Advice for Safe Handling of Malformed Messages
draft-ietf-appsawg-malformed-mail-07
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (appsawg WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Murray Kucherawy , Gregory N. Shapiro , Ned Freed | ||
| Last updated | 2013-07-13 | ||
| Replaces | draft-kucherawy-mta-malformed | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Reviews |
GENART Last Call review
(of
-09)
Ready with Nits
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||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | Salvatore Loreto | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists (IESG: Dead) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Barry Leiba | ||
| Send notices to | appsawg-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-appsawg-malformed-mail@tools.ietf.org |
draft-ietf-appsawg-malformed-mail-07
APPSAWG M. Kucherawy
Internet-Draft G. Shapiro
Intended status: Informational N. Freed
Expires: January 14, 2014 July 13, 2013
Advice for Safe Handling of Malformed Messages
draft-ietf-appsawg-malformed-mail-07
Abstract
Although Internet mail formats have been precisely defined since the
1970s, authoring and handling software often show only mild
conformance to the specifications. The distributed and non-
interactive nature of email has often prompted adjustments to
receiving software, to handle these variations, rather than trying to
gain better conformance by senders, since the receiving operator is
primarily driven by complaining recipient users and has no authority
over the sending side of the system. Processing with such
flexibility comes at some cost, since mail software is faced with
decisions about whether or not to permit non-conforming messages to
continue toward their destinations unaltered, adjust them to conform
(possibly at the cost of losing some of the original message), or
outright rejecting them.
A core requirement for interoperability is that both sides of an
exchange work from the same details and semantics. By having
receivers be flexible, beyond the specifications, there can be -- and
often has been -- a good chance that a message will not be fully
interoperable. Worse, a well-established pattern of tolerance for
variations can sometimes be used as an attack vector.
This document includes a collection of the best advice available
regarding a variety of common malformed mail situations, to be used
as implementation guidance. It must be emphasized, however, that the
intent of this document is not to standardize malformations or
otherwise encourage their proliferation. The messages are manifestly
malformed, and the code and culture that generates them needs to be
fixed. Therefore, these messages should be rejected outright if at
all possible. Nevertheless, many malformed messages from otherwise
legitimate senders are in circulation and will be for some time, and,
unfortunately, commercial reality shows that we cannot always simply
reject or discard them. Accordingly, this document presents
alternatives for dealing with them in ways that seem to do the least
additional harm until the infrastructure is tightened up to match the
standards.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. The Purpose Of This Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Not The Purpose Of This Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Document Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Invariant Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Mail Submission Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Line Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Header Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Converting Obsolete and Invalid Syntaxes . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1.1. Host-Address Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1.2. Excessive Angle Brackets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1.3. Unbalanced Angle Brackets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.4. Unbalanced Parentheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.5. Commas in Address Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.6. Unbalanced Quotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.7. Naked Local-Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Non-Header Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.3. Unusual Spacing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.4. Header Malformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.5. Header Field Counts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.6. Missing Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.7. Return-Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.8. Repeated Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.9. Missing or Incorrect Charset Information . . . . . . . . . 16
7.10. Eight-Bit Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. MIME Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. Missing MIME-Version Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. Faulty Encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Body Anomalies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1. Oversized Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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1. Introduction
1.1. The Purpose Of This Work
The history of email standards, going back to [RFC733] and beyond,
contains a fairly rigid evolution of specifications. But
implementations within that culture have also long had an
undercurrent known formally as the robustness principle, but also
known informally as Postel's Law: "Be conservative in what you do, be
liberal in what you accept from others."
Jon Postel's directive is often misinterpreted to mean that any
deviance from a specification is acceptable. Rather, it was intended
only to account for legitimate variations in interpretation within
specifications, as well as basic transit errors, like bit errors.
Taken to its unintended extreme, excessive tolerance would imply that
there are no limits to the liberties that a sender might take, while
presuming a burden on a receiver to guess "correctly" at the meaning
of any such variation. These matters are further compounded by
flawed receiver software -- the end users' mail readers -- which are
also sometimes flawed, leaving senders to craft messages (sometimes
bending the rules) to overcome those flaws.
In general, this served the email ecosystem well by allowing a few
errors in implementations without obstructing participation in the
game. The proverbial bar was set low. However, as we have evolved
into the current era, some of these lenient stances have begun to
expose opportunities that can be exploited by malefactors. Various
email-based applications rely on strong application of these
standards for simple security checks, while the very basic building
blocks of that infrastructure, intending to be robust, fail utterly
to assert those standards.
