Optimizing BFD Authentication
draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (bfd WG)
Last updated 2017-01-03
Replaces draft-mahesh-bfd-authentication
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Network Working Group                                    M. Jethanandani
Internet-Draft                                             Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track                               A. Mishra
Expires: July 9, 2017                                          A. Saxena
                                                       Ciena Corporation
                                                               M. Bhatia
                                                          Ionos Networks
                                                         January 5, 2017

                     Optimizing BFD Authentication
              draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-02

Abstract

   This document describes an optimization to BFD Authentication as
   described in Section 6.7 of BFD [RFC5880].

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 9, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Jethanandani, et al.      Expires July 9, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft             BFD Authentication               January 2017

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Authentication Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  NULL Auth TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Authenticating every BFD [RFC5880] packet with a Simple Password, or
   with a MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321] , or Secure Hash
   Algorithm (SHA-1) algorithms is computationally intensive process,
   making it difficult if not impossible to authenticate every packet -
   particularly at faster rates.  Also, the recent escalating series of
   attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack2] raise
   concerns about their remaining useful lifetime as outlined in Updated
   Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5
   Algorithm [RFC6151] and Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and
   SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC6194].  If replaced by stronger
   algorithms, the computational overhead, will make the task of
   authenticating every packet even more difficult to achieve.

   This document proposes that only BFD frames that signal a state
   change in BFD be authenticated.  Rest of the frames can be
   transmitted and received without authentication enabled.  Most frames
   that are transmitted and received have no state change associated
   with them.  Limiting authentication to frames that affect a BFD
   session state allows more sessions to be supported for
   authentication.  Moreover, most BFD frames that signal a state change
   are generally transmitted at a slower interval of 1s leaving enough
   time to compute the hash.
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