Ed25519 for DNSSEC
draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-ed25519-00

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (curdle WG)
Authors Ondřej Surý  , Robert Edmonds 
Last updated 2016-01-28
Replaces draft-sury-dnskey-ed25519, draft-curdle-dnskey-ed25519
Replaced by RFC 8080, RFC 8080
Stream IETF
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Internet Engineering Task Force                                  O. Sury
Internet-Draft                                                    CZ.NIC
Intended status: Standards Track                              R. Edmonds
Expires: July 31, 2016                           Farsight Security, Inc.
                                                        January 28, 2016

                           Ed25519 for DNSSEC
                  draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-ed25519-00

Abstract

   This document describes how to specify Ed25519 keys and signatures in
   DNS Security (DNSSEC).  It uses the Ed25519 instance of the Edwards-
   curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 31, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for Ed25519 . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   DNSSEC, which is broadly defined in [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and
   [RFC4035], uses cryptographic keys and digital signatures to provide
   authentication of DNS data.  Currently, the most popular signature
   algorithm in use is RSA.  [RFC5933] and [RFC6605] later defined the
   use of GOST and NIST specified elliptic curve cryptography in DNSSEC.

   This document defines the use of DNSSEC's DS, DNSKEY, and RRSIG
   resource records (RRs) with a new signing algorithm: the Ed25519
   instance of the Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm.  A more
   thorough description of Ed25519 can be found in
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa].

   Ed25519 has a 128-bit security target, which is considered to be
   equivalent in strength to RSA with ~3000-bit keys.  Ed25519 public
   keys are 256 bits (32 bytes) long while signatures are 512 bits (64
   bytes) long.

   The usage of the Ed25519 algorithm in DNSSEC has advantages and
   disadvantages relative to RSA.  Ed25519 keys are much shorter than
   RSA keys.  At comparable strengths, Ed25519 keys are 352 bytes
   smaller than RSA-3072 keys.  Similarly, an Ed25519 signature saves
   320 bytes over an RSA-3072 signature.

   However, DNSSEC with RSA is not commonly deployed on the Internet
   with signatures as large as 3072 bits.  [RFC6781] contemplates the
   routine use of RSA-1024 and RSA-2048 in DNSSEC.  Even when compared
   to the use of RSA at reduced strengths, Ed25519 still provides
   substantially smaller keys and signatures.  The authors of Making the
   Case for Elliptic Curves in DNSSEC [ECCSIZE] study comes to
   conclusion that using Eliptic Curves in DNSSEC can effectively

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   prevent fragmentation of DNSSEC responses as well as significantly
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