This document presents some areas in which the more lenient stances
can provide vectors for attack, and then presents the collected
wisdom of numerous applications in and around the email ecosystem for
dealing with them to mitigate their impact.
1.2. Not The Purpose Of This Work
It is important to understand that this work is not an effort to
endorse or standardize certain common malformations. The code and
culture that introduces such messages into the mail stream needs to
be repaired, as the security penalty now being paid for this lax
processing arguably outweighs the reduction in support costs to end
users who are not expected to understand the standards. However, the
reality is that this will not be fixed quickly.
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Given this, it is beneficial to provide implementers with guidance
about the safest or most effective way to handle malformed messages
when they arrive, taking into consideration the tradeoffs of the
choices available especially with respect to how various actors in
the email ecosystem respond to such messages in terms of handling,
parsing, or rendering to end users.
1.3. General Considerations
Many deviations from message format standards are considered by some
receivers to be strong indications that the message is undesirable,
i.e., is spam or contains malware. Such receivers quickly decide
that the best handling choice is simply to reject or discard the
message. This means malformations caused by innocent
misunderstandings or ignorance of proper syntax can cause messages
with no ill intent also to fail to be delivered.
Senders that want to ensure message delivery are best advised to
adhere strictly to the relevant standards (including, but not limited
to, [MAIL], [MIME], and [DKIM]), as well as observe other industry
best practices such as may be published from time to time either by
the IETF or independently.
Receivers that haven't the luxury of strict enforcement of the
standards on inbound messages are usually best served by observing
the following guidelines for handling of malformed messages:
1. Whenever possible, mitigation of syntactic malformations should
be guided by an assessment of the most likely semantic intent.
For example, it is reasonable to conclude that multiple sets of
angle brackets around an address are simply superflous and can be
dropped.
2. When the intent is unclear, or when it is clear but also
impractical to change the content to reflect that intent,
mitigation should be limited to cases where not taking any
corrective action would clearly lead to a worse outcome.
3. Security issues, when present, need to be addressed and may force
mitigation strategies that are otherwise suboptimal.
2. Document Conventions
2.1. Examples
Examples of message content include a number within braces at the end
of each line. These are line numbers for use in subsequent
discussion, and are not actually part of the message content
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presented in the example.
Blank lines are not numbered in the examples.
3. Background
The reader would benefit from reading [EMAIL-ARCH] for some general
background about the overall email architecture. Of particular
interest is the Internet Message Format, detailed in [MAIL].
Throughout this document, the use of the term "message" should be
assumed to mean a block of text conforming to the Internet Message
Format.
4. Invariant Content
An agent handling a message could use several distinct
representations of the message. One is an internal representation,
such as separate blocks of storage for the header and body, some
header or body alterations, or tables indexed by header name, set up
to make particular kinds of processing easier. The other is the
representation passed along to the next agent in the handling chain.
This might be identical to the message input to the module, or it
might have some changes such as added or reordered header fields or
body elisions to remove malicious content.
Message handling is usually most effective when each in a sequence of
handling modules receives the same content for analysis. A module
that "fixes" or otherwise alters the content passed to later modules
can prevent the later modules from identifing malicious or other
content that exposes the end user to harm. It is important that all
processing modules can make consistent assertions about the content.
Modules that operate sequentially sometimes add private header fields
to relay information downstream for later filters to use (and
possibly remove), or they may have out-of-band ways of doing so.
Whenever possible, the latter mechanism should be used.
The above is less of a concern when multiple analysis modules are
operated in parallel, independent of one another.
Often, abuse reporting systems can act effectively only when a
complaint or report contains the original message exactly as it was
generated. Messages that have been altered by handling modules might
render a complaint inactionable as the system receiving the report
may be unable to identify the original message as one of its own.
Some message changes alter syntax without changing semantics.
(Indeed, analyzing the semantics of malformations was the impetus for
this work.) For example, Section 7.4 describes a situation where an
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agent removes additional header whitespace. This is a syntax change
without a change in semantics, though some systems (e.g., DKIM) are
sensitive to such changes. Message system developers need to aware
of the downstream impact of making either kind of change.
