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Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)
draft-ietf-avt-dtls-srtp-07

Yes

(Cullen Jennings)
(Pasi Eronen)

No Objection

(Chris Newman)
(Dan Romascanu)
(David Ward)
(Jari Arkko)
(Jon Peterson)
(Lars Eggert)
(Lisa Dusseault)
(Mark Townsley)
(Ross Callon)
(Russ Housley)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.

Cullen Jennings Former IESG member
(was Discuss, Yes) Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Pasi Eronen Former IESG member
Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Chris Newman Former IESG member
(was Discuss, No Objection) No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
David Ward Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Jon Peterson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Lars Eggert Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Lisa Dusseault Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
(was Discuss) No Objection
No Objection (2008-11-06) Unknown
Section 3:

"This improves the cryptographic
   performance of DTLS, but may cause problems when RTCP and RTP are
   subject to different network treatment (e.g., for bandwidth
   reservation or scheduling reasons.)"
   
The above sentence seems so backwards. If you multiplex them together then they can't be subject to different treatment. And the reasons seems to be wrong ones for arguing against multiplexing. The three main reasons why RTP and RTCP isn't multiplex as stated in the MUX draft are: Simplicity, effiency and 3rd party monitoring. Especially the last is hard to combine with encryption services, especially such that perform setup point to point.
Mark Townsley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Ross Callon Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Tim Polk Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2008-11-06) Unknown
Section 4.2, immediately before Figure 1:

A brief statement that the master key and master salt are provided to the SRTCP key
derivation function seems to be missing here.  These invocations are implied by Figure
1, but are conspicuously absent from the text.