Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution
draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-11

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (avtcore WG)
Last updated 2012-11-28 (latest revision 2012-11-19)
Replaces draft-perkins-avt-srtp-not-mandatory
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
Formats pdf htmlized bibtex
Reviews
Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Roni Even
IESG IESG state AD is watching
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD Robert Sparks
IESG note Tom Taylor (tom111.taylor@bell.net) is PROTO Shepherd.
Send notices to avt-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org, tom111.taylor@bell.net
Network Working Group                                         C. Perkins
Internet-Draft                                     University of Glasgow
Intended status: Informational                             M. Westerlund
Expires: May 23, 2013                                           Ericsson
                                                       November 19, 2012

 Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single
                        Media Security Solution
                draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-11.txt

Abstract

   This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia
   sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP),
   and the associated RTP control protocol (RTCP), do not mandate a
   single media security mechanism.  Guidelines for designers and
   reviewers of future RTP extensions are provided, to ensure that
   appropriate security mechanisms are mandated, and that any such
   mechanisms are specified in a manner that conforms with the RTP
   architecture.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 23, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Perkins & Westerlund      Expires May 23, 2013                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft     Securing the RTP Protocol Framework     November 2012

   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  RTP Applications and Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  RTP Media Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  RTP Session Establishment and Key Management  . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  On the Requirement for Strong Security in Framework
       protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   6.  Guidelines for Securing the RTP Protocol Framework  . . . . . . 6
   7.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   11. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Perkins & Westerlund      Expires May 23, 2013                  [Page 2]
Internet-Draft     Securing the RTP Protocol Framework     November 2012

1.  Introduction

   The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550] is widely used for
   voice over IP, Internet television, video conferencing, and other
   real-time and streaming media applications.  Despite this use, the
   basic RTP specification provides only limited options for media
   security, and defines no standard key exchange mechanism.  Rather, a
   number of extensions are defined that can provide confidentiality and
   authentication of RTP media streams and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)
   messages.  Other mechanisms define key exchange protocols.  This memo
   outlines why it is appropriate that multiple extension mechanisms are
   defined rather than mandating a single security and keying mechanism.

   The IETF policy on Strong Security Requirements for IETF Standard
   Protocols [RFC3365] (the so-called "Danvers Doctrine") states that
   "we MUST implement strong security in all protocols to provide for
   the all too frequent day when the protocol comes into widespread use
   in the global Internet".  The mechanisms defined for use with RTP
   allow these requirements to be met.  However, since RTP is a protocol
   framework that is suitable for a wide variety of use cases, there is
   no single security mechanism that is suitable for every scenario.
Show full document text