There will always be local handling exceptions, but these guidelines
should be useful for developing integrated message processing
environments.
In most cases, this document only discusses techniques used on
internal representations. It is occasionally necessary to make
changes between the input and output versions; such cases will be
called out explicitly.
5. Mail Submission Agents
Within the email context, the single most influential component that
can reduce the presence of malformed items in the email system is the
Mail Handling Service (MHS; see [EMAIL-ARCH]). This is the component
that is essentially the interface between end users that create
content and the mail stream.
MHSes need to become more strict about enforcement of all relevant
email standards, especially [MAIL] and the [MIME] family of
documents.
More strict conformance by relaying MTAs will also be helpful.
although preventing the dissemination of malformed messages is
desirable, the rejection of such mail already in transit also has a
support cost, namely the creation of a [DSN] that many end users
might not understand.
6. Line Termination
For interoperable Internet Mail messages, the only valid line
separation sequence during a typical SMTP session is ASCII 0x0D
("carriage return", or CR) followed by ASCII 0x0A ("line feed", or
LF), commonly referred to as CRLF. This is not the case for binary
mode SMTP (see [BINARYSMTP]).
Common UNIX user tools, however, typically only use LF for internal
line termination. This means that a protocol engine, which converts
between UNIX and Internet Mail formats, has to convert between these
two end-of-line representations before transmitting a message or
after receiving it.
Non-compliant implementations can cause messages to be transmitted
with a mix of line terminations, such as LF everywhere except CRLF
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only at the end of the message. According to [SMTP] and [MAIL], this
means the entire message actually exists on a single line.
Within modern Internet Mail it is highly unlikely that an isolated CR
or LF is valid in common ASCII text. Furthermore, [MIME] presents
mechanisms for encoding content that actually does need to contain
such an unusual character sequence.
Thus, it will typically be safe and helpful to treat a naked CR or LF
as equivalent to a CRLF when parsing a message.
Note that this advice pertains only to the raw SMTP data, and not to
decoded MIME entities. In fact, it could be necessary to encode MIME
content that actually does need to contian such unusual character
sequences. However, they would by definition be encoded, and not
visible in the raw SMTP stream.
7. Header Anomalies
This section covers common syntactical and semantic anomalies found
in a message header, and presents preferred mitigations.
7.1. Converting Obsolete and Invalid Syntaxes
A message using an obsolete header syntax might confound an agent
that is attempting to be robust in its handling of syntax variations.
A bad actor could exploit such a weakness in order to get abuse or
malicious content through a filter. This section presents some
examples of such variations. Messages including them ought be
rejected; where this is not possible, recommended internal
interpretations are provided.
7.1.1. Host-Address Syntax
The following obsolete syntax attempts to specify source routing:
To: <@example.net:fran@example.com>
This means "send to fran@example.com via the mail service at
example.net". It can safely be interpreted as:
To: <fran@example.com>
7.1.2. Excessive Angle Brackets
The following over-use of angle brackets, e.g.:
To: <<<user2@example.org>>>
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can safely be interpreted as:
To: <user2@example.org>
7.1.3. Unbalanced Angle Brackets
The following use of unbalanced angle brackets:
To: <another@example.net
To: second@example.org>
can usually be treated as:
To: <another@example.net>
To: second@example.org
7.1.4. Unbalanced Parentheses
The following use of unbalanced parentheses:
To: (Testing <fran@example.com>
To: Testing) <sam@example.com>
should be interpreted as:
To: (Testing) <fran@example.com>
To: "Testing)" <sam@example.com>
7.1.5. Commas in Address Lists
This use of an errant comma:
To: <third@example.net, fourth@example.net>
can reasonably be interpreted as ending an address, so the above
should really be interpreted as:
To: third@example.net, fourth@example.net
7.1.6. Unbalanced Quotes
The following use of unbalanced quotation marks:
To: "Joe <joe@example.com>
leaves software with no obvious "good" interpretation. If it is
essential to extract an address from the above, one possible
interpretation is:
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To: "Joe <joe@example.com>"@example.net
where "example.net" is the domain name or host name of the handling
agent making the interpretation. Another possible interpretation is
simply:
To: "Joe" <joe@example.com>
7.1.7. Naked Local-Parts
[MAIL] defines a local-part as the user portion of an email address,
and the display-name as the "user-friendly" label that accompanies
the address specification.
