HMAC authentication for the Babel routing protocol
draft-ietf-babel-hmac-02
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2018-12-23
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draft-do-babel-hmac
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Donald Eastlake
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Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
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Network Working Group C. Do
Internet-Draft W. Kolodziejak
Obsoletes: 7298 (if approved) J. Chroboczek
Updates: 6126bis (if approved) IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Intended status: Standards Track December 23, 2018
Expires: June 26, 2019
HMAC authentication for the Babel routing protocol
draft-ietf-babel-hmac-02
Abstract
This document describes a cryptographic authentication for the Babel
routing protocol that has provisions for replay avoidance. This
document updates RFC 6126bis and obsoletes RFC 7298.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 26, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Do, et al. Expires June 26, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft HMAC authentication for Babel December 2018
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Assumptions and security properties . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conceptual overview of the protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. The Interface Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. The Neighbour table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. HMAC computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Packet Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Packet Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Expiring per-neighbour state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. HMAC TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. PC TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Challenge Request TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Challenge Reply TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Incremental deployment and key rotation . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Changes from previous versions . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B.1. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00 . . . . . . . . . 16
B.2. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00 . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
By default, the Babel routing protocol trusts the information
contained in every UDP packet it receives on the Babel port. An
attacker can redirect traffic to itself or to a different node in the
network, causing a variety of potential issues. In particular, an
attacker might:
o spoof a Babel packet, and redirect traffic by announcing a smaller
metric, a larger seqno, or a longer prefix;
o spoof a malformed packet, which could cause an insufficiently
robust implementation to crash or interfere with the rest of the
network;
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