Key Derivation for Kerberos V5
draft-ietf-cat-kerb-key-derivation-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(cat WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Marc Horowitz | ||
| Last updated | 1996-11-27 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
In the Kerberos protocol [RFC1510], cryptographic keys are used in a number of places. In order to minimize the effect of compromising a key, it is desirable to use a different key for each of these places. Key derivation [Horowitz96] can be used to construct different keys for each operation from the keys transported on the network. For this to be possible, a small change to the specification is necessary.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)