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SLH-DSA for JOSE and COSE
draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus-05

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (cose WG)
Authors Michael Prorock , Orie Steele , Rafael Misoczki , Michael Osborne , Christine Cloostermans
Last updated 2024-10-20
Replaces draft-ietf-cose-post-quantum-signatures
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draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus-05
CBOR Object Signing and Encryption                            M. Prorock
Internet-Draft                                                  mesur.io
Intended status: Standards Track                               O. Steele
Expires: 23 April 2025                                         Transmute
                                                             R. Misoczki
                                                                  Google
                                                              M. Osborne
                                                                     IBM
                                                         C. Cloostermans
                                                                     NXP
                                                         20 October 2024

                       SLH-DSA for JOSE and COSE
                    draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus-05

Abstract

   This document describes JOSE and COSE serializations for SLH-DSA,
   which was derived from SPHINCS+, a Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
   based digital signature scheme.  This document does not define any
   new cryptography, only seralizations of existing cryptographic
   systems described in [FIPS-205].  Note to RFC Editor: This document
   should not proceed to AUTH48 until NIST completes paramater tuning
   and selection as a part of the PQC (https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/
   post-quantum-cryptography) standardization process.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://cose-
   wg.github.io/draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus/draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-
   plus.html.  Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the CBOR Object Signing
   and Encryption Working Group mailing list (mailto:cose@ietf.org),
   which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cose/.
   Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cose/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/cose-wg/draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2025.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The SLH-DSA Algorithm Family  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  SLH-DSA Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Validating public keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Side channel attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.3.  Randomness considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Additions to Existing Registries  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       6.1.1.  New COSE Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       6.1.2.  New JOSE Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     A.1.  JOSE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       A.1.1.  Key Pair  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       A.1.2.  Thumbprint  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       A.1.3.  JSON Web Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

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     A.2.  COSE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       A.2.1.  Key Pair  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       A.2.2.  Thumbprint URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       A.2.3.  COSE Sign 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   This document describes JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and
   CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) serializations for the
   Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (SLH-DSA), which was
   derived from Version 3.1 of SPHINCS+, a Post-Quantum Cryptography
   (PQC) based digital signature scheme.

   This document does not define any new cryptography, only
   serializations of existing cryptographic systems described in
   [FIPS-205].

   This document builds on the Algorithm Key Pair (AKP) type as defined
   in [I-D.draft-ietf-cose-dilithium].  The AKP type enables flexible
   representation of keys used across different post-quantum
   cryptographic algorithms, including SLH-DSA.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  The SLH-DSA Algorithm Family

   The SLH-DSA Signature Scheme is parameterized to support different
   security levels.

   This document requests the registration of the following algorithms
   in [IANA.jose]:

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   +====================+====================+====================+
   | Name               | alg                | Description        |
   +====================+====================+====================+
   | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s  | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s  | JSON Web Signature |
   |                    |                    | Algorithm for SLH- |
   |                    |                    | DSA-SHA2-128s      |
   +--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
   | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | JSON Web Signature |
   |                    |                    | Algorithm for SLH- |
   |                    |                    | DSA-SHAKE-128s     |
   +--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+
   | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f  | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f  | JSON Web Signature |
   |                    |                    | Algorithm for SLH- |
   |                    |                    | DSA-SHA2-128f      |
   +--------------------+--------------------+--------------------+

                 Table 1: JOSE algorithms for SLH-DSA

   This document requests the registration of the following algorithms
   in [IANA.cose]:

   +====================+=================+=====================+
   | Name               | alg             | Description         |
   +====================+=================+=====================+
   | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s  | TBD (requested  | CBOR Object Signing |
   |                    | assignment -51) | Algorithm for SLH-  |
   |                    |                 | DSA-SHA2-128s       |
   +--------------------+-----------------+---------------------+
   | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s | TBD (requested  | CBOR Object Signing |
   |                    | assignment -52) | Algorithm for SLH-  |
   |                    |                 | DSA-SHAKE-128s      |
   +--------------------+-----------------+---------------------+
   | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f  | TBD (requested  | CBOR Object Signing |
   |                    | assignment -53) | Algorithm for SLH-  |
   |                    |                 | DSA-SHA2-128f       |
   +--------------------+-----------------+---------------------+

                Table 2: COSE algorithms for SLH-DSA

4.  SLH-DSA Keys

   Private and Public Keys are produced to enable the sign and verify
   operations for each of the SLH-DSA Algorithms.  The SLH-DSA Algorithm
   Family uses the Algorithm Key Pair (AKP) key type, as defined in
   [I-D.draft-ietf-cose-dilithium].  This ensures compatibility across
   different cryptographic algorithms that use AKP for key
   representation.

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   The specific algorithms for SLH-DSA, such as SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, SLH-
   DSA-SHAKE-128s, and SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f, are defined in this document
   and are used in the alg value of an AKP key representation to specify
   the algorithm that corresponds to the key.  Like ML-DSA keys, SLH-DSA
   keys use the AKP Key Type.

   The thumbprints for SLH-DSA keys are also computed according to the
   process described in [I-D.draft-ietf-cose-dilithium]

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC7515], [RFC7517] and [RFC9053]
   applies to this specification as well.

   A detailed security analysis of SLH-DSA is beyond the scope of this
   specification, see [FIPS-205] for additional details.

   The following considerations apply to all parameter sets described in
   this specification.

5.1.  Validating public keys

   All algorithms in that operate on public keys require first
   validating those keys.  For the sign, verify and proof schemes, the
   use of KeyValidate is REQUIRED.

