MAC authentication for the Babel routing protocol
draft-ietf-babel-hmac-10
| The information below is for an old version of the document | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (babel WG) | |
| Authors | Clara Do , Weronika Kolodziejak , Juliusz Chroboczek | ||
| Last updated | 2019-08-16 | ||
| Replaces | draft-do-babel-hmac | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Donald Eastlake | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2019-03-12) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::AD Followup | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
Has enough positions to pass. |
||
| Responsible AD | Martin Vigoureux | ||
| Send notices to | Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
Network Working Group C. Do
Internet-Draft W. Kolodziejak
Obsoletes: 7298 (if approved) J. Chroboczek
Intended status: Standards Track IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Expires: February 18, 2020 August 17, 2019
MAC authentication for the Babel routing protocol
draft-ietf-babel-hmac-10
Abstract
This document describes a cryptographic authentication mechanism for
the Babel routing protocol that has provisions for replay avoidance.
This document obsoletes RFC 7298.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 18, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Do, et al. Expires February 18, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft MAC authentication for Babel August 2019
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Assumptions and security properties . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conceptual overview of the protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. The Interface Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. The Neighbour table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. MAC computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Packet Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Packet Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Expiring per-neighbour state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Incremental deployment and key rotation . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. MAC TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. PC TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3. Challenge Request TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.4. Challenge Reply TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Changes from previous versions . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.1. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00 . . . . . . . . . 19
A.2. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-01 . . . . . . . . . 19
A.3. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-02 . . . . . . . . . 19
A.4. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-03 . . . . . . . . . 19
A.5. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-04 . . . . . . . . . 20
A.6. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-05 . . . . . . . . . 20
A.7. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-06 . . . . . . . . . 20
A.8. Changes since draft-ietf-babel-hmac-07 . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
By default, the Babel routing protocol trusts the information
contained in every UDP datagram that it receives on the Babel port.
An attacker can redirect traffic to itself or to a different node in
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