HMAC authentication for the Babel routing protocol
draft-ietf-babel-hmac-06

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Network Working Group                                              C. Do
Internet-Draft                                            W. Kolodziejak
Obsoletes: 7298 (if approved)                              J. Chroboczek
Intended status: Standards Track       IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Expires: December 22, 2019                                 June 20, 2019

           HMAC authentication for the Babel routing protocol
                        draft-ietf-babel-hmac-06

Abstract

   This document describes a cryptographic authentication mechanism for
   the Babel routing protocol that has provisions for replay avoidance.
   This document updates RFC 6126bis and obsoletes RFC 7298.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 22, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Do, et al.              Expires December 22, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        HMAC authentication for Babel            June 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Assumptions and security properties . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conceptual overview of the protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  The Interface Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  The Neighbour table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Protocol Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  HMAC computation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Packet Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Packet Reception  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Expiring per-neighbour state  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  HMAC TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  PC TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Challenge Request TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  Challenge Reply TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.2.  Informational References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix A.  Incremental deployment and key rotation  . . . . . .  17
   Appendix B.  Changes from previous versions . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     B.1.  Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00  . . . . . . . . .  18
     B.2.  Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-01  . . . . . . . . .  18
     B.3.  Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-02  . . . . . . . . .  18
     B.4.  Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-03  . . . . . . . . .  18
     B.5.  Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-04  . . . . . . . . .  19
     B.6.  Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-05  . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   By default, the Babel routing protocol trusts the information
   contained in every UDP datagram that it receives on the Babel port.
   An attacker can redirect traffic to itself or to a different node in
   the network, causing a variety of potential issues.  In particular,
   an attacker might: