Using DANE to Associate OpenPGP public keys with email addresses
draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-02

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Network Working Group                                         P. Wouters
Internet-Draft                                                   Red Hat
Intended status: Standards Track                          March 09, 2015
Expires: September 10, 2015

    Using DANE to Associate OpenPGP public keys with email addresses
                     draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-02

Abstract

   OpenPGP is a message format for email (and file) encryption, that
   lacks a standardized lookup mechanism to obtain OpenPGP public keys.
   This document specifies a method for securely publishing and locating
   OpenPGP public keys in DNS using a new OPENPGPKEY DNS Resource
   Record.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Wouters                Expires September 10, 2015               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        DANE for OpenPGP public keys            March 2015

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  The OPENPGPKEY Resource Record  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA component  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA wire format  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  The OPENPGPKEY RDATA presentation format  . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Location of the OPENPGPKEY record . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Email address variants  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  OpenPGP Key size and DNS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Response size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Email address information leak  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.3.  Forward security of OpenPGP versus DNSSEC . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  OPENPGPKEY RRtype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Appendix A.  Generating OPENPGPKEY records  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   To encrypt a message to a target recipient using OpenPGP [RFC4880],
   possession of the recipient's OpenPGP public key is required.  To
   obtain that public key, the sender's email client or MTA needs to
   know where to find the recipient's public key.  Once obtained, it
   needs to find some proof that the public key found actually belongs
   to the intended recipient.

   Obtaining a public key is not a straightforward process as there are
   no trusted standardized locations for publishing OpenPGP public keys
   indexed by email address.  Instead, OpenPGP clients rely on "well-
   known key servers" that are accessed using the HTTP Keyserver
   Protocol ("HKP") or manually by users using a variety of differently
   formatted front-end web pages.

   Currently deployed key servers have no method of validating any
   uploaded OpenPGP public key.  The key servers simply store and
   publish.  Anyone can add public keys with any identities and anyone
   can add signatures to any other public key using forged malicious
   identities.  Furthermore, once uploaded, public keys cannot be
   deleted.  People who did not pre-sign a key revocation can never
   remove their public key from these key servers once they lose their
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