on secure end-to-end
   communications (TLS/DTLS) and identification and authentication via
This looks normative. Should it be MUST?

(Adam Roach) No Objection