Options for Securing RTP Sessions
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-01

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Last updated 2012-10-22
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Network Working Group                                      M. Westerlund
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                C. Perkins
Expires: April 25, 2013                            University of Glasgow
                                                        October 22, 2012

                   Options for Securing RTP Sessions
               draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-01

Abstract

   The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is used in a large number of
   different application domains and environments.  This hetrogeneity
   implies that different security mechanisms are needed to provide
   services such as confidentiality, integrity and source authentication
   of RTP/RTCP packets suitable for the various environments.  The range
   of solutions makes it difficult for RTP-based application developers
   to pick the most suitable mechanism.  This document provides an
   overview of a number of security solutions for RTP, and gives
   guidance for developers on how to choose the appropriate security
   mechanism.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Point to Point Sessions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  Sessions Using an RTP Mixer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  Sessions Using an RTP Translator . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.1.  Transport Translator (Relay) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.2.  Gateway  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       2.3.3.  Media Transcoder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.4.  Any Source Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.5.  Source-Specific Multicast  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   3.  Security Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.1.  Secure RTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.1.1.  Key Management for SRTP: DTLS-SRTP . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.1.2.  Key Management for SRTP: MIKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.1.3.  Key Management for SRTP: Security Descriptions . . . . 13
       3.1.4.  Key Management for SRTP: Encrypted Key Transport . . . 14
       3.1.5.  Key Management for SRTP: Other systems . . . . . . . . 14
     3.2.  RTP Legacy Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.3.  IPsec  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.4.  DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     3.5.  TLS over TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     3.6.  Payload-only Security Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       3.6.1.  ISMA Encryption and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . 17
   4.  Securing RTP Applications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.1.  Application Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       4.1.1.  Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       4.1.2.  Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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