Some broken submission agents might introduce messages with only a
local-part or only a display-name and no properly formed address.
For example:
To: Joe
A submission agent ought to reject this or, at a minimum, append "@"
followed by its own host name or some other valid name likely to
enable a reply to be delivered to the correct mailbox. Where this is
not done, an agent receiving such a message will probably be
successful by synthesizing a valid header field for evaluation using
the techniques described in Section 7.6.
7.2. Non-Header Lines
Some messages contain a line of text in the header that is not a
valid message header field of any kind. For example:
From: user@example.com {1}
To: userpal@example.net {2}
Subject: This is your reminder {3}
about the football game tonight {4}
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 20:53:35 -0400 {5}
Don't forget to meet us for the tailgate party! {7}
The cause of this is typically a bug in a message generator of some
kind. Line {4} was intended to be a continuation of line {3}; it
should have been indented by whitespace as set out in Section 2.2.3
of [MAIL].
This anomaly has varying impacts on processing software, depending on
the implementation:
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1. some agents choose to separate the header of the message from the
body only at the first empty line (i.e. a CRLF immediately
followed by another CRLF);
2. some agents assume this anomaly should be interpreted to mean the
body starts at line {4}, as the end of the header is assumed by
encountering something that is not a valid header field or folded
portion thereof;
3. some agents assume this should be interpreted as an intended
header folding as described above and thus simply append a single
space character (ASCII 0x20) and the content of line {4} to that
of line {3};
4. some agents reject this outright as line {4} is neither a valid
header field nor a folded continuation of a header field prior to
an empty line.
This can be exploited if it is known that one message handling agent
will take one action while the next agent in the handling chain will
take another. Consider, for example, a message filter that searches
message headers for properties indicative of abusive of malicious
content that is attached to a Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) implementing
option 2 above. An attacker could craft a message that includes this
malformation at a position above the property of interest, knowing
the MTA will not consider that content part of the header, and thus
the MTA will not feed it to the filter, thus avoiding detection.
Meanwhile, the Mail User Agent (MUA) which presents the content to an
end user, implements option 1 or 3, which has some undesirable
effect.
It should be noted that a few implementations choose option 4 above
since any reputable message generation program will get header
folding right, and thus anything so blatant as this malformation is
likely an error caused by a malefactor.
The preferred implementation if option 4 above is not employed is to
apply the following heuristic when this malformation is detected:
1. Search forward for an empty line. If one is found, then apply
option 3 above to the anomalous line, and continue.
2. Search forward for another line that appears to be a new header
field, i.e., a name followed by a colon. If one is found, then
apply option 3 above to the anomalous line, and continue.
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7.3. Unusual Spacing
The following message is valid per [MAIL]:
From: user@example.com {1}
To: userpal@example.net {2}
Subject: This is your reminder {3}
{4}
about the football game tonight {5}
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 20:53:35 -0400 {6}
Don't forget to meet us for the tailgate party! {8}
Line {4} contains a single whitespace. The intended result is that
lines {3}, {4}, and {5} comprise a single continued header field.
However, some agents are aggressive at stripping trailing whitespace,
which will cause line {4} to be treated as an empty line, and thus
the separator line between header and body. This can affect header-
specific processing algorithms as described in the previous section.
This example was legal in earlier versions of the Internet Mail
format standard.
The best handling of this example is for a message parsing engine to
behave as if line {4} was not present in the message and for a
message creation engine to emit the message with line {4} removed.
7.4. Header Malformations
Among the many possible malformations, a common one is insertion of
whitespace at unusual locations, such as:
From: user@example.com {1}
To: userpal@example.net {2}
Subject: This is your reminder {3}
MIME-Version : 1.0 {4}
Content-Type: text/plain {5}
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 20:53:35 -0400 {6}
Don't forget to meet us for the tailgate party! {8}
Note the addition of whitespace in line {4} after the header field
name but before the colon that separates the name from the value.
The acceptance grammar of [MAIL] permits that extra whitespace, so it
cannot be considered invalid. However, a consensus of
implementations prefers to remove that whitespace. There is no
perceived change to the semantics of the header field being altered
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as the whitespace is itself semantically meaningless. Therefore, it
is best to remove all whitespace after the field name but before the
colon and to emit the field in this modified form.
