Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures
draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-01

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (bfd WG)
Last updated 2012-07-02
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream WG state WG Document (wg milestone: Jan 2015 - Submit the cryptogra... )
Document shepherd None
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                           D. Zhang
Internet-Draft                                                    Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track                              M. Bhatia
Expires: January 4, 2013                                  Alcatel-Lucent
                                                              V. Manral
                                                     Hewlett-Packard Co.
                                                           July 03, 2012

             Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures
                       draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-01

Abstract

   This document describes the mechanism to authenticate Bidirectional
   Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol packets using Hashed Message
   Authentication Mode (HMAC) with the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
   algorithms.  The mechanism described uses the Generic Cryptographic
   Authentication and Generic Meticulous Cryptographic Authentication
   sections to carry the authentication data.  This document updates,
   but does not supercede, the cryptographic authentication mechanism
   specified in RFC 5880.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2013.

Copyright Notice

Zhang, et al.            Expires January 4, 2013                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                BFD HMAC-SHA                     July 2012

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Cryptographic Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Procedures at the Sending Side  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   4.  Procedure at the Receiving Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Zhang, et al.            Expires January 4, 2013                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                BFD HMAC-SHA                     July 2012

1.  Introduction

   The cryptographic authentication mechanisms specified in BFD
   [RFC5880] defines MD5 [RFC1321] and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1)
   algorithms to authenticate BFD packets.  The recent escalating series
   of attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack2] raise
   concerns about their remaining useful lifetime [RFC6151] [RFC6194].

   These attacks may not necessarily result in direct vulnerabilities
   for Keyed-MD5 and Keyed-SHA-1 digests as message authentication codes
   because the colliding message may not correspond to a syntactically
   correct BFD protocol packet.  Regardless, there is a need felt to
   deprecate MD5 and SHA-1 as the basis for the HMAC algorithm in favor
   of stronger digest algorithms.

   This document adds support for Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) defined
   in the US NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHS), which is defined by NIST
   FIPS 180-2 [FIPS-180-2].  [FIPS-180-2] includes SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
   256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.  The HMAC authentication mode defined in
   NIST FIPS 198 is used [FIPS-198].

   It is believed that [RFC2104] is mathematically identical to
Show full document text