Guidelines for Use of the RTP Monitoring Framework
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 18 and is now closed.
(Robert Sparks) (was Discuss, Yes) Yes
(Ron Bonica) No Objection
(Stewart Bryant) No Objection
(Gonzalo Camarillo) No Objection
Benoit Claise (was Discuss) No Objection
Thanks for addressing all my points. For the record, I want to stress I didn't request, part of my review, the addition of the following sentence (added in version 22) part of my review: New RTCP XR report block definitions should not define new performance metrics, but should rather refer to metrics defined elsewhere
(Wesley Eddy) No Objection
(Adrian Farrel) No Objection
Stephen Farrell No Objection
Comment (2012-09-11 for -19)
Saying "encryption of the monitoring report is recommended" seems a bit trite. I'm not asking that you define precisely how to secure all possible RTP deployment choices, but perhaps the right thing to do here is to say that these metrics SHOULD be secured to the same extent as the RTP flows that they measure. (Or some such.) How could you encrypt traffic for a 3rd party monitor without knowing who that monitor is? That seems somewhat impossible in general. So, as pointed out by the secdir review  the document should at least recognise the problem and maybe describe some environments where it can in fact be solved.  http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg03465.html
(Brian Haberman) No Objection
(Russ Housley) No Objection
Comment (2012-09-09 for -18)
The authors report than changes are pending to handle the editorial comments raised in the Gen-ART Review by Meral Shirazipour on 31-Jul-2012. I hope the updated I-D will be posted prior to IESG approval of this document.
(Barry Leiba) No Objection
Comment (2012-09-12 for -19)
Please consider expanding "RTP" in the first line of the Abstract.