7.5. Header Field Counts
Section 3.6 of [MAIL] prescribes specific header field counts for a
valid message. Few agents actually enforce these in the sense that a
message whose header contents exceed one or more limits set there are
generally allowed to pass; they typically add any required fields
that are missing, however.
Also, few agents that use messages as input, including Mail User
Agents (MUAs) that actually display messages to users, verify that
the input is valid before proceeding. Some popular open source
filtering programs and some popular Mailing List Management (MLM)
packages select either the first or last instance of a particular
field name, such as From, to decide who sent a message. Absent
strict enforcement of [MAIL], an attacker can craft a message with
multiple fields if that attacker knows the filter will make a
decision based on one but the user will be shown the other.
This situation is exacerbated when message validity is assessed, such
as through enhanced authentication methods. Such methods might cover
one instance of a constrained field but not another, taking the wrong
one as "good" or "safe". An MUA, for example could show the first of
two From fields to an end user as "good" or "safe" while an
authentication method actually only verified the second.
In attempting to counter this exposure, one of the following can be
enacted:
1. reject outright or refuse to process further any input message
that does not conform to Section 3.6 of [MAIL];
2. remove or, in the case of an MUA, refuse to render any instances
of a header field whose presence exceeds a limit prescribed in
Section 3.6 of [MAIL] when generating its output;
3. where a field has a limited instance count, combine additional
instances into a single compound instance;
4. alter the name of any header field whose presence exceeds a limit
prescribed in Section 3.6 of [MAIL] when generating its output so
that later agents can produce a consistent result. Any
alteration likely to cause the field to be ignored by downstream
agents is acceptable. A common approach is to prefix the field
names with a string such as "BAD-".
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Selecting a mitigation action from the above list, or some other
action, must consider the needs of the operator making the decision,
and the nature of its user base.
7.6. Missing Header Fields
Similar to the previous section, there are messages seen in the wild
that lack certain required header fields. In particular, [MAIL]
requires that a From and Date field be present in all messages.
When presented with a message lacking these fields, the MTA might
perform one of the following:
1. Make no changes
2. Add an instance of the missing field(s) using synthesized content
based on data provided in other parts of the protocol
Option 2 is recommended for handling this case. Handling agents
should add these for internal handling if they are missing, but
should not add them to the external representation. The reason for
this advice is that there are some filter modules that would consider
the absence of such fields to be a condition warranting special
treatment (e.g., rejection), and thus the effectiveness of such
modules would be stymied by an upstream filter adding them in a way
visible to other components.
The synthesized fields should contain a best guess as to what should
have been there; for From, the SMTP MAIL command's address can be
used (if not null) or a placeholder address followed by an address
literal (e.g., unknown@[192.0.2.1]); for Date, a date extracted from
a Received field is a reasonable choice.
One other important case to consider is a missing Message-Id field.
An MTA that encounters a message missing this field should synthesize
a valid one using techniques described above and add it to the
external rpresentation, since many deployed tools use the content of
that field as a common unique message reference, so its absence
inhibits correlation of message processing. One possible synthesis
would be based on based on an encoding of the current date/time and
an internal MTA ID (e.g., queue ID) followed by @ and the fully
qualified hostname of the machine synthesizing the header value.
Whatever details are chosen, the key is to generate something
guaranteed to be unique.
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7.7. Return-Path
A valid message will have exactly one Return-Path header field, as
per Section 4.4 of [SMTP]. Should a message be encountered bearing
more than one, all but the topmost one is to be disregarded, as it is
most likely to have been added nearest to the mailbox that received
that message.
7.8. Repeated Header Fields
There are some occasions where repeated fields are encountered where
only one is expected. Two examples are presented. First:
From: reminders@example.com {1}
To: jqpublic@example.com {2}
Subject: Automatic Meeting Reminder {3}
Subject: 4pm Today -- Staff Meeting {4}
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 08:00:00 -0700 {5}
Reminder of the staff meeting today in the small {6}
auditorium. Come early! {7}
The message above has two Subject fields, which is in violation of
Section 3.6 of [MAIL]. A safe interpretation of this would be to
treat it as though the two Subject field values were concatenated, so
long as they are not identical, such as:
From: reminders@example.com {1}
To: jqpublic@example.com {2}
Subject: Automatic Meeting Reminder {3}
4pm Today -- Staff Meeting {4}
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 08:00:00 -0700 {5}
Reminder of the staff meeting today in the small {6}
auditorium. Come early! {7}
Second:
From: president@example.com {1}
From: vice-president@example.com {2}
To: jqpublic@example.com {3}
Subject: A note from the E-Team {4}
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 08:00:00 -0700 {5}
This memo is to remind you of the corporate dress {6}
code. Attached you will find an updated copy of {7}
the policy. {8}
...
