Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Security Mechanism
draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-08

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (avtcore WG)
Last updated 2011-10-31 (latest revision 2010-07-01)
Replaces draft-perkins-avt-srtp-not-mandatory
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
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Document shepherd Roni Even
IESG IESG state IESG Evaluation::AD Followup
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Needs a YES.
Responsible AD Robert Sparks
IESG note Tom Taylor (tom111.taylor@bell.net) is PROTO Shepherd.
Send notices to avt-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org, tom111.taylor@bell.net
Network Working Group                                         C. Perkins
Internet-Draft                                     University of Glasgow
Intended status: Informational                             M. Westerlund
Expires: May 3, 2012                                            Ericsson
                                                        October 31, 2011

          Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Security Mechanism
                draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-08.txt

Abstract

   This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia
   sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP),
   and the associated RTP control protocol (RTCP), do not mandate a
   single media security mechanism.  It also discusses how applications
   using RTP can meet the goals of BCP 61 to have strong and mandatory
   to implement security.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  RTP Applications and Deployment Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Implications for RTP Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Implications for Key Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  On the Requirement for Strong Security in IETF protocols . . .  7
   6.  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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1.  Introduction

   The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550] is widely used for
   voice over IP, Internet television, video conferencing, and various
   other real-time and streaming media applications.  Despite this, the
   base RTP specification provides very limited options for media
   security, and defines no standard key exchange mechanism.  Rather, a
   number of extensions are defined to provide confidentiality and
   authentication of RTP media streams and RTCP control messages, and to
   exchange security keys.  This memo outlines why it is appropriate
   that multiple extension mechanisms are defined, rather than mandating
   a single security and keying mechanism.

   The consensus for Strong Security Requirements  for IETF Standard
   Protocols (BCP61) [RFC3365] describes the Danvers Doctrine, which
   states that:

      "The solution is that we MUST implement strong security in all
      protocols to provide for the all too frequent day when the
      protocol comes into widespread use in the global Internet."

   BCP 61 also discusses that security must be implemented, and makes
   the following statement:

      "However security must be a MUST IMPLEMENT so that end users will
      have the option of enabling it when the situation calls for it."

   This IETF consensus provides a clear challange for RTP security, due
   to the heterogenous scenarios in which RTP can be used, and the wide
   choice of security mechanisms available.  This memo describes how RTP
   based applications, or classes of applications, can best meet the
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