Babel Routing Protocol over Datagram Transport Layer Security
draft-ietf-babel-dtls-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (babel WG)
Last updated 2018-11-14
Replaces draft-decimo-babel-dtls
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Network Working Group                                          A. Decimo
Internet-Draft                         IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Updates: 6126bis (if approved)                               D. Schinazi
Intended status: Standards Track                              Google LLC
Expires: May 18, 2019                                      J. Chroboczek
                                       IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
                                                       November 14, 2018

     Babel Routing Protocol over Datagram Transport Layer Security
                        draft-ietf-babel-dtls-02

Abstract

   The Babel Routing Protocol does not contain any means to authenticate
   neighbours or protect messages sent between them.  This documents
   describes a mechanism to ensure these properties, using Datagram
   Transport Layer Security (DTLS).  This document updates RFC 6126bis.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 18, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Operation of the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  DTLS Connection Initiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Protocol Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Transmission  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.5.  Neighbour table entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.6.  Simultaneous operation of both Babel over DTLS and
           unprotected Babel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Interface Maximum Transmission Unit Issues  . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The Babel Routing Protocol [RFC6126bis] does not contain any means to
   authenticate neighbours or protect messages sent between them.
   Because of this, an attacker is able to send maliciously crafted
   Babel messages which could lead a network to route traffic to an
   attacker or to an under-resourced target causing denial of service.
   This documents describes a mechanism to prevent such attacks, using
   Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347].

1.1.  Specification of Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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1.2.  Applicability

   The protocol described in this document protects Babel packets with
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