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As with the first example, there is a violation in terms of the
number of instances of the From field. A likely safe interpretation
would be to combine these into a comma-separated address list in a
single From field:
From: president@example.com, {1}
vice-president@example.com {2}
To: jqpublic@example.com {3}
Subject: A note from the E-Team {4}
Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2010 08:00:00 -0700 {5}
This memo is to remind you of the corporate dress {6}
code. Attached you will find an updated copy of {7}
the policy. {8}
...
7.9. Missing or Incorrect Charset Information
MIME provides the means to include textual material employing
charsets other than US-ASCII. Such material is required to have an
identifiable charset. Charset identification is done using a
"charset" parameter in the Content-Type header field, a character set
label within the MIME entity itself, or the character set may be
implicitly specified by the Content-Type (see [CHARSET]).
It is unfortunately fairly common for required character set
information to be missing or incorrect in textual MIME entities. As
such, processing agents should perform basic sanity checks, e.g.:
o US-ASCII is 7bit only, so 8bit material is necessarily not US-
ASCII.
o UTF-8 has a very specific syntactic structure that other 8bit
charsets are unlikely to follow.
o Null bytes (ASCII 0x00) are not allowed in either 7bit or 8bit
data.
o Not all 7bit material is US-ASCII. The presence of the various
escape sequences used for character switching may be used as an
indication of the various ISO-2022 charsets.
When a character set error is detected, processing agents should:
a. apply heuristics to determine the most likely character set and,
if successful, proceed using that information; or
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b. refuse to process the malformed MIME entity.
A null byte inside a textual MIME entity can cause typical string
processing functions to mis-identify the end of a string, which can
be exploited to hide malicious content from analysis processes.
Accordingly, null bytes require additional special handling.
A few null bytes in isolation is likely to be the result of poor
message construction practices. Such nulls should be silently
dropped.
Large numbers of null bytes are usually the result of binary material
that is improperly encoded, improperly labeled, or both. Such
material is likely to be damaged beyond the hope of recovery, so the
best course of action is to refuse to process it.
Finally, the presence of null bytes may be used as indication of
possible malicious intent.
7.10. Eight-Bit Data
Standards-compliant email messages do not contain any non-ASCII data
without indicating that such content is present by means of published
SMTP extensions. Absent that, MIME encodings are typically used to
convert non-ASCII data to ASCII in a way that can be reversed by
other handling agents or end users.
The best way to handle non-compliant 8bit material depends on its
location.
Non-compliant 8bit in MIME entity content should simply be processed
as if the necessary SMTP extensions had been used to transfer the
message. Note that improperly labeled 8bit material in textual MIME
entities may require treatment as described in Section 7.9.
Non-compliant 8bit in message or MIME entity header fields can be
handled as follows:
o Occurrences in unstructured text fields, comments, and phrases,
can be converted into encoded-words (see [MIME3] if a likely
character set can be determined. Alternatively, 8bit characters
can be removed or replaced with some other character.
o Occurrences in header fields whose syntax is unknown may be
handled by dropping the field entirely or by removing/replacing
the 8bit character as described above.
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o Occurrences in addresses are especially problematic. Agents
supporting [EAI] may, if the 8bit conforms to 8bit syntax, elect
to treat the messages as an EAI message and process it
accordingly. Otherwise, it is in most cases best to exclude the
address from any sort of processing -- which may mean dropping it
entirely -- since any attempt to fix interpret it definitively is
unlikely to be successful.
8. MIME Anomalies
[MIME], et seq, include a mechanism of message extensions for
providing text in character sets other than ASCII, non-text
attachments to messages, multi-part message bodies, and similar
facilities.
Some anomalies with MIME-compliant generation are also common. This
section discusses some of those and presents preferred mitigations.
