Babel Routing Protocol over Datagram Transport Layer Security
draft-ietf-babel-dtls-07
| The information below is for an old version of the document | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (babel WG) | |
| Authors | Antonin Décimo , David Schinazi , Juliusz Chroboczek | ||
| Last updated | 2019-08-08 (latest revision 2019-07-05) | ||
| Replaces | draft-decimo-babel-dtls | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Donald Eastlake | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2019-02-08) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
Has enough positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Martin Vigoureux | ||
| Send notices to | Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - Actions Needed | |
Network Working Group A. Decimo
Internet-Draft IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Intended status: Standards Track D. Schinazi
Expires: January 6, 2020 Google LLC
J. Chroboczek
IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
July 5, 2019
Babel Routing Protocol over Datagram Transport Layer Security
draft-ietf-babel-dtls-07
Abstract
The Babel Routing Protocol does not contain any means to authenticate
neighbours or protect messages sent between them. This document
specifies a mechanism to ensure these properties, using Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Decimo, et al. Expires January 6, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Babel over DTLS July 2019
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Operation of the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. DTLS Connection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Protocol Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.5. Neighbour table entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.6. Simultaneous operation of both Babel over DTLS and
unprotected Babel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Interface Maximum Transmission Unit Issues . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The Babel Routing Protocol [RFC6126bis] does not contain any means to
authenticate neighbours or protect messages sent between them.
Because of this, an attacker is able to send maliciously crafted
Babel messages which could lead a network to route traffic to an
attacker or to an under-resourced target causing denial of service.
This document specifies a mechanism to prevent such attacks, using
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347].
1.1. Specification of Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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1.2. Applicability
The protocol described in this document protects Babel packets with
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