Encrypted Key Transport for Secure RTP
draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-02
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Expired".
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | David McGrew , Dan Wing | ||
| Last updated | 2014-08-18 (Latest revision 2014-02-14) | ||
| Replaces | draft-ietf-avt-srtp-ekt | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | Magnus Westerlund | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Encrypted Key Transport (EKT) is an extension to Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that provides for the secure transport of SRTP master keys, Rollover Counters, and other information. This facility enables SRTP to work for decentralized conferences with minimal control. This note defines EKT, and also describes how to use it with SDP Security Descriptions, DTLS-SRTP, and MIKEY. With EKT, these other key management protocols provide an EKT key to everyone in a session, and EKT coordinates the SRTP keys within the session.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)