8.1. Missing MIME-Version Field
Any message that uses [MIME] constructs is required to have a MIME-
Version header field. Without it, the Content-Type and associated
fields have no semantic meaning.
It is often observed that a message has complete MIME structure, yet
lacks this header field. It is prudent to disregard this absence and
conduct analysis of the message as if it were present, especially by
agents attempting to identify malicious material.
Further, the absence of MIME-Version might be an indication of
malicious intent, and extra scrutiny of the message may be warranted.
Such omissions are not expected from compliant message generators.
8.2. Faulty Encodings
There have been a few different specifications of base64 in the past.
The implementation defined in [MIME] instructs decoders to discard
characters that are not part of the base64 alphabet. Other
implementations consider an encoded body containing such characters
to be completely invalid. Very early specifications of base64 (see
[PEM], for example) allowed email-style comments within base64-
encoded data.
The attack vector here involves constructing a base64 body whose
meaning varies given different possible decodings. If a security
analysis module wishes to be thorough, it should consider scanning
the possible outputs of the known decoding dialects in an attempt to
anticipate how the MUA will interpret the data.
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9. Body Anomalies
9.1. Oversized Lines
A message containing a line of content that exceeds 998 characters
plus the line terminator (1000 total) violates Section 2.1.1 of
[MAIL]. Some handling agents may not look at content in a single
line past the first 998 bytes, providing bad actors an opportunity to
hide malicious content.
There is no specified way to handle such messages, other than to
observe that they are non-compliant and reject them, or rewrite the
oversized line such that the message is compliant.
To ensure long lines do not prevent analysis of potentially malicious
data, handling agents are strongly encouraged to take one of the
following actions:
1. Break such lines into multiple lines at a position that does not
change the semantics of the text being thus altered. For
example, breaking an oversized line such that a [URI] then spans
two lines could inhibit the proper identification of that URI.
2. Rewrite the MIME part (or the entire message if not MIME) that
contains the excessively long line using a content encoding that
breaks the line in the transmission but would still result in the
line being intact on decoding for presentation to the user. Both
of the encodings declared in [MIME] can accomplish this.
10. Security Considerations
The discussions of the anomalies above and their prescribed solutions
are themselves security considerations. The practises enumerated in
this document are generally perceived as attempts to resolve security
considerations that already exist rather than introducing new ones.
However, some of the attacks described here may not have appeared in
previous email specifications.
11. IANA Considerations
This document contains no actions for IANA.
[RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication.]
12. References
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12.1. Normative References
[MAIL] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
October 2008.
12.2. Informative References
[BINARYSMTP] Vaudreuil, G., "SMTP Service Extensions for
Transmission of Large and Binary MIME Messages",
RFC 3030, December 2000.
[CHARSET] Melnikov, A. and J. Reschke, "Update to MIME regarding
"charset" Parameter Handling in Textual Media Types",
RFC 6657, July 2012.
[DKIM] Allman, E., Callas, J., Delany, M., Libbey, M., Fenton,
J., and M. Thomas, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
Signatures", RFC 4871, May 2007.
[DSN] Moore, K. and G. Vaudreuil, "An Extensible Message
Format for Delivery Status Notifications", RFC 3464,
January 2003.
[EAI] Yang, A., Steele, S., and N. Freed, "Internationalized
Email Headers", RFC 6532, February 2012.
[EMAIL-ARCH] Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
July 2009.
[MIME] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet
Message Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[MIME3] Moore, K., "MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions) Part Three: Message Header Extensions for
Non-ASCII Text", RFC 2047, November 1996.
[PEM] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part I -- Message Encipherment and Authentication
Procedures", RFC 1113, August 1989.
[RFC733] Crocker, D., Vittal, J., Pogran, K., and D. Henderson,
Jr., "Standard for the Format of Internet Text
Messages", RFC 733, November 1977.
[SMTP] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008.
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[URI] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter,
"Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax",
RFC 3986, January 2005.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge the following for their review and
constructive criticism of this proposal: Dave Cridland, Dave Crocker,
Ned Freed, Jim Galvin, Tony Hansen, John Levine, Franck Martin, and
Timo Serainen
Authors' Addresses
Murray S. Kucherawy
EMail: superuser@gmail.com
Gregory N. Shapiro
EMail: gshapiro@sendmail.com
N. Freed
EMail: ned.freed@mrochek.com
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