5.2.  Side channel attacks

   Implementations of the signing algorithm SHOULD protect the secret
   key from side-channel attacks.  Multiple best practices exist to
   protect against side-channel attacks.  Any implementation of the SLH-
   DSA signing algorithms SHOULD utilize the following best practices at
   a minimum:

   *  Constant timing - the implementation should ensure that constant
      time is utilized in operations

   *  Sequence and memory access persistance - the implementation SHOULD
      execute the exact same sequence of instructions (at a machine
      level) with the exact same memory access independent of which
      polynomial is being operated on.

   *  Uniform sampling - care should be given in implementations to
      preserve the property of uniform sampling in implementation and to
      prevent information leakage.

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5.3.  Randomness considerations

   It is recommended that the all nonces are from a trusted source of
   randomness.

6.  IANA Considerations

6.1.  Additions to Existing Registries

6.1.1.  New COSE Algorithms

   IANA is requested to add the following entries to the COSE Algorithms
   Registry.  The following completed registration templates are
   provided as described in RFC9053 and RFC9054.

6.1.1.1.  SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s

   *  Name: SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s

   *  Value: TBD (requested assignment -51)

   *  Description: CBOR Object Signing Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Reference: RFC XXXX

   *  Recommended: Yes

6.1.1.2.  SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s

   *  Name: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s

   *  Value: TBD (requested assignment -52)

   *  Description: CBOR Object Signing Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Reference: RFC XXXX

   *  Recommended: Yes

6.1.1.3.  SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f

   *  Name: SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f

   *  Value: TBD (requested assignment -53)

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   *  Description: CBOR Object Signing Algorithm for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Reference: RFC XXXX

   *  Recommended: Yes

6.1.2.  New JOSE Algorithms

   IANA is requested to add the following entries to the JSON Web
   Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry.  The following
   completed registration templates are provided as described in
   RFC7518.

6.1.2.1.  SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s

   *  Algorithm Name: SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s

   *  Algorithm Description: SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s as described in FIPS 205.

   *  Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg

   *  JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Value registry: [IANA.jose] Algorithms

   *  Specification Document(s): RFC XXXX

   *  Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): [FIPS-205]

6.1.2.2.  SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s

   *  Algorithm Name: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s

   *  Algorithm Description: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s as described in FIPS
      205.

   *  Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg

   *  JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Value registry: [IANA.jose] Algorithms

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   *  Specification Document(s): RFC XXXX

   *  Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): [FIPS-205]

6.1.2.3.  SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f

   *  Algorithm Name: SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f

   *  Algorithm Description: SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f as described in FIPS 205.

   *  Algorithm Usage Location(s): alg

   *  JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Value registry: [IANA.jose] Algorithms

   *  Specification Document(s): RFC XXXX

   *  Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): [FIPS-205]

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.draft-ietf-cose-dilithium]
              Prorock, M., Steele, O., Misoczki, R., Osborne, M., and C.
              Cloostermans, "ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-04, 20
              October 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-04>.

   [IANA.cose]
              IANA, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose>.

   [IANA.jose]
              IANA, "JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

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   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9053]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053,
              August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9053>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [FIPS-205] "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard", n.d.,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205>.

   [NIST-PQC-2022]
              "Selected Algorithms 2022", n.d.,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/
              selected-algorithms-2022>.

Appendix A.  Examples

A.1.  JOSE

A.1.1.  Key Pair

   {
     "kty": "AKP",
     "alg": "SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s",
     "pub": "V53SIdVF...uvw2nuCQ",
     "priv": "V53SIdVF...cDKLbsBY"
   }

          Figure 1: Example SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Private JSON Web Key

   {
     "kty": "AKP",
     "alg": "SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s",
     "pub": "V53SIdVF...uvw2nuCQ"
   }

          Figure 2: Example SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Public JSON Web Key

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A.1.2.  Thumbprint

   The thumbprint is computed as described in

A.1.3.  JSON Web Signature

   {
     "alg": "SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s"
   }

        Figure 3: Example SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Decoded Protected Header

   eyJhbGciOiJ...LCJraWQiOiI0MiJ9\
   .\
   eyJpc3MiOiJ1cm46d...XVpZDo0NTYifQ\
   .\
   5MSEgQ0dZB4SeLC...AAAAAABIhMUE

       Figure 4: Example SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Compact JSON Web Signature

A.2.  COSE

A.2.1.  Key Pair

   {                                   / COSE Key                    /
     1: 7,                             / AKP Key Type                /
     3: -51,                           / SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Algorithm /
     -1: h'7803c0f9...3f6e2c70',       / AKP Private Key             /
     -2: h'7803c0f9...3bba7abd',       / AKP Public Key              /
   }
   ~~~
   {: #SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s-private-cose-key title="Example SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Private COSE Key"}

   ~~~~ cbor-diag
   {                                   / COSE Key                    /
     1: 7,                             / AKP Key Type                /
     3: -51,                           / SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Algorithm /
     -2: h'7803c0f9...3bba7abd',       / AKP Public Key              /
   }

            Figure 5: Example SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s Public COSE Key

A.2.2.  Thumbprint URI

   TODO

A.2.3.  COSE Sign 1

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   / cose-sign1 / 18(
     [
       / protected / <<{
         / algorithm / 1 : -51 / SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s /
       }>>
       / unprotected / {},
       / payload / h'66616b65',
       / signature / h'53e855e8...0f263549'
     ]
   )

              Figure 6: Example SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s COSE Sign 1

Acknowledgments

   TODO acknowledge.

Authors' Addresses

   Michael Prorock
   mesur.io
   Email: mprorock@mesur.io

   Orie Steele
   Transmute
   Email: orie@transmute.industries

   Rafael Misoczki
   Google
   Email: rafaelmisoczki@google.com

   Michael Osborne
   IBM
   Email: osb@zurich.ibm.com

   Christine Cloostermans
   NXP
   Email: christine.cloostermans@